VERNACULAR SOVEREIGNTIES

INDIGENOUS WOMEN CHALLENGING WORLD POLITICS

MANUELA LAVINAS PICQ

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Á Mama Tránsito

Cristina

y Sharita

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WE WERE seated in a coffee shop when my committee chair asked what I was going to do during my sabbatical. After six years of teaching, I had decided to give myself a year off to pursue a dream: to paraglide across the Himalayas. But given my junior scholar status, I did not dare reveal my vagabond plans to the prestigious senior faculty member sitting across from me. So I faked serious academic instead: I told Amrita Basu that I would be working on a new book project at my grandfather's house in France. Amrita immediately inquired about the topic, and I tried not to lose my composure as I collected my thoughts on the spot. All I could articulate was a persistent gut feeling: Indigenous women's struggles matter in world politics. I must have been convincing because Amrita contacted me a week later to offer a yearlong fellowship. I did not dare to refuse, and I put my trip on hold. I was young enough to think I would finish the book within the year (maybe two), then move on to my Himalayan flying. Ignorance is bliss. The book turned out to be a six-year adventure, and the Himalayas are still waiting for my wings.

Institutions were key in this adventure, which in fact started much earlier, when I moved to Ecuador in 2004. The Universidad San Francisco de Quito (USFQ) hired me as a fresh PhD and has been a lasting academic home. USFQ introduced me to the Andes, first in Quito, then encouraged me to spend two years as academic dean in a new campus in the foothills of Chimborazo (mostly because none of my colleagues were willing to move to Riobamba). Through the

years, USFQ has offered me institutional and human support to pursue the most unconventional ideas, even standing by me when I was brutally detained by the Ecuadorian government in 2015. Colleagues from USFQ were among the first at the hospital; deans visited me in detention; and others joined my legal defense in court. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., provided early support for my research on Indigenous women. Serendipity (and Amrita Basu) brought me back twice to Amherst College, where I started and finished this book as a Loewenstein Fellow. I am grateful for the solid intellectual and material support Amherst offered me—first as a young faculty member, then as a "scholar at risk"—and the reliable humor of Theresa and Steve Laizer in the Department of Political Science. In between, I undertook a major rewriting task during a year at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, which then continued at the Lateinamerika Institut, Freie Universität Berlin, thanks to the swift support of the desiguALdades.net project, which welcomed me immediately after I was expelled from Ecuador.

Beyond the institutional support, writing this book was more than anything a human adventure in which many people took part. I was always on the move or being moved. At first the book traveled with me, then it became my home. Many friends hosted the book and fed its writer: Michael Storper in Paris, Pablo Corral Vega in Quito, Sabina Rieck in Berlin, Juan Castro and Angelina Aspuac in Sacatepéquez. In southern France, I wrote in an abandoned warehouse surrounded by circus artists, an office so big one could bike into it. Yaku Pérez Guartambel patiently built me two offices in Cuenca after I found the first one too noisy. He often wrote next to me and shared more joy and sadness with me than either of us ever imagined possible.

It takes learning to write in movement, and I owe much to those who made me a writer. Tanya Golash-Boza taught me that writing is like running: a daily affair. Mujib Mashal and Naz Khan believed in my voice before I even knew it existed. My lasting teacher has been my mother, who raised me among books, shared her knowledge, and encouraged me with inexhaustible enthusiasm.

I am especially indebted to the scholars who worked with me on this book. Many are intellectual companions whom I have never met but whose insights and ideas have become inextricably entangled with my own. Others have nurtured me over the years, editing my writing and thinking. Sonia Correa sparked the initial ideas leading to this book without even knowing it. Marc Becker planted the seeds at a conference on "Ethnicity, Race and Indigenous Peoples" at the Latin American Studies Association, then accompanied their maturation

with tough editorial support and political disagreement. Andrew Canessa has been a close interlocutor who pushed my thinking while never losing sight of the epicurean dimension of life. I am thankful to those who read drafts and offered advice at the most god-awful hours, especially Antonia Carcelén-Estrada, Joan Scott, Freya Ridling, Marc Woons, and Pitagorino Shepardson. Subhankar Banerjee made it fun to organize the book's photography; Andy Anderson played with the map. I am especially grateful to the careful editorial assistance of Maristher Guevara, my rock, and Cristina Rey, a student organizer who shared the intense last stages of revision. Bill Smith has been my closest editor for years, my academic *pai de santo*, guiding the scholar in me as only he could.

It has been an honor as much as a pleasure to make these years of life work come together in a beautiful book with the dedicated editorial team at the University of Arizona Press. A special *mahsi cho* to Lianne Charlie, descendent of the Tagé Cho Hudän (Big River People), Northern Tutchone–speaking people of the Yukon. Thank you for your art on the cover and on the streets, may it awaken us all to the extractive fractures that destroy the territories and waterways of our children to come.

My deepest appreciation goes to the Kichwa peoples of the Ecuadorian Andes. They taught me beauty and strength, walking the *páramos* and eating *mote*. This book is not *for* them; it is *with* them. It is the fruit of thinking with Cristina and inquiring with Yaku, of learning freedom through the eyes of Gustavo and resilience from the words of Tránsito, of sharing the streets and prisons in the face of state violence.

Manuela Lavinas Picq
November 6, 2017

NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

THE KICHWA language is characterized by linguistic variations in sound and spelling. Because it was an oral language at the time of the European encounter, it does not have a single orthography, but a diverse heterography. Quechua, Quichua, and Kichwa are languages from a single family that acquired different forms throughout the Andes as they adapted to their regional histories, like Aymara and Kañari. These languages do not have a single form of pronunciation and feature substantial variations between the Quechua of Bolivia, the "Quichua colonial" from Cuzco, and vernacular forms of Kichwa spoken in Ecuador.

Kichwa is the most widely spoken Native language in the western hemisphere. In Ecuador alone, three million Indigenous people currently speak Kichwa. There are notable differences between the Kichwa spoken in the northern, central, and southern highlands of Ecuador and the Amazonian variations spoken in the lowlands. Regional geographies mark the spoken languages. The written ones are even more diverse because different linguists have interpreted the oral language into the roman alphabet in different historical contexts and according to conflicting political agendas. Indigenous linguists have challenged colonial translations. They have rejected the traditional spelling established by non-Natives, usually with *c* and *qu* (as in *Inca* and *Quichua*), adopting instead a simplified spelling of their own that favors the use of *k* and *w* (as in *Inka* and *Kichwa*).

As the language of the Andes, Kichwa is an entry into Andean epistemology. That is why Catalan philologist Antonio Rubió i Lluch had already warned in 1892 that true Indigenous poetry could only be expressed in Kichwa. Scholars discuss the history and politics of translating Kichwa because this language has been a site of resistance for centuries, where linguistic and social struggles interact (Carcelén-Estrada 2012). Spelling differences hold political connotations. One spelling refers to foreign translations of the language; the other to Indigenous choices that dissociate it from the colonizer's Castilian Spanish. These interpretations merit consideration as part of decolonial claims among Native linguists and translation scholars. I have adopted the Native spellings, respecting the preferences of Indigenous Kichwa linguists.

On the Western orthographic front, I capitalize the word *Indigenous*, which is the preferred style of Indigenous and Native peoples. It is also the format recommended by the *Chicago Manual of Style* (16th ed.), since names of ethnic and national groups are to be capitalized, including adjectives associated with these names. There is no reason to apply this rule to, say, "British English" and not to "Indigenous language." *Indigenous* refers to a political identity relational to the state, and like any nationality, it should be capitalized not only for grammatical accuracy, but to recognize that Indigenous belonging is a political stand.

ACRONYMS

CAOI	Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas / Andean Network of Indigenous Organizations
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CODENPE	Consejo de Desarrollo de los Pueblos y Nacionalidades del Ecuador / Council for the Development of the Peoples and Nationalities of Ecuador
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador / Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
CONAMU	Consejo Nacional de Mujeres / Women's National Council
CONFENIAE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana / Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon
CONMIE	Confederación de Mujeres Indígenas del Ecuador / Confederation of Indigenous Women of Ecuador
ECUARUNARI	Confederación de los Pueblos Kichwas del Ecuador / Confederation of Kichwa Peoples of Ecuador
EU	European Union
FEI	Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios / Ecuadorian Federation of Indians

FENOCIN	Federación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras / Ecuadorian Federation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organizations
FIMI	Foro Internacional de Mujeres Indígenas / International Indigenous Women's Forum
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILO 169	Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
REDCH	Red Provincial de Organizaciones de Mujeres Kichwas y Rurales de Chimborazo / Provincial Network of Kichwa and Rural Women Organizations of Chimborazo
UN	United Nations
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNPFII	United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
WCIP	World Council of Indigenous Peoples
WGIP	Working Group on Indigenous Populations

VERNACULAR SOVEREIGNTIES

Kilometers
0 25 50 100
N
W
E
S
Colombia
Quito
Ecuador
Montecristi
Mt. Chimborazo
Riobamba
Provincia de Chimborazo
Guayaquil
Ruta de Riobamba a Montecristi
Peru
South America
Map prepared by Andy Anderson, Amherst College
Sources: Esri, USGS, NOAA

INTRODUCTION

Indigenous Women in World Politics

INDIGENOUS WOMEN are rarely accounted for in world politics. They appear to embody Gayatri Spivak's subalterns who cannot speak: they have no power of self-definition, self-representation, or self-determination. They can easily be overlooked as voiceless remnants of the past, irrelevant to global modernity. When they are visible in global media, they are often represented as makers of colorful textiles, harvesters of millennia-old grains, or defenders of nature. Photographs in publications like *National Geographic* emphasize their cultural authenticity and harmonious interaction with nature, not their political complexity. If they appear in the international press, it is as a prop in climate talks that persistently fail to include their demands. Indigenous women are perceived far more often as static cultural artifacts than as dynamic political agents. They continue to be imagined as passive subjects at the margins of political decision-making, isolated in the peripheries of national and global politics. Most often, Indigenous women epitomize the antithesis of world politics.

It is therefore unsurprising that nobody paid attention to the Kichwa women advocating for gender parity during the 2008 constitutional reform in Ecuador. The small network comprising nearly one hundred Indigenous women from the highlands of Chimborazo achieved unparalleled legal rights. They made sure the Constitution guarantees women's decision-making power in the administration of Indigenous justice and influenced another twenty articles on collective

rights. It was the first constitution in Latin America to explicitly guarantee the rights of Indigenous women, the first worldwide to require gender parity in the administration of justice. However, this legal milestone went unnoticed: it was not mentioned in the press, nor did any social movements celebrate it. It was as if this impressive achievement had never happened, as is usually the case with the politics of peoples dismissed as marginal. This book investigates the politics of Indigenous women to argue that actions overlooked as irrelevant nonetheless shape state authority. From their positions of marginality, Indigenous women actively challenge state sovereignty and are more enmeshed in international relations than many would imagine.

The accomplishments of the Chimborazo women, while astounding, are by no means unique: Indigenous women have long been dynamic political actors who have partaken in international politics and shaped state practices using different forms of resistance. In Amazonia, women resisted colonial conquest from the beginning. They battled the men of Francisco de Orellana during the first Spanish journey down the Amazon River in 1534, thereby influencing the naming of the region.[1] In the sixteenth century, Indian women were already active litigators in Spanish courts (Gauderman 2003), constituting over half of the plaintiffs in cases of property litigation in Mexico (Kellogg 1995, 85). They led powerful uprisings against colonial invasions in the Andes through the eighteenth century, taking up arms or practicing underground rebellion as "witches" (Silverblatt 1987). Many led armed forces with their partners. In the 1782 siege of La Paz, Bartolina Sisa and Tupak Katari led powerful armies from opposite sides of the city; for months, Sisa alone controlled the rebellion (Ari Murillo 2003). Micaela Bastidas coordinated war strategies with Tupak Amaru II during the anticolonial marches in Cuzco. Indigenous women were also skillful diplomats. In North America, British settlers considered the Delawares to be a "nation of women" because women were central to diplomatic relations (Fur 2009). In the late 1770s Cherokees asked a British delegation, "Where are your women?"—highlighting their exclusion of women from treaty-making (Parisi and Corntassel 2007). Kichwa women shaped twentieth-century politics in Ecuador. Dolores Cacuango and Tránsito Amaguaña changed the course of the country's history when they led peasant strikes in the 1920s, founded the modern Indigenous movement, and created clandestine Kichwa schools (Rodas Morales 1985; Becker 2008a). Despite considerable efforts to write them out of history, Indigenous women have played a major role in shaping the worlds in which they lived.

Today, Indigenous women exercise political leadership worldwide, whether as official delegates for Indigenous Affairs at the United Nations (UN) or as ministers of justice in Canada. Ecuadorean governments on the right and the left have appointed Indigenous women to the posts of minister of foreign affairs and minister of communication; other women have been elected to Congress. That is to say, the invisibility of Indigenous women in high politics, in the past and in the present, is arguably more a consequence of our failure to recognize their agency than a result of their de facto absence. Their agency becomes evident if we only take the time to look for it. Indigenous women are kept invisible by selective political processes that deny their political influence. More than untold, their stories are unheard. The challenge for us is not merely to recognize their achievements, but to understand why they matter to world politics.

This book challenges conventional wisdom by arguing that Indigenous women are not only politically active but are also among the important forces reshaping states in Latin America. The example of Ecuador is particularly instructive for exploring Indigenous women's political agency for it is here that Kichwa women, despite facing overlapping oppressions, are achieving legal rights unparalleled in the world. My analysis emphasizes their sophisticated politics at the intersection of gender and ethnicity—their strategic use of international norms to guarantee vernacular rights. In the process, they reconcile enduring divisions between universal women's rights and particular rights to culture. Furthermore, Kichwa women successfully relocate legal authority from the state to Indigenous people in the form of a recognized Indigenous justice system. This legal reassemblage disrupts state-centric understandings of sovereignty as singular and homogenous. It also contests postcolonial state phobia and uses the state as an external arbitrator. Such politics defy hegemonic concepts of the international and expand our political imagination beyond the system of states. I refer to this architecture of legal authority as vernacular sovereignties.

As I call attention to the role of Indigenous women, it is important to understand the roots, as well as the limits, of their power in historical and cultural context. In the Andes, gender roles are largely rooted in cultural notions of gender complementarity, a crux of Andean world views. In Inkan times, women engaged in political rule with their male counterparts in systems of governance that considered feminine and masculine as opposites that complement each other (Webb 2012). This dual complementarity was an organizing principle of systems of inheritance and structures of authority. At the same time, in our

effort to recognize the significance of Indigenous women, we must be careful not to assume that Inkan notions of gender complementarity have remained unchanged or to overstate women's power today. While I insist on the significance of Indigenous women in politics, it would be an absurdity to portray them as powerful or autonomous (Nelson 1999). Indigenous women form some of the most vulnerable sectors in society, oppressed by a web of interlocking power structures along race, gender, and class lines (Smith 2005; Mallon 1995). Most Indigenous women have less access to formal education, basic health care, and judicial representation than men; they are excluded from politics; and they endure intense sexual violence. Sexism may be a colonial legacy, but it permeates Indigenous experiences today, including within communities (Rovira 1996). The colonial invasion brought forms of racism and sexism that racialized and feminized the subalterns (Canessa 2012; Wade 2009). This is why the specificities of Indigenous women's politics are relevant to a larger political analysis: to combat sexism is not only to tackle a problem that is prevalent within their communities but also to unravel the nexus that has informed the exercise of power since the arrival of Europeans.

Interdisciplinary approaches permit us to bring gender into Indigenous studies and Indigenous studies into world politics. In this book, I elucidate the significance of gender in Indigenous politics and bring this perspective to bear on the scholarly work that has established the importance of Indigenous movements in a gender-neutral manner. I also posit Indigenous women's experiences as a strategic perspective to rethink world politics, to challenge what makes up the political and where the international is located. Ultimately, this analysis weaves feminist perspectives with Indigenous and Native studies to expand conceptual debates on state sovereignty.

INDIGENEITY ENTERS HIGH POLITICS

Indigenous movements have become a key democratizing force in Latin America over the last generation. Although Indigenous peoples have a long history of political activism, the Indigenous uprising of June 1990 in Ecuador presaged a profound reformulation of politics across the region. This massive mobilization paralyzed the country for over a week and forced Ecuador's government to formally negotiate with Indigenous peoples. Uprisings contesting neoliberal policies and calling for a plurinational state continued through the

1990s. The result was an upsurge of Indigenous voices, which catalyzed the reformulation of national politics. In 1996 the Indigenous movement created its own political party, the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement.[2] Representatives were elected to Congress and appointed to ministerial positions, including Nina Pacari as minister of foreign affairs and Luis Macas as minister of agriculture. Pachakutik represented nearly 10 percent of the legislature in 1998, when a constitutional reform officially recognized Indigenous justice and bilingual education, coming to terms with multiculturalism but falling short of plurinationalism. Although Pachakutik's electoral success was short lived, it left an Indigenous imprint on Ecuadorian politics and across the region. In 2005 Bolivia elected the first Indigenous head of state in Latin America: Evo Morales consolidated Indigenous participation in high politics and inspired others to run for office. Before the end of the decade, Indigenous politics had profoundly redesigned the architecture of the state to formally account for Indigenous authority. Constitutional reforms redefined Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009) as plurinational states, revamping the sovereign nation-state into an archipelago of nations with a plurality of legal authorities.

As indigeneity became a viable electoral strategy, it acquired broad legitimacy and expanded across the political spectrum to non-Indigenous sectors. In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa never allied with Indigenous movements, in fact, quite the contrary since he repeatedly criminalized their leadership. Yet he frequently engaged Indigenous symbols by wearing ethnic shirts and using Kichwa words. He celebrated his presidential inauguration in the Kichwa village of Zumbahua together with Bolivian president Evo Morales.[3] He mainstreamed Indigenous concepts of *sumak kawsay* into governmental planning even though he pursued extractive industries in Indigenous territories.[4] Non-Indigenous electoral parties included Indigenous representatives in their ranks and interjected Indigenous symbols into electoral discourse. In the 2017 presidential campaign, both the political Right and Left were competing for the support of the Indigenous movement. The mainstreaming of Indigenous politics during the 1990s led more people to self-identify as Indians in the Andes, as reflected in Bolivia's national census (Canessa 2007, 208).

In the Andes, Indigenous agendas appealed to the electoral rhetoric of an emerging New Left. Early on, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) defined its political identity based on the common exclusion of peoples throughout the global south rather than on cultural difference. This clearly wove Indigenous politics of resistance into the larger fabric of social

justice, intertwining calls for self-determination with socioeconomic redistribution. The moral force of Indigenous politics rests not on cultural differences but on the history of exclusion that is constitutive of Indigenous identity (Jung 2008). Indigenous movements are not quintessentially about ethnicity; they are about social justice and the redistribution of resources (Canessa 2006). When Morales proclaimed, "We are all Indians," he was showing how Indigenous agendas echo the struggles of excluded peoples globally. Even as they criminalize Indigenous peoples defending their territories, Leftist governments continue to invoke Indigenous symbols to gain moral legitimacy.

The creation of international norms gave traction to Indigenous mobilization locally. The most powerful international treaty for Indigenous rights was signed in 1989: Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) explicitly guarantees Indigenous rights to self-determination through territorial autonomy, political participation, and prior consultation. In 2007 the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) expanded these principles to the international community of states. The two treaties were ratified across Latin America, validating Indigenous political authority and fueling transnational activism. The Continental Summits of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala (Becker 2008b) and the Andean Network of Indigenous Organizations (CAOI) are local enactments of global dynamics. Indigenous politics in Ecuador must be understood in relation to the international development of an Indigenous rights regime.

Recent scholarship has established the significance of Indigenous movements for state politics in the Andes (Canessa 2012; Postero 2007, 2017). Indigenous movements are significant in terms of how power is exercised, but also because they challenge the very rules of the game. Donna Lee Van Cott (2007) explains how Indigenous movements evolved into political parties, Raúl Madrid (2012) how they gather support across ethnic lines to win elections. Scholars have compared Indigenous movements across the region to stress how local struggles combining multiple voices have proposed radical forms of democracy (Cameron 2010; Lucero 2008; Van Cott 2008). Comparative studies with Bolivia and Peru have identified Ecuador as having Latin America's strongest Indigenous movement (Yashar 2005), while more tightly focused studies have analyzed how the 1990 uprising changed social relations with the state (Almeida et al. 1993; Lucas 2000; Whitten and Whitten 2011). Indigenous resistance has historically contributed to state-making, and Florencia Mallon (1995) explains how nation-states in Peru and Mexico were formed through the repression of

Indigenous movements in the nineteenth century. In Bolivia, state-making was an oligarchical endeavor that excluded popular Indigenous classes and constructed the nation "on the corpses produced by repression" (Mallon 1992, 46). Scholars have also mapped the historical depth of Indigenous politics. Sinclair Thomson (2002) draws on two hundred years of Indigenous resistance to better understand Evo Morales's ascendancy. In Ecuador, Marc Becker (2008a, 2010) analyzes the making of modern Indigenous politics from the Cayambe highlands to the party politics of Pachakutik and stresses complex Indigenous relationships with leftist politics. Mateo Martínez Abarca (2010) shows how Correa's Citizen Revolution excluded Indigenous organizations. Indigenous movements changed the way the state related to marginal social sectors, as well as how the state could be imagined altogether.

Scholarship on the salience of Indigenous movements for state-making is expanding, but there remains a stubborn blind spot centered on the role of women. Indigenous women are rarely at the core of political inquiry, which overlooks their singular politics at the intersection of gender and indigeneity. It is not simply that Indigenous women's political contributions should be studied so that we may understand Indigenous women qua women, but that a true understanding of Indigenous mobilization eludes us without an adequate consideration of their role. This book combines ethnographic research with secondary sources to recognize the full experience of Indigenous women in all their heterogeneity. Indigenous women suffer discrimination for being Indigenous, women, and (often) rural—exclusions that overlap to create a specific geography of oppression. I thus explore the work of Kichwa women in the province of Chimborazo, notably their successful use of international women's rights to frame national legislation on Indigenous justice. They employ international gender norms to negotiate legal guarantees at the intersections of a racist state system and Indigenous communities that reproduce sexist, patriarchal practices. Through these politics of intersectionality, Indigenous women create unique legal arrangements that combine international women's rights with collective rights to self-determination. Their singular positionality calls attention to the relatedness of their experiences. Far from isolated, they articulate international norms with constitutional reforms to invent practices of authority adapted to vernacular realities.

Although Indigenous women have actively participated in legal contestation and were deeply involved in the 1990s uprisings, their achievements have rarely made it onto library bookshelves. When they gain attention in social science

research, it is from scholars whose historical or ethnographic perspectives fail to establish their relevance in international politics. Historians and anthropologists have contributed few analyses of Indigenous women in Latin America (Gutiérrez Chong 2007; Graubart 2007; Smith 2005; Speed, Hernández-Castillo, and Stephen 2006). Mary Weismantel (1989) offers an ethnographic analysis of Indigenous women's lives in Zumbahua through food; Lynn Stephen's (2005) ethnography explores the realities of Zapotec weavers in Oaxaca, Mexico. Other studies trace the mobilization of Indigenous women's struggles for rights in the face of neoliberal interventions in Chile and Mexico (Richards 2004; Sieder and Sierra 2010; Speed 2007), analyzing how they address discriminatory gender norms in legally plural settings (Barrera 2016; Speed 2013). Stéphanie Rousseau and Anahi Morales Hudon (2017) offer a comparative analysis of the organizing trajectories of Indigenous women's movements in Peru, Mexico, and Bolivia. In Ecuador, historian Erin O'Connor (2007) analyzes gender dynamics in the development of Indian-state relations in the nineteenth century, stressing the role of gender in state-building in the first century of independence. Short biographies about Dolores Cacuango and Tránsito Amaguaña tell powerful life stories that have yet to be framed for today's politics (Rodas Morales 1985, 2005).

Scholarship has nevertheless largely failed to "dig in" to look more deeply at gender inequalities within Indigenous movements. Similarly, scholarly analyses have yet to "move out" to investigate the broader impact of Indigenous politics globally. I push existing debates at once "in" and "out" to tackle the significance of Indigenous women today from two complementary perspectives. Moving in, I explore tensions between gender and ethnicity within Indigenous movements in Ecuador, and I study the overlapping exclusions of Indigenous women to understand their intersectional positionality. Black feminism introduced the concept of intersectionality to refer to the interlocking systems of oppression, historically interconnected, and the multiple axes of inequality that socially locate women of color (Crenshaw 1989). For Indigenous women, gender inequality goes beyond sexism and racism to mean a foundational exclusion from the state. Moving out, I call attention to the international significance of Indigenous women's local politics. In the last two decades, Indigenous women have challenged various forms of exclusion through different strategies, transforming Indigenous movements' organizations and collective identities (Rousseau and Morales Hudon 2017). Just like Indigenous politics in Ecuador have had transnational impacts (Brysk 2000), Indigenous women's activism merits evaluation from an international perspective. In pursuing this project, I

intertwine indigeneity and gender to present unique perspectives that neither feminists nor scholars of Indigenous politics have yet confronted.

The impact of Indigenous women in Andean contexts is not without implications for world politics. Yet studies of the international seem uninterested. Indigenous movements are rarely approached from the perspective of international relations, much less Indigenous women. Anthropologists have emphasized the transnational dimension of Indigenous experiences today (De la Cadena and Starn 2007). Native and Indigenous studies scholars show the interaction of the global Indigenous movement with the UN system (Morgan 2011), arguing that global Indigenous politics are a subtle revolution that is changing the international system (Lightfoot 2016). Yet Indigenous studies remain largely confined to disciplinary niches and are rarely considered to explain world politics. The discipline of international relations conceptualizes the world system without taking into account Indigenous politics. Efforts to stress the significance of Indigenous politics in the Arctic (Shadian 2013) or Indigenous diplomacies (Beier 2009a) have yet to generate theoretical debates. Karena Shaw (2008) believes that scholars' disinterest in articulating the impact of Indigenous struggles on state sovereignty signals the colonial nature of a discipline that still considers Indigenous ontologies to be "inappropriate" subjects of political analysis. Indigeneity is not only an uncommon place to practice the international (Beier 2009b), but also a practice still invisible on the world stage.

This invisibility raises the broader problem of various peripheries excluded as irrelevant to the study of the political core. Indigenous peoples have been dismissed as irrelevant to world politics in the same way that the Haitian Revolution was not recognized as a critical juncture in the international history of state-making (Buck-Morss 2009). The absence of Indigenous politics from legitimate world politics seems to be the result of who defines political theory, from where, and for what purpose (Cox 1986) rather than serious historical considerations. Critical scholars emphasize Eurocentric racial dynamics in the conceptual organization of the world system (Hobson 2012; Vitalis 2010), not Indigenous perspectives. The study of world politics has yet to recognize the role of indigeneity (Tickner 2011), especially Indigenous women who are considered "more Indian" than their male counterparts (De la Cadena 1992).

This book makes two core arguments. First, I posit the importance of indigeneity in world politics. Indigenous politics constitute an important aspect of contemporary world politics, especially in Latin America, that impacts the international in meaningful ways. At a theoretical level, indigeneity forms a

unique positionality that contests hegemonic accounts of the world system, contributing political cosmologies that denaturalize the state as the sole locus of the political (Beier 2005). Indigenous politics permit an approach to the international beyond state centrism. The second argument of this book has to do with the specific role of Indigenous women. The gender component implies a distinct approach to world politics: Indigenous women do not seek self-determination but instead advocate for autonomy *with gender accountability*. Indigenous women are aware of the multiple sources of discrimination and oppression they face, and they use Indigenous, national, and international legal systems to reconfigure state authority in unique ways. Ecuador is the perfect place in which to explore these issues because it is home to some of the world's most vibrant Indigenous politics. Most importantly, it is in Ecuador where Kichwa women have achieved legislation unparalleled anywhere else in the world regarding gender parity within collective rights. This book is not intended to be just one more study of Ecuador; rather, I consider Ecuador in order to make a much broader argument about Indigenous world politics in general and the experiences of Indigenous women in particular.

THEORY FROM THE PERIPHERY

Kichwa women's politics challenge conceptual canons by showing how the non-core interacts with the core. The experiences of Kichwa women in Ecuador suggest that serious engagement with assumed peripheries can disrupt established thinking in the core—in their case, opening fruitful theoretical spaces in which to analyze gender dynamics within Indigenous movements and for rethinking state sovereignty. Postcolonial studies have long argued that the core and the non-core are inherently connected. Anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff (2012) propose a "theory from the South" not only because African modernity has always had its own trajectories but also because North and South are relational categories. State modernity, they claim, is the result of a North-South collaboration, a "world-historical production" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 6). They argue that modernity separated worlds that are, in fact, intimately linked, in which political economies are articulated and legal authorities interdependent. In many ways, the state we know today has emerged out of its colonial encounters. This is also what Frantz Fanon (1963) meant when he wrote, "Europe is literally the creation of the Third World."

Indigeneity only acquires meaning as a category in relation to the "civilized" Western state. Through the colonial encounter Europe developed its Western identity as the center between Asia and the Americas. Indigeneity was an all-encompassing category referring to non-European peoples from the Indies (Seth 2010). It was therefore always difficult to identify who was *indio* and who was not. In sixteenth-century Spain, the label referred equally to people from the East and West Indies, China and Chiapas, India and Peru, the Moluccas in Indonesia and Hispaniola in the Caribbean. Studies have demonstrated that *indio* referred to a homogenizing legal status that constituted difference based on unequal power relations: conflating vastly distinct peoples as Indigenous was an act of colonial governance (Van Deusen 2015, 11). Historians have stressed the construction of this relational identity between the European state and Native populations, recalling that in the first centuries after the colonial encounter Spaniards used *indio* to refer to "People of the Indies" as a new "people" in relation to themselves (Van Deusen 2015, 13). Indigenous peoples are the *others* of Europe—that is why there are no Indigenous peoples *in* Europe.[5] Indigeneity is thus foundational to Europe's engagement with the rest of the world over the last centuries. It was the colonial encounter that shaped claims to sovereignty in Europe (Benton 2009). In fact, the colonial confrontation was central not only to the formation of European states, but also to the larger formation of international law (Anghie 2007). The sovereignty doctrine, a core principle of world politics, has been animated by the project of governing non-European peoples. The importance of the colonial relationship in developing concepts of modernity and civilization is by now well established, not least through Edward Said's (1978) seminal work on orientalism, but the particular relation of the Indigenous to colonialism has been less explored as a means of understanding the world system.

Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) discusses the simultaneous indispensability and inadequacy of Western concepts to think about the political. He stresses the colonial mark on the genealogy of thought in the social sciences, regretting that non-European intellectual traditions are treated as history. Scholars in India, for example, engage in intellectual debates with Marx but not with the thirteenth-century logician Gangesa. In the Andes, too, Foucault is frequently invoked, whereas Indigenous world views are dismissed as folklore. Chakrabarty's (2000) project of "provincializing Europe" is important across political peripheries from India to Ecuador, where European concepts of political authority are indispensable points of departure but inadequate to account for diverse historical

realities. We need further theoretical hybridity because it is ethically urgent in the postcolonial world and because neglecting hybridity amounts to a refusal to apprehend the world in its full complexity.

The Indigenous is invariably related to the European, and Indians were constructed as Europe's homogenous other. Vanita Seth (2010) analyzes "Europe's Indians" to argue that the invention of noncivilized Indians enabled European modernity. I argue that part of our inability to see Indigenous politics derives from this constitutive otherness, and this premise of relationality is one of my work's overarching themes. I write as a non-Indigenous scholar of European descent to defend indigeneity as a site critical to our understanding of the international system. In the same way that feminist theory is not only of interest to women but is a critical mode of inquiry, Indigenous perspectives are not only of concern to Indigenous studies but are necessary for thinking deeply about state sovereignty.

I emphasize the relationship between the core and the non-core to contest the divide between a universal grand theory and localized case studies. The politics of Kichwa women are valuable for their broader theoretical implications, and my research joins a critique of the core-periphery opposition that obscures the social construction of knowledge (Tickner 2003, 2013). The problem with a division of labor in which the core generates theory, whereas its peripheries are consumed as case studies to confirm the theory of the core, is that conceptual frameworks developed at the core do not always stand the test of practical scrutiny in the non-core. It thus becomes difficult to understand dynamics in much of the world defined as the non-core because the concepts available are inadequate to account for their realities in the first place. This book answers calls to conceptualize the international from the non-core (Tickner and Blaney 2013).

Indigenous politics are co-constitutive of state politics and therefore key to understanding non-Indigenous politics. They permit a reflexive approach that challenges epistemological foundations. Seth (2010) ambitiously suggests unmaking history because "race thinking," far from inevitable, is the product of a certain theory of knowledge. Here, I bring situated Indigenous experiences to the fore to suggest that state sovereignty is not the inevitable form for the organization of world politics, but rather the product of a specific theory of knowledge. Indigeneity reveals alternative forms of political authority. This matters to political theory because alternative practices of global politics expand our ideas of the world. More than a case study of Kichwa women's politics, this book offers a conceptual exploration of their political advocacy in international

relations. Indigenous politics comprise a terrain of struggle that provides opportunities for different actors to experiment with new possibilities. Indigenous women's struggles speak a specific "language of contention" that merits theorization at the core (Roseberry 1994).

MANY WAYS OF BEING INDIGENOUS

A book on Indigenous politics must start with the question of what *Indigenous* means. I use the words *Indio*, *Indian*, *Indigenous*, *Native*, and *Originary peoples* interchangeably throughout, though wording varies across regions and over time. Australia refers to Aboriginal peoples, Canada to First Nations, and India to Tribals. In the Andes, the recent term *Indigenous* replaced the old term *indio*, which was associated with serf labor, when Indigenous movements gained political prominence. Wording is so diverse because *indigeneity* does not refer to homogenous groups, nor is it a static category. The fact that there are over fifty ways of defining Indians in current U.S. laws (from blood quantum to federal acknowledgment to living on or off reservations) shows how complex it can be to recognize indigeneity (Den Ouden and O'Brien 2013; Brown-Perez 2012). Indigeneity is a relational identity; it refers to a historical positioning rather than an essential nature. Thus, variations in wording denote distinct colonial histories and changing power relations. They indicate that indigeneity is an external identity, not an internal trait, constructed by and for states through colonial processes.

Many words express indigeneity because there are many ways of being Indigenous, including in the Ecuadorian Andes. The beats and rhymes that emerged in the Bronx have been adopted by the Otavalo rap group Los Nin, who blend Spanish and Kichwa into hip-hop to construct complex identities and share their own practices of resistance. Indigenous identity is fueled by contention, not homogeneity, and energized by the values of each generation and a plurality of communities with local agendas. Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009) contends that highland Native populations divide along class lines, profess different values, and migrate and navigate across different cultural settings. He argues that it is precisely this internal pluralism, rather than the sharing of core values, that has driven the politics of Latin America's most comprehensive Indigenous movement. This pluralism characterizes Indigenous politics worldwide. While Indigenous politics tend to be organized around claims for self-determination,

agendas develop in local context. For instance, the preservation of Native land is negotiated through distinct institutional agreements in Hawaii or Amazonia. In Brazil, the Kaiowá-Guaranis pressure for land demarcation in Congress to stop the agribusiness invasion that is killing their communities (Capiberibe and Bonilla 2015). In contrast, Native peoples in Hawaii resist land demarcation because they consider the entire island to be their territory; they refuse to be granted only a fraction of it. In Ecuador, Kichwa demands for gender parity are related to legal battles for plurinationalism. There are as many Indigenous politics as there are Indigenous peoples.

There are as many different ways of being Indigenous as there are colonial processes. What matters is not to determine who is Indigenous, but to understand it as a fluid, relational, and inevitably political identity. Andrew Canessa (2012) suggests that indigeneity is highly contingent, informed by a certain historical consciousness and entangled with gendered and racial identities. Indigeneity is impossible to define narrowly because it refers less to a constitutive who/what than to the otherness implied by it—like the core-periphery divide. Native scholars Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel (2005) explain being Indigenous as inhabiting lands in contrast to and in contention with the colonial states that spread out from Europe. They define indigeneity as an oppositional identity linked to the consciousness of struggle against dispossession in the era of contemporary colonialism. The term *Indigenous* is constantly in process, both embraced and contested, and its meaning should not be codified but understood as positional.

Official estimates of the sizes of Indigenous populations vary greatly depending on who is doing the estimates, when, and for what purposes (Angosto Ferrández and Kradolfer 2012). The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII 2015, 2) estimates around 370 million individuals representing more than five thousand distinct Indigenous peoples in more than ninety countries. About 34 million of them are in Latin America. Ecuador is one of the top five countries with the largest Indigenous populations in the region, behind Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru (Telles and Flores 2013). From there, estimates diverge significantly. Ecuador's government recognizes eighteen Indigenous peoples, most of them located in the Andean highlands, but estimates of the country's Indigenous population vary greatly. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has estimated Ecuador's Indigenous population at nearly 25 percent of the total population,[6] while the Inter-American Development Bank raises the estimate to 43 percent (Roldán

Ortega 2002). According to CONAIE, Indigenous peoples represent about 40 percent of the total population. Official censuses, in turn, provide surprisingly lower estimates. Only about 7 percent of Ecuadorians self-identified as Indigenous in 2010, whereas over 70 percent self-identified as mestizo (INEC 2010). About 10 percent of the population identifies as white, making Ecuador the country with the smallest white population in Latin America behind Bolivia (7 percent; Telles and Flores 2013, 433). Whiteness is a useful indicator of Indigenous presence. The Dominican Republic, which has a different history of *mestizaje* embedded within the African diaspora, stands with Ecuador as the country with the second lowest white population behind Bolivia. The same census records over 13 percent of the population speaking a Native tongue other than Spanish (i.e., an Indigenous language). Ecuador's Indigenous population thus varies fourfold depending on who produces the estimates and may double within official censuses if we consider ethnolinguistic markers rather than self-determination.

International norms regard indigeneity as a set of features that includes attachment to ancestral lands, cultural customs, and languages, as well as distinct collective norms like autonomous forms of justice (ILO 169, art. 1). But many of the attributes used internationally to characterize indigeneity are difficult to assess in national statistical approaches. Minority cultural practices are not only complex, but also become interwoven with the culture of dominant societies (Song 2007). Rarely are such indicators reflected in statistics. Native languages are usually a strong ethnic marker, but they are rapidly disappearing in mutually reinforcing processes of urbanization, assimilation, and discrimination. In Ecuador, over 32 percent of self-identified Indigenous peoples do not speak their Native language (INEC 2010). Quantitative indicators related to land, nature, and territory are undermined by migration, especially in areas affected by conflict and environmental stress. Indigeneity attached to territorial lines is problematic once people are forced off their land, whatever the reason.

In the Americas, *Indigenous* refers to the people who inhabited the continent before the arrival of European colonizers in 1492 (1534 in the case of Ecuador). Indigeneity tends to be associated with territorial belonging, tied to an imagined ancestry conjoined with nature. Yet borders get blurry when Indigenous peoples move to urban areas and adopt the culture, language, and opportunities of the dominant society. Today, nearly half of Latin American Indigenous populations live in urban areas (World Bank 2016). Canada's 2016 census counted over 50

percent of Indigenous peoples residing in urban areas; in the United States, more than 70 percent of Indians and Alaska Natives now live in metropolitan areas, compared with only 8 percent in 1940 (Williams 2013). Brazil's 2010 Census recorded 42.3 percent of the self-identified Indigenous population as living outside reservations. Even in the 2000 census Indigenous populations were present in over 80 percent of Brazilian municipalities.

Ecuador's Indigenous population continues to be significantly more rural than urban. In the 2010 census, 82 percent of the Indigenous population lived in rural areas and only 18 percent in urban (INEC 2010). Yet the increasing migration of this population to cities in search of education or employment opportunities undermines a sense of collective belonging and Indigenous identity in two ways. First, Indigenous culture is more susceptible to intermingling with the dominant society, thus becoming more hybrid. In that context, maintaining Indigenous identities requires awareness and mobilization—in other words, a conscious political act. Second, Indigenous peoples are less visible in cities, vulnerable to the pressure to conform but also made invisible by dominant societies unwilling to recognize cultural differences.

SOVEREIGNTIES IN THE VERNACULAR

Indigenous politics challenge concepts of sovereignty in ways similar, though reversed, to those experienced within the European Union (EU). In the EU, states transferred their legal sovereignty to supranational entities, thus dislocating state sovereignty from above. Similarly, the consolidation of accountability mechanisms related to Indigenous justice in the Andes constituted a transfer of legal authority to autonomous nations. However, legal rearrangements have emerged from below to relocate authority within the state. The reconfigurations of state sovereignty in Europe and in the Andes are similar. Supranational institutions dislocated sovereignty from above in the EU; Indigenous justice (including individual women's rights) is relocating state sovereignty from below in Latin America. In both cases, legal reassemblages initiate the relocation of sovereignty beyond the state. The main distinction is that in one case sovereignty is relocated to supranational levels *outside* the state and in the other to autonomous Indigenous nations *within* it. Both the EU and Indigenous justice disturb state sovereignty. Unlike politics within the EU, however, the impacts of Indigenous politics on state sovereignty go largely unexamined.

The notion of vernacular sovereignties presupposes interdisciplinary perspectives and references Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld's (2009) metaphor for vernacular statecraft and Juliet Erazo's (2013) theorizing on "enacting" Indigenous sovereignty. Colloredo-Mansfeld examines how local communities in Ecuador adopt state methods of administration to pursue local autonomy. Translating architectural concepts into politics, he conceives vernacular statecraft as ordinary, domestic, and pragmatic rather than monumental. Vernacular architecture adapts elements of conventional design to local conditions, with the primary purpose of satisfying people's needs. It is functional, reflects community values, and creates solutions to a problem. Vernacular architecture centers on the intimate, but often abrasive, relationship between structures and people. Erazo (2013, 3) argues that "the enactment of sovereignty and the social relations that go with it are continually being negotiated, as leaders, their constituents, and a host of external entities . . . seek to define the form that Indigenous sovereignty will take." Vernacular sovereignties evoke new, local forms of authority detached from states. I transpose vernacular statecraft and enacting sovereignty to Indigenous international politics: Kichwa women appropriate global women's rights and adapt them to Indigenous contexts with minimal state intervention. Kichwa women are adapting global norms to carve out vernacular sovereignties. Their experience shows how gender makes a difference in claims for self-determination. While Indigenous claims to self-determination are about autonomy *from* the state, Indigenous women seek autonomy *with* gender accountability *through* the state. Their strategic use of the state as a third party shows that the poison can at times be used as remedy.

Vernacular Sovereignty intertwines European and Native understandings of sovereignty. Native scholars are split on whether to reject sovereignty as a category unrelated to Indigenous governance or adopt it to make autonomy claims intelligible to state institutions. Taiaiake Alfred (1999) rejects sovereignty as a specifically European concept of power that is fundamentally at odds with Native governance. He both rejects this terminology and defends sovereignty-free governments according to Indigenous peoples' own traditional terms. Other scholars believe that Indigenous claims must be articulated in terms of sovereignty to get legal traction. For Dale Turner (2006, 93), this translation of Indigenous knowledge into European political tradition is the work of "the word warrior." I engage the vernacular because it stands in opposition to the supranational, placing Indigenous political practices at the antipode of European ones. Sovereignty has been contested as an inappropriate way to apprehend

Indigenous nationhood and as reproducing colonial structures. Yet as Erazo explains, the process of governing Indigenous territories changes expectations and obligations attached to sovereignty. Indigenous sovereignties are practiced in vernacular contexts, thus transforming a singular form of authority into a plurality of forms adaptable to contextual realities. The concept of vernacular sovereignties rejects essentialist approaches to Indigenous politics, recognizing instead that Indigenous politics use state-centric semantics to practice self-determination and resist assimilation.

We must understand indigeneity if we are to understand the current crisis of state sovereignty because it is co-constitutive of the modern state. Indigenous peoples were imagined as living in the Hobbesian state of nature, marked by the absence of sovereignty (Helliwell and Hindess 2011; Shaw 2008). In 1492 the Vatican issued bulls framing the Americas as terra nullius, and lands that were not under the control of the Christian faith were considered empty wastelands, up for grabs. This doctrine relied on the invention of Indigenous peoples as savages "without society, sovereignty, or private property" (Buchan and Heath 2006, 9), too primitive to embody political authority, and justified European invasions. Terra nullius was a Christian "law of nations," but it shaped the formation of international law, which has historically treated Indigenous peoples as *sovereign nullius*. To this day, Canada's Supreme Court invokes terra nullius as a rationale for the "unequal distribution of sovereignty" between Canada and Indigenous peoples there (Coulthard 2014, 100).

The meanings of sovereignty have changed significantly since the Treaty of Westphalia began the era of sovereign nation-states in 1648. This treaty, which ended the Thirty Years' War, defined principles of sovereignty and founded the system of states in Europe. The Westphalian system of mutually recognized sovereign states became the organizing principle of the international system. Sovereignty surpasses the notion of a legal authority bound to territory to shape the complex modus operandi of the international system (Bartelson 1995). Globalization disrupted the Westphalian association between land, people, exclusive legal authority, and external (mutual) recognition. Scholars have addressed the crisis of state sovereignty through the concept of global reassemblages (Sassen 2006), considered deterritorialized forms of sovereignty (Agnew 2009), and envisioned cosmopolitan frameworks providing universal rights for global citizens (Linklater 1998; Chandler 2003). Historical approaches that revealed the unevenness of sovereignty within Dutch and British empires also showed that European sovereignty had been constructed in the process of imperial

expansion, more its product than its cause (Stoler 2002; Benton 2009). Yet epistemological challenges to sovereignty also lie in places not yet addressed by the mainstream.

Mainstream analyses perceive threats to state sovereignty coming from international realms located above the state, not subnational groups located within the state. They overlook Indigenous politics within the territorial boundaries of the state that disrupt conventional forms of stateness. Indigenous movements have fundamentally changed the relationship of citizens and states, notably by demanding recognition of collective rights that disrupt the nineteenth-century idea of the liberal nation-state. Indigenous sovereignties expand the political imagination, for instance, advancing the idea of Indigenous legal authority as a "third space of sovereignty" (Bruyneel 2007). Jens Bartelson (2014) writes that even critical theories of sovereignty assume that the state is a self-contained entity and the international system self-regulating, implying that the international system is the only possible political order and therefore lacks an exterior. This logic of sovereignty faces inconsistencies similar to what mathematicians call Russell's paradox or Gödel's incompleteness theorems: we run into problems when we try to create an internally consistent set of rules that applies to sets that contain themselves. Indigenous world views offer an exterior from which to rethink state sovereignty and engage alternative perspectives of the international system.

INDIGENEITY AS A CATEGORY OF INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS

Indigeneity is perhaps as "beyond" the state as it goes and is therefore a strategic site from which to rethink sovereignty. Indigenous experiences offer radically different insights into the international because they support forms of governance created outside—and to a large extent before—the modern state. Indigeneity contests hegemonic world histories because it is informed by political cosmologies that denaturalize the state as the sole locus of the political (Beier 2005). More specifically, Indigenous practices of authority—plural, shared, and unbounded from states—"dispense" with conventional state sovereignty, emancipating world politics from the straitjacket of the Eurocentric Westphalian system.

In the study of international relations, the proliferation of research dealing with the periphery and colonialism is the product of a growing discontent

with a discipline regarded as disconnected from the world it is supposed to understand. Isolated expressions of discontent began to emerge from a literature out of and about the "non-West," taking early postpositivist debates to a new level (Ashley 1987; Walker 1993). Not only have scholars accused international relations of being created by and for a hegemonic core, but they have also called it a disciplinary shackle. Critics accuse international relations of two interrelated sins. The first is an ingrained hegemony. Stanley Hoffmann (1977) describes international relations as an American social science, pointing out that the field is not only Eurocentric but US-centric. Related to this first critique is the charge that international relations is out of touch with many important issues because of its narrow disciplinary approach. Scholarly dominance implies a certain conceptual parochialism, with inevitable epistemological implications. The study of international relations, it turns out, is often not all that worldly.

Critical scholarship has challenged major paradigms of international relations but still fails to seriously engage Indigenous world views. Immanuel Wallerstein (2006) decries European universalism as a rhetoric of power, whereas John Hobson (2007) interprets international relations theory as a defense of Western civilization, thus making understandable the persistently Eurocentric organization of this field of study. Scholars have unveiled the role of scientific racism and Eurocentric institutionalism in conceptions of world politics (Hobson 2012), and they have showed how white supremacy is a foundational construct that continues to shape a world politics more concerned with racial borders than territorial ones (Henderson 2013; Vitalis 2010, 910). Critical methodologies have decentered theory from the Eurocentric mainstream, describing the relationship between knowledge and experience as a "hook-up" to enable alternative ways of being in the world (Jackson 2011; Inayatullhah 2011). However, international relations' Eurocentrism enforces a narrow understanding of the world, one that validates positivist perspectives over other ways of knowing. One problem with an imagined core as the central subject and referent of global politics is that it deprives the discipline of a multiplicity of ways of being in the world. This means, for instance, that scholarly discussions about state formation almost invariably refer to Westphalian nations, failing to account for centuries of slave trade between Africa and the Americas (Shilliam 2010) and ignoring Muslim understandings of security and Chinese theories of world order (Acharya and Buzan 2010). Indigenous ways of seeing the world have been overlooked even within critical scholarship.

On empirical grounds, Indigenous politics successfully contest sovereignty and therefore impact practices and theories of the international in significant ways. The experiences of Kichwa women in Ecuador are testimony to the ways in which dynamic political movements influence global, national, and substate actors in innovative ways. In historical terms, indigeneity is intrinsically related to state formation in the Americas, making it a valuable tool with which to rethink legal authority and imagine postnational reassemblages. And at a theoretical level, indigeneity is a strategic site from which to defy Westphalian principles that operate as conceptual straightjackets.

Scholars need to integrate Indigenous politics into the study of international relations because of their significant impact on world affairs. Indigenous politics are dynamic and innovative. Indigenous peoples actively participate in international treaties and have reframed state politics in global realms via UNDRIP and in local contexts through negotiations of legal authority. From the Andes to the Arctic, Indigenous communities are fighting extractive industries and resisting predatory policies affecting their territories (Banerjee 2012; Bebbington and Bebbington 2011). Kichwa women are reshaping state sovereignty in the Andes. Since 1977, the Inuit Circumpolar Circle has forged some of the most comprehensive forms of self-government in the world (Shadian 2014). Inuit delegates sit at the table of the Arctic Council alongside eight delegates of sovereign states and five other Indigenous groups to define resource management. None of these Indigenous forces challenging state sovereignty strives for statehood. Indigenous nations are not concerned with secession, nor do they want to create parallel states. Rather, they pursue different forms of governance outside the Westphalian state. Their autonomy undermines both the practices and epistemology of the Westphalian state, changing the course of sovereignty. Indigenous movements articulate with global sites of contestation to recast legal authority and form collaborative social contracts independent from the state. Indigenous politics are too important in world politics to be dismissed as "Indian affairs." Vernacular sovereignties challenge not only the authority of individual states within national borders, but also the organization of world politics around Westphalian sovereignty.

Indigeneity is co-constitutive of state formation in the Americas. The historical imperative to bring indigeneity into political theory stems from its role in so many processes of state formation. The Indigenous is imagined as the antithesis of European modernity, atemporal and apolitical, epitomizing an absence of political reason that justifies land appropriation by states. Indigeneity refers to

the "uncivilized" Natives, without reason, who do not belong to the "modern" project of state-building, those "culturalized" others against which European history unfolds. To dismiss Indigenous politics on the grounds of minority status is misleading because indigeneity refers, first and foremost, to the state. State and indigeneity are two sides of a coin. From its inception, indigeneity has referred much more to a colonial relation with the state than to a cultural or ethnic identity. This is why indigeneity needs to be historically and legally situated. Since Indian identities were constituted in the European reformulation of self in relation to others, they reflect the formation of a sovereignty regime as European empires spread globally.

Because indigeneity refers to the state as much as to the people outside of it, Indigenous counternarratives to state formation vary greatly according to context (Engelbert 2009). "Indigenous" is a heterogeneous and fluid identity, referring to the otherness implied by the term (Canessa 2005). This conceptual interlinkage is key. The co-constitutive relationship between indigeneity and the state explains the worldwide proliferation, and multiplicity, of Indigenous claims. That is why the most common denominator of Indigenous politics worldwide is the colonial legacy of nation-states. Colonialisms vary from Southeast Asia to Latin America, and Indigenous groups have defended themselves differently from distinct colonial invasions. What is common to the many Native peoples in the world is not their inner cultural features but their efforts to assert self-determination in the face of European frameworks. Because Indigenous politics are intrinsic to the emergence of the Westphalian state and dispute its authority, they contribute insightful critiques of the international. Standing outside of and prior to the state, Indigenous perspectives point to new forms of sovereignty. The "prior," which challenges sovereignty (Sassen 2006), is precisely indigeneity.

Finally, indigeneity disrupts some of the core epistemological foundations of state sovereignty. Indigeneity allows us to think differently because its precedence over the modern state entails a political legitimacy beyond it. Indigenous experiences complement official national histories with forgotten or repressed narratives. These experiences stem from other epistemologies that resemble queer concepts in their attempt to destabilize state-centric conceptualizations of the political. If decolonized epistemologies are an indispensable point of departure for moving beyond European state-centrism, then Indigenous experiences expand the political imagination. Indigenous practices of authority enable us to conceptualize, for instance, territory and jurisdiction in a political space beyond state sovereignty. Indigenous epistemologies free political imaginaries

from the hegemonic episteme of the nation-state, making it possible to think of a world that is not state based.

Conceptions of the state as modern and global, in contrast to indigeneities imagined as nonpolitical and isolated, miss not only the impact of Indigenous politics but the very essence of the state. Indigeneity is key to resolving post-colonial debates, to proving that the modern state is fundamentally unable to encompass the breadth of alternative political projects. As a colonial category central to state-making, indigeneity gives us the tools we need to historicize state sovereignty. From realpolitik to socially constructed perspectives, theories of sovereignty have evolved to account for the changing realities of political practice. The recognition of Indigenous justice across Latin America is one such change that is forcing political rearrangements and reconfiguring state authority. Bringing indigenous studies into international relations increases our ability to engage the variety of political practices that are thriving beneath the surface, where high politics operate. Further, this process opens epistemological debates that can transform disciplinary self-understanding. The resiliency of Indigenous peoples in their struggles not only confirms the inadequacy of the state, it also provides concrete examples of what the international can actually look like within and beyond it.

ARCHITECTURE OF THE BOOK

The first step in understanding the politics of Indigenous women is to look at their position at the intersections of various forms of exclusion. Chapter 1, "Invisible Women," discusses the intersectionality of sexism, colonial racism, and conceptual statelessness to demonstrate the political situation of Indigenous women. I first examine what it means to be Indigenous through the fluctuation of Indigenous categorizations in official records. I then analyze the multidimensional overlap of socioeconomic exclusions of Indigenous women. Structural un-freedoms like economic scarcity, ill health, and low levels of education are accentuated by limited access to political participation to make Indigenous women vulnerable political actors. Finally, I analyze the Remache case to illustrate the pervasiveness of domestic violence against Indigenous women. Estuardo Remache, a Pachakutik congressional delegate, was repeatedly charged with domestic violence in Riobamba's *comisaría de la mujer* before

the case was transferred to Indigenous justice, but neither legal system provided security to the victim.

Taking a historical perspective, chapter 2, "The Inheritance of Resistance," argues that women have long participated in Indigenous struggles against colonial governments. It traces the inheritance of political resistance among Indigenous women from colonial times, stressing female leaders who were blacklisted by colonial states, persecuted for constituting military threats, and feared for their cold-bloodedness across the Andes. If Indigenous women are invisible today it is because they are erased from memory by selective histories. I retell their history to subvert familiar understandings of Indigenous women as passive or unrelated to state-making. A closer look at Dolores Cacuango and Tránsito Amaguaña, the two women who founded Ecuador's modern Indigenous movement, suggests that their leadership is part of a legacy of resistance against state violence. Surprisingly, however, their forceful political contestation has resulted in their relative absence from contemporary politics, and I show how the incorporation of Indigenous movements into formal politics may have adversely impacted women's leadership.

Although Indigenous women are oppressed by socioeconomic, political, and sexual violence, in chapter 3, "Indigenous International Relations," they are dynamic actors in world politics. Indigenous women have mobilized transnationally across the Abya Yala (the Americas), articulating local activism with international frameworks. I discuss how Indigenous rights emerged in international law, especially ILO Convention 169 and the 2007 UNDRIP, to explain the profoundly international dimension of Indigenous politics. Indigenous ways of "worlding" without "stateness" offer unique insights into alternative practices of the international. Indigeneity, long framed as terra nullius, makes up a time prior to and space outside the modern state that fundamentally challenges Westphalian sovereignty.

I ground these global dynamics in a case study from Ecuador in chapter 4. "Self-Determination with Gender Parity" explains how Indigenous women engage international norms to consolidate their rights in local contexts. I tell the largely unknown story of Kichwa women's claims for gender parity in the Indigenous justice movement. I analyze how women from the Red Provincial de Organizaciones de Mujeres Kichwas y Rurales de Chimborazo (REDCH) have envisioned new rights and successfully pursued original legislation almost single-handedly. Their unprecedented legal achievements have far-reaching implications for women's rights and for the practice and conceptualization of

human rights globally. Kichwa women's struggles may be local, but they represent a remarkable contribution to international women's rights. Through their innovative practice of interlegality, they have reconciled old tensions between gender and multiculturalism to propose a differentiated practice of universal rights.

The last chapter, "Sovereignties Within," analyzes how these politics challenge conventional understandings of sovereignty as Kichwa women pursue autonomy *and* legal accountability. The particular effect of their claims is a legal triangulation between international norms, constitutional rights, and Indigenous justice. The ensuing legal assemblage challenges established practices of sovereignty. While threats to sovereignty tend to be perceived as coming from international locations "above" the state, Indigenous politics also challenge sovereignty from within. I discuss how Indigenous politics engage with nonexclusive forms of sovereignty, challenging the concept of exclusive authority over a territory. Indigenous authority, I argue, can be thought of as vernacular forms of sovereignty within the state. I conclude by emphasizing the significance of Indigenous ways of seeing and Indigenous politics in relation to state sovereignty, the organizing principle of world politics.

This book offers more than a new Andean case study; rather, I am interested in what Indigenous practices of legal authority signify in relation to and within conventional notions of state sovereignty. Indigenous politics, a space of alienated subalterity, do what seems impossible: they take us to new geographies beyond state sovereignty. My analysis of Kichwa women in Ecuador, therefore, is an effort to historicize and complicate our typical notions of sovereignty. Only by recognizing subaltern sovereignties can we truly begin to theorize Westphalian sovereignty in the world system. It is my hope that this examination of Indigenous women's vernacular sovereignties will inspire new ways of valuing Indigenous politics beyond the geographical and conceptual reach of this project.

1

INVISIBLE WOMEN

INDIGENOUS WOMEN evoke rich cultural traditions. Popular culture commonly represents these women in traditional ethnic attires, resisting global forces of modernization. In these accounts, Indigenous women guard authentic cultures and ancestral languages on the verge of disappearing. But such depictions have at least two problems. First, there is no such thing as an "authentic" indigeneity. Indigeneity is a relational identity, changing and contested. Second, Indigenous women live in the present, not in some imagined past, and have to deal with the multiple forms of marginalization prevailing in contemporary societies.

Indigeneity is hard to pinpoint because it is extremely diverse and always in flux. There are many ways to be Indigenous across the Americas and wide disparities in accounts of Indigenous presence in the hemisphere. Nearly three hundred Indigenous groups speak over two hundred distinct languages in Brazil, while the United States counts over eight hundred cultures and nationalities.[1] Some have federally recognized Indigenous status, some are recognized by states but not by the federal government, and others are denied official Indigenous status altogether (Brown-Perez 2015). Part of the difficulty is that indigeneity is neither static nor defined by the past. It is a relational identity shaped by exchange and other complex cultural encounters. For instance, Indigenous music should not be approached as an unchanging cultural expression but as one

of experiential authenticity (Bigenho 2012). The Ecuadorian hip-hop group Los Nin raps in a blend of Spanish and Kichwa, embodying an indigeneity endlessly redefined by cultural mélange. Likewise, the lives of Indigenous women are constantly transforming, even if they bear witness to the indelible weight of the past. These women's role as guardians of culture is intertwined with their political participation in today's interconnected world. Their experiences should not be romanticized, but recognized as the result of social, economic, and political inequalities in contemporary societies.

On the whole, Indigenous women share systematic forms of marginalization more than they share expressions of ethnicity, and the common denominator in their lives is the experience of exclusion, poverty, and overlapping layers of violence. This chapter shows that, as a group, they are the least educated sector of society, work more for less, and have few property rights. They face high levels of violence but have less access to health care, legal protection, and resources for well-being. Many are peasants living in rural areas prone to acute class-based inequalities and abused by extractive industries. Their lives are considerably harder than most people's, yet their voices remain unheard in formal and community politics.

These mutually reinforcing forms of violence result in a specific geography of oppression that shapes Indigenous women's strategies of resistance. Gender-based violence among Indigenous women is qualitatively different from that of white women because the intersectional experience is greater than the mere sum of racism and sexism. Black feminists proposed the term *intersectionality* to account for the ways in which racism and sexism converge to build hierarchical, simultaneous, and mutually reinforcing systems of domination (Crenshaw 1989; Collins 2000). They used *intersectionality* to refer to the historically interlocking systems of oppression and the multiple axes of inequality that socially locate women of color. What makes gender inequality worse for Indigenous women is that it goes beyond sexism and racism to conflate with a foundational exclusion from the state. The intersectionality of sexism, colonial racism, and conceptual statelessness is key to understanding the political situation of Indigenous women. This intersectional violence needs to be tackled through intersectional politics. As we will see, public policy advocating for women's rights alone cannot address the experienced realities of Indigenous women, just like ethnopolitics alone fail to respond to women's concerns. Neither provides an adequate strategy for redressing the marginalization of Indigenous women. Intersectionality, however, allows us to

understand their specific subalternity, as well as their struggles at the margins of mainstream politics of gender and ethnicity.

This chapter approaches three forms of violence that contribute to the invisibility of Indigenous women in contemporary Ecuador. First, I discuss what it means to be Indigenous, stressing definitional violence. Indigeneity is a tricky category because it can be defined only in relation to the state and is therefore contextual to different processes of colonial state-making. What it means to be Indigenous and who qualifies as such vary across time and space. Second, I analyze the multidimensional overlap of socioeconomic exclusions experienced by Indigenous women. Structural restraints like economic scarcity, ill health, and low levels of education are accentuated by limited access to political participation to make Indigenous women vulnerable political actors. Third, I explore the effects of domestic violence, which deeply affect Indigenous women. I analyze the Remache case to illustrate the challenge of domestic violence and how inefficient, biased justice systems are failing Indigenous women in Ecuador and beyond.

WHO IS INDIGENOUS?

In 2013 Ecuador's president, Rafael Correa, accused a prominent Indigenous leader of not being Indigenous. Carlos Pérez Guartambel, a peasant, lawyer, and activist, had just been elected president of the Confederación de los Pueblos Kichwas del Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), the most powerful Indigenous organization in the country. Created in 1972, ECUARUNARI is the umbrella organization for eighteen Indigenous peoples and fourteen nationalities from the Andean highlands. Correa's claim had two dimensions. At a basic level, the accusation was clearly aimed at discrediting an Indigenous leadership that had successfully invoked rights to prior consultation to resist the state appropriation of natural resources. It was first and foremost an attempt to delegitimize an opponent. At a deeper level, the accusation was possible because it relied on a shared perception of indigeneity as poverty. Correa insinuated that Pérez Guartambel was "too educated" to fit social perceptions of indigeneity. International norms of self-identification were irrelevant. Nor did Pérez Guartambel's family count: that his father spoke only Kichwa until learning Spanish at age twelve or that his mother had worked as an *india* on haciendas and still wore the traditional pollera. The government rhetoric implied that Pérez Guartambel

was less Indigenous because he had surpassed poverty and exclusion: he had graduated with a law degree from one of Ecuador's best universities to become a leading activist and the author of five books. Because Pérez Guartambel did not embody expectations of indigeneity, President Correa could contest his political legitimacy. This anecdote illustrates definitional violence. It reveals not only who gets to define who is (or is not) Indigenous and how contentious indigeneity is, but also how the state continues to claim the prerogative to define it.

An analysis of the oppression of Indigenous women must start from a discussion of the complex meanings of indigeneity. Estimates of Indigenous populations vary greatly depending on who generates the data, how, when, and for which purposes. Indigeneity is tricky to define because it is a broad and fluid identity, purposefully open ended. Self-identification has evolved to become the accepted international legal practice since the second general assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) passed a resolution in 1977 stating that only Indigenous peoples could define Indigenous peoples (Corntassel 2003). The UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) and ILO Convention 169 (art. 1) have advocated an unlimited right to self-identification for Indigenous peoples to counter the practice of many states that deny Indigenous claims within their borders. Accordingly, Indigenous peoples have generally tried to keep understandings of indigeneity broad and open, rejecting state efforts to tighten its definition. Indigenous peoples actively denounce the violence of states that decide when to allow peoples to define as Indigenous and when to deny the identity. Definitional violence is yet another form of violence against Indigenous peoples. That is why the 2007 UNDRIP (art. 33) decided not to adopt a formal definition of the term *Indigenous* but instead to stress self-identification.

HIDE AND SEEK: CENSUS VARIATIONS

Most Latin American censuses have incorporated an ethnic focus into their questionnaires, improving the accuracy of demographic data across the continent (Telles and Flores 2013).[2] Data show that growing numbers of people self-identify as Indigenous, signaling that ethnic identification is fluid and contextual. In Brazil, for instance, the 2010 census added questions on ethnic belonging and language to the basic questionnaire and recorded an 11 percent increase in the Indigenous population. The increase in Indigenous populations in census data indicates the availability of tools for categorization in the questions created

FIGURE 1. Beliza Coro and her mother pose for a picture in their kitchen in the community of Lupaxi Convalescencia, Chimborazo (2007). With her parents' support, Beliza finished school and attended the country's best university. She studied abroad and went on to become a lawyer.

by governments. It also indicates that more people are willing to self-identify as Indigenous. One reason is that international norms like ILO Convention 169 give legal rights and new credibility to previously dismissed peoples, thus giving additional weight to the strategic use of indigeneity in legal claims. The growing sense of Indigenous belonging is, in that sense, related to two decades of successful ethnopolitics that have stirred a sense of self-worth and restored self-esteem across the Andes (Albó 2008; Almeida et al. 1993). Powerful mobilizations in Ecuador—also apparent in Bolivia's election of Evo Morales as the first Indigenous president in the hemisphere—have imbued Indigenous belonging with a new sense of political power and authority.

This historical shift in the Andes may also have created disincentives to identify as white, as it coincides with a period of white contraction and nonwhite expansion in censuses around the region (Telles and Flores 2013). Similar to indigeneity, who identifies as white changes over time with the relative valorization of nonwhite identities and political opportunities embedded in racial categories. Morales's motto, "Todos somos Indígenas," illustrated the force of Indigenous consciousness (Canessa 2006).[3] The identity acquired such legitimacy

that even non-Indigenous presidents now invoke Indigenous values, sites, and imagery. In Ecuador, Correa staged a symbolic presidential inauguration in the Indigenous village of Zumbahua, wore traditional shirts, and adopted the Indigenous concept of sumak kawsay across ministries (Martínez Novo 2009).

The visibility of Indigenous peoples in official censuses has political implications. Estimates of Indigenous population will vary greatly depending on who defines who is Indigenous and for what purposes. For Indigenous movements, making ethnicity statistically tangible in census polls is central to their demands. It matters because Indigenous (in)visibility is often used to invalidate Indigenous claims and to undermine Indigenous movements by portraying them as marginal and their concerns irrelevant to state politics. In Ecuador, where Indigenous politics influence government, defining who is Indigenous can have a significant effect on electoral grounds. Since 1999, the census has used self-identification to count the Indigenous population. The National Statistical Commission for Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Ecuadorians was created in 2007 to foster awareness about diversity through ethnically differentiated statistics (Chisaguano 2008). Before the 2010 census, CONAIE promoted cultural values, and grassroots women's groups like the Red de Mujeres Kichwas de Chimborazo deployed province-broad campaigns to encourage self-identification. But Indigenous peoples are still undercounted. Carmen Martínez Novo (2015) shows that it has been convenient for Ecuador's government to undercount Indigenous populations in national censuses when CONAIE opposed extractive policies, while rendering more visible Afro-Ecuadorian and Montúbio groups that opted for nonconfrontational corporatist politics. Governments use census statistics as ideological devices, masking and hiding populations to shape (or remake) reality according to the state's own schemata.

Definitions vary by region, political context, and standpoint, challenging data collection. For example, Teodosio Condori, a renowned shaman and monolingual Aymara speaker from the village of Pocobaya in the Bolivian highlands, does not identify as Indigenous (Canessa 2007). He may be perceived as Indigenous by outsiders, whether foreigners or urban Bolivians. But he does not identify with Indigenous peoples. In his view, the term *Indigenous* refers to peoples living in the Amazonian lowlands. The fact that Indigenous identity is now more widely invoked and tied to international rights does not change the fundamental problem of defining a category that is anything but straightforward. Indigeneity is a historically constructed category, one that is related to the state rather than to a specific set of cultural or demographic characteristics.

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF INVISIBILITY

The history of measuring Indigenous populations indicates how politics infuse analyses of indigeneity, and Brooke Larson (2004) describes how Indigenous censuses are tied to state-making in Ecuador. In 1770 the Real Audiencia of Quito registered about 50 percent of the population as "Indian" (Larson 2004, 107). A more rigorous 1785 census under Bourbon reformers estimated 65 percent of colonial Ecuador to be Indian. By 1840, estimates fell back to about 50 percent. Counting Indians was useful as long as they paid a tribute to the Spanish Crown. Indians between eighteen and fifty years old were required to pay the "Personal Contribution of Indigenous peoples," usually in cash, which further added to Indian workers' indebtedness. Indian tribute was maintained after independence, when the former Audiencia was incorporated into Gran Colombia (1825), because Indians made a significant financial contribution to the newly created state. Tribute was temporarily abolished under the new republican government in 1825, then reestablished by Simón Bolívar to help cover military costs. In 1857 the new republic officially terminated the Indian tribute, ending one form of Indigenous exploitation, and simultaneously abolished statistics about Indigenous populations (Becker 1997, 112).

For over a century, Indians were left off official records. The newly established Ecuadorian state dropped ethnic categories while still relying on coerced Indigenous labor and tribute to finance its emergence as a modern nation. By the time Ecuador conducted a post-independence national census in 1876, Indigenous peoples had officially been erased. Of course, they never ceased to serve as the main source of labor across the highlands, powering the country's agricultural economy and building the country's road infrastructure. Yet they were kept invisible from the very start of Ecuador's republic.

The making and unmaking of Indigenous populations is inscribed in processes of state formation. This is not peculiar to Ecuador, but a characteristic of colonial politics that has been examined in various contexts. Far from a casual practice of colonial observation, counting Indians was part of a strategy of erasure. Amy Den Ouden (2012, 7) argues that U.S. bureaucracies strategically undercounted Indians as part of a tactic to turn over "vacant" land to settlers and dismantle "empty" reservations that stood in the way of the expansion of private property on conquered land. Censuses with few Indians gave quantitative "evidence" to the colonial narrative of total and final conquest in popular accounts like *The Last of the Mohicans* (Cooper [1826] 1957). Jean M. O'Brien

(2010) examines how New England writers produced narratives of the "vanishing" Indian, thereby writing Indians out of existence.

Another common colonial strategy consisted of statistical racialization, which effectively "othered" the non-European groups.[4] The first All-India Census in 1871 was concerned with preserving the "Aryan type" using statistical methods that racialized bodies and forged caste stratification (Seth 2010, 220). The state's contradictory practice of fixing identities on bodies, as if bodies were immutable proof of identity, while at the same time inventing and reshaping ethnic identities according to its needs can be retraced across all colonial states. And with statistical racialization came the creation of "others" who did not belong to the state and therefore constituted a menace. For example, India's colonial state wrote the 1871 Criminal Tribes Act explicitly to criminalize and control certain ethnic groups by forcing them to register with the state (Seth 2010, 223).

Colonial policies varied according to the economic interests of colonizers. Patrick Wolfe (2006) explains the U.S. political economy of racial difference. The racial difference between Indians and blacks reveals their antithetical roles in the formation of U.S. settler society. The enslavement of black people produced an inclusive taxonomy that lingers on today in the form of the "one-drop rule." For Indians, in contrast, the blood quantum applied, leading to "half-breeds" and contemporary regulations that require one-quarter Indian ancestry for official recognition. The multiplication of slaves enriched the slave-owning settler economy, whereas the disappearance of Indigenous peoples facilitated settlers' access to land.

In Ecuador, indigeneity is historically associated with *huasipungo*, the Kichwa term referring to labor bondage. The state did not officially account for Indian populations, who were deprived of citizenship rights while they were subordinated to an exploitative system of tax collection and labor conscription. This invisibility was the basis for Indigenous forced labor and servitude late into the twentieth century. The huasipungo officially ended with the 1963 agrarian reform, its practice even later. Indians were free from labor bondage but were still denied adequate socioeconomic means of survival. As in most cases of abolition, they were freed from quasi-feudal forms of slavery only to be imprisoned in miserable life conditions, excluded from formal education, and deprived of political rights. Ecuador was one of the last countries in Latin America to extend voting rights to illiterate people. Indigenous peoples were subaltern groups excluded from formal education and, by extension, suffrage

until 1978, when a constitutional clause attaching literacy to suffrage was cancelled. By 1999, when the state had restored ethnic categories to national census statistics, Indigenous identity had long been associated with servitude, poverty, and marginality.

The negative connotations of Indigenous identity were rooted in its association with slavery. Van Deusen (2015, 28) found that already in the sixteenth century Native elites preferred not to identify as *Indios*, even if Spaniards identified them as such, because indigeneity referred to tributary subjects and Native lords did not pay tribute. In legal cases, Native complainants preferred to identify with their place of origin, be it a village or a political domain. At the time, the term *Indio* in Castilian referred not to ethnic belonging but to slavery, reflecting the socioeconomic dimensionality of Indianness.

The separation of Indigenous peoples from the rest of society was at the core of colonial nation-making. Seth (2010) traces the concept of indigeneity back to the European Enlightenment because it refers to peoples who do not belong to political modernity. Indians are the quintessential others who have no part in the republican project. This invented identity is an ambiguous, contested racial and political marker that differentiated citizens from noncitizens in the seventeenth century just as it does now (O'Hara and Fisher 2009). It came to refer to the peasants and *huasipungueros* exploited and kept at the margins of society and still evokes a degrading set of characteristics, largely associated with extreme poverty and subordination. A history of indigeneity is crucial to understanding why Indigenous populations may have strong incentives to detach themselves from their own past in the pursuit of better lives. For many, indigeneity is an identity to be ashamed of. The way out of poverty often translates into assimilation within mestizo society: moving to urban areas, putting on mestizo clothing, and leaving one's "poor" identity behind. In that sense, indigeneity is to be understood as a political identity clearly embedded in state formation and attached to colonial economics of racialization (De la Cadena 2002).

INDIGENEITY AS A RELATION TO THE STATE

Indigeneity is so difficult to define in part because it is a relational identity, not a stand-alone category. Indigeneity refers not only to peoples whose presence *precedes* the arrival of European colonizers in the New World, as explicitly mentioned in international law, but also to peoples who stand *outside* the state. Thus, indigeneity is defined in relation to the state. Scholars have probed this

relational dynamic in various colonial contexts. Catherine Hall (2002) describes how the British Empire was built through the mirror of the colonized in Jamaica. Andrew Canessa (2005) explains how indigeneity indicates a relationship to the state in Bolivia. In contrast, there are no Indigenous peoples in Europe. European minorities who maintain distinct cultures (the Bretons in France) and languages (Catalan in Spain) are not identified as Indigenous. The construction of modern nation-states in Europe repressed minority cultural practices to assert a national homogeneity. Yet it was not a colonial conquest that maintained an other within. European states incorporated all cultural groups, independent of linguistic differences, into the social contract. Indigenous peoples of the New World, by contrast, have historically been kept *outside* the state and denied political membership in the form of citizenship.

Indigeneity refers fundamentally to political exclusion. It refers to those who preceded and did not participate in the construction of the modern nation-state, invoking a historical continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial societies. What makes societies tribal in India or Indigenous in Canada is their precedence with regard to the state, tangible from language to territories. What they share is a history of exclusion from the modern state, not a specific cultural belonging. Indigenous belonging is impossible to define in itself because it has no internal referent. Rather, it is a fluid identity that encompasses different claims contingent on varying histories of colonial state-making. As a result, it cannot be strictly defined in international law because it refers less to a constitutive "who/what" than to an implied otherness.

Indigenous peoples are the ultimate outsiders not because they are pure or authentic (they are not), but because indigeneity historically identifies this imaginary other against which the modern state could invent itself. Indigeneity refers to those peoples who do not belong in European political modernity, the "local" and "cultural" others without a history, in contrast to the "modern," "universal" state. Whether Indians were excluded from state-making in the Andes or "disappeared" in North America (O'Brien 2010), they were all cast as outsiders unworthy of political modernity. It is still difficult to see who is Indigenous today largely because this identity is so profoundly relational. In other words, it's not about the Indian, it's about the state. Indigeneity is intrinsically co-constitutive of the modern state and makes no sense without it. It serves as a mirror to the state.

Female indigeneity, in turn, mirrors the patriarchal state. Virginia Woolf (1929) argued that women serve as men's looking glass. Applying this concept, Ann MacGrath (1990) argues that Indigenous women have served as the white

man's looking glass. Sexism is a core feature of colonialism. Because Indigenous women were considered freely available to colonizers, their conquest represented a central tenet of the larger conquest of the New World. Karen Powers (2005) describes Indigenous women as the crucible of sixteenth-century conquest, while Andrea Smith (2005) argues that conquest was (and continues to be) largely enacted on women's bodies. Indigenous women serve as a double reflection of the European state, doubly inferior and thus doubly vulnerable to exclusions. That is why, as Marisol de la Cadena (1992) puts it, Andean women are considered "more Indian" than their male counterparts.

OVERLAPPING EXCLUSIONS

The testimony of the Mapuche feminist Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef (2002) contains experiences of discrimination both from a dominant racist society and from within the community, where men abuse their gendered power. Her story resonates with the experiences of most Indigenous women. They stand at the margins of the social contract, vulnerable to overlapping systems of marginalization coming from the state and their own communities. Their lives are marked by structural violence, and they are historically excluded by colonial processes of state-making. The few indicators available to describe their situation illustrate structural poverty, which combines low educational levels, poor health, economic un-freedoms, and limited political representation. As women, they are also marginalized by patriarchal patterns prevailing within Indigenous communities. Domestic and sexual violence only exacerbate a geography of exclusion.

UN-FREEDOMS: PERVASIVE, SEVERE POVERTY

Indigenous peoples face pervasive, severe poverty and are overwhelmingly present among the poorest of the poor. Indigenous peoples make up less than 5 percent of the global population but comprise about 15 percent of the world's poor (World Bank 2016). Everywhere in the world, their quality of life is strikingly worse than that of the general population. They uniformly have less access to water and education, as well as greater risks of illness and unemployment, than other groups.

In Latin America, the most unequal region in the world, Indigenous peoples are systematically among the poorest, and Indigenous poverty shows the

stickiest rates (World Bank 2016). Indigenous peoples have barely benefited from the recent redistribution of rights, income, and public services that have raised millions of people out of poverty in recent decades (UNDP 2013). In fact, public power is remiss to the point of cruelty in terms of the provision of public services and the welfare of Native populations. Over 80 percent of Guatemala's Indigenous population is living in poverty, as compared to 40 percent of the general population.[5] In Colombia, Indigenous households have both the highest rate of multidimensional poverty (58 percent in 2010) and the lowest rates of poverty reduction (Angulo, Díaz, and Pardo 2011). In Peru, the figures stand at 79 percent compared to 50 percent and in Bolivia, 64 percent to 48 percent, respectively (UNICEF 2003; UNPFII 2015). In Paraguay, poverty is 7.9 times higher among Indigenous peoples, and in Panama it is 5.9 times higher (UNPFII 2015, 27). In Mexico, poverty impacts 45 percent of society but 72 percent of Indigenous populations (Coneval 2012); extreme poverty is three times higher among Indigenous populations (Cord, Genoni and Rodríguez-Castelán 2015, 202). It is of course difficult to reverse Indigenous poverty if inclusion is the most widespread of equality mechanisms (Therborn 2013, 64) and if Indigenous peoples are the historical other that has been systematically excluded from state-making.

Indigeneity brings with it discrimination and structural violence. In many countries, public spending on basic social services systematically discriminates against Indigenous peoples (UNDP 2004). The World Bank (2011) attributes over 40 percent of differences in earning to "unexplained" factors: about half the earning differential for Indigenous peoples is not related to education, skills, or abilities but is instead the result of discrimination. In other words, education is not sufficient to lift Indigenous peoples out of poverty since they face tremendous difficulty in transforming human capital into economic improvement or greater well-being.

But Indigenous poverty is often invisible. In a preliminary review of the Millennium Development Goals, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) noted that 68 percent of countries did not mention the situation of Indigenous and tribal peoples (Tauli Corpuz 2005). The case of Bolivia is emblematic. Although the country has the largest Indigenous population in South America, Bolivia's MDG report makes no mention of Indigenous peoples. India, in contrast, mentions tribal populations but has done little to reverse colonial inequality: Scheduled Tribes face the same gap in secondary education today as they did under British rule in 1945 (Rai 2011, 4).

In Ecuador some sources estimate up to 90 percent of the Indigenous population to be living in poverty (Camacho and Jácome 2008). Chimborazo is the province with the highest proportion of Indigenous population, ranging from 38 to 60 percent depending on estimates, and also the poorest.[6] Poverty is heightened further among Indigenous women: their well-being is significantly lower than all other sectors of society. Discrimination related to ethnicity and gender joins with the fact that most live in rural areas. Social indicators signal high levels of poverty, with bigger gender gaps than the general society in relation to income and more than 50 percent of the economically active women working nonremunerated jobs (García-Aracil and Winter 2006; Vásconez 2005, 276).

Economic un-freedoms hit Indigenous women particularly hard, with deep gender gaps in relation to income and property. CONAIE (2009, 152) estimated that about 40 percent of Indigenous women were unemployed in 2009. In the province of Chimborazo, 60 percent of women were self-employed in 2005 (CEDIS 2005). In Chile only a third of Indigenous women were considered economically active in the mid-2000s, meaning that two-thirds had no formal income (MIDEPLAN 2005, 50). The challenge of rural livelihoods is accentuated by unequal gender roles. Men often migrate out from the community in search of work, while most women take on numerous nonremunerated chores, including caring for the family, working in the fields, and taking care of the animals. For women, these chores mean no stable salary; for children, they limit school attendance. Women in rural Chimborazo identify the lack of time as a major obstacle to education or to holding political positions (Cucuri 2007).

Everywhere in the world, health invariably is worst among Indigenous societies. Across the Americas, Indigenous peoples' lives are on average ten to twenty years shorter than those of the general population. Data collected by the World Health Organization reveal staggering inequalities. Inuit youth have one of the highest rates of suicide in the world, at eleven times Canada's national average, and in Panama the average infant mortality rate among Indigenous children is over three times higher than that of the overall population (WHO 2007). Indigenous children in Brazil suffer from anemia more than twice as much as non-Indigenous children.[7] In Amazonia child mortality among the Xavantes reached over 141.4 deaths for each thousand born; a similar ratio is on record for Altamira, in the Brazilian state of Pará (Lavinas 2016). In Guatemala, children have double the general levels of chronic malnutrition (Minority Rights Group International 2013, 12). The World Bank (2017) reports that Guatemala has the

FIGURE 2. Tránsito Amaguaña in her home with her great-grandchild on a Sunday afternoon, La Chimba (2008).

highest mortality rate in Latin America with three quarters of maternal deaths among women of Indigenous ancestry.

In Ecuador Indigenous women's access to health facilities is extremely low, leading to high levels of infant and maternal mortality (CEDIS 2005; Guzmán 2005). Child mortality between zero and five years of age is more than doubled among mothers who speak a native language other than Spanish—respectively 38.5 and 90.5 deaths per thousand live births to Spanish and Native speakers in 2001 (Guzmán 2005, 203). Where the data exist, we also see alarming rates of infection with HIV/AIDS. In the Amazon province of Morona Santiago, for instance, the rate of infection has increased 680 percent between 2000 and 2015; Indigenous individuals make up half the recorded cases.[8] Indigenous peoples have such extreme health disparities compared to other groups that UN committees have identified these as a serious human rights concern. It is a global trend that testifies to centuries of exploitation, as well as displacement and exclusion from public services, which continues today. For example, Ecuador's National Office for Indigenous Peoples' Health (Dirección Nacional de Salud

de los Pueblos Indígenas) counted eighteen regional offices in 2009 but received only 0.25 percent of the state budget (CONAIE 2009,142).

Rural populations are hit harder. Women living in rural areas travel twice the distance to reach health providers as do women in urban areas (CEDIS 2005, 47). Over 50 percent of the women who identify as Indigenous give birth at home, usually without the support of a midwife (Guzmán 2005, 210), in a context where pregnancy- and birth-related complications are the main causes of female mortality (CONAMU 2005, 40). It is not only distance but also health costs and racism that make care less accessible. Indigenous women usually lack the financial means to afford formal health care and often feel discriminated against by racist personnel in institutions dismissive of their culture and language. In addition, Indigenous notions of health, entailing physical, mental, spiritual, and community well-being, are at odds with the positivist medicine offered in modern health systems. Close to 60 percent of Indigenous peoples and 47 percent of the non-Indigenous population report that they self-medicate when sick, for instance using plants (CONAIE 2009, 144). Malnutrition impacts most Indigenous provinces, and tuberculosis affects more than 13 percent of the population in the province of Chimborazo. Overall, high poverty and discrimination make Indigenous peoples more vulnerable to disease and simultaneously less likely to seek or receive medical treatment.

Indigenous groups lag behind in human capital and education, which is another flagrant area of exclusion. In Ecuador they exhibited an average of four years less schooling than the total population in 2012; in Bolivia their literacy rate was 13.7 percentage points lower than that of the general population (Cord, Genoni, and Rodríguez-Castelán 2015, 31). The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from formal education is manifest from primary to higher education. For instance, the Pan American Health Organization estimated that only 53 percent of the Indigenous population had access to primary education, 15 percent to secondary education, and 1 percent to university or higher education in 1998 (Del Álamo 2005, 111).

Gender further compounds schooling inequalities. In Ecuador illiteracy affects 26.7 percent of women who identify as Indigenous, about 20 percent of Indigenous men, 5 percent of mestizos, and less than 4 percent of whites (INEC 2010). Ecuadorians who self-identify as white have, on average, 10.7 years of schooling, mestizos 9.8, Afro-Ecuadorians 8.4, Montúbios 7.4,[9] and Indigenous peoples 6.4 (INEC 2010). Indigenous peoples benefit little from

public programs to combat illiteracy and boost educational attainment, and the lowest educational levels are accompanied by the starkest gender gaps.

Indigenous women's access to education is alarmingly low. In 2001 illiteracy affected under 10 percent of non-Indigenous women but over 30 percent of Indigenous women (INEC 2001). Illiteracy is highest in regions with the strongest Indigenous presence, like Chimborazo. There, the gender gap in education is far higher than anywhere else in the country, with the female illiteracy rate (30.9 percent) virtually double that of men (17.3 percent). In rural Chimborazo, only 10 percent of women finish high school (CEDIS 2005). The rural municipality of Guamote shows rates of functional illiteracy above 56 percent for women. In 2005 the province of Chimborazo recorded functional illiteracy for 35.5 percent of women and over 80 percent in the poorest parishes (CEDIS 2005). Over 80 percent of Indigenous girls between fifteen and seventeen were out of the school system in 1999 (García-Aracil and Winter 2006, 67). But poverty alone cannot be blamed for gender inequality. In Esmeraldas Afro-Ecuadorian populations also face poverty, but their rates of illiteracy among women are around 5 percent and are also lower than men's (INEC 2001). Afro-Ecuadorian and Indigenous populations endure high rates of poverty, but only Indigenous populations show extreme indicators of gender inequality in access to education.

The problem is not only that illiteracy rates are so high among women, but also that the gender gap remains even when illiteracy rates decrease. Illiteracy affects mostly women above forty-five. Yet even though illiteracy is drastically lower among young women (15.9 percent), their rate is still double the illiteracy level among young Indigenous men (8.1 percent). Literacy rates therefore indicate that Indigenous women face acute gender inequalities within their communities. According to a 2006 national labor survey, 67.8 percent of Indigenous women stop their studies to fulfill household duties and work in agriculture (INEC 2006). In contrast, over 32 percent of Indigenous men interrupt their studies to migrate to urban areas. Although bilingual rural schools tend to have low educational levels, they do nonetheless provide an opportunity for girls to be schooled. When the government decided to shut down such schools in 2014 because of their low performance, it deprived Indigenous girls of the few educational opportunities within their reach.

Across the board, women receive less schooling than men, they are forgotten by the government, and they shoulder responsibilities in their communities that reinforce their isolation, negatively impact their health, and increase their economic stress. These inequalities exist across the Andean region. An average

FIGURE 3. Indigenous peoples have too little land to let the cattle roam free; many Indigenous women collect grass and bring it daily to the cows.

Quechua man in Bolivia is 14 percent less likely to finish secondary school than a non-Indigenous man, but a Quechua women is 28 percent, or twice, as unlikely (World Bank 2013, 75). This accentuates women's financial dependency in the household as they work nonremunerated jobs on lands that they are less likely to own.

One of the various forms of violence against Indigenous women is their historical dispossession of land. Patrimonial inequality, an indicator of other gender gaps, is stark. Indigenous women own little, often unproductive, land and live below the poverty line. In rural Ecuador, 74 percent of the people who produce and own the means of production, mostly artisanal and agricultural, are men (Astete and García 2012). The low rates of land tenure among Indigenous women today are the result of multiple histories of dispossession. Scholars associate the decline in female landholding with Mexico's independence in 1821, when the judiciary gave women little legal autonomy to defend themselves when land possessions were challenged in court (Kanter 1995). This resulted in the near-disappearance of female land tenure by the late nineteenth century, and many women were forced to migrate to cities (in Mexico City, for instance, women constituted most of the population). Under the

huasipungo system, plots of land were passed down through male members of a family, the oldest son taking over or the plot forfeited, but never passed to the wife or daughter of a worker (Becker 1997, 112). This system required women to remain reliant on a male relative, whether it was a father, husband, or brother, to access land.

The continuation of unequal distribution of land ownership between men and women means that women now work on their husbands' fields, giving aggregate value to something that does not belong to them. It also means that they are more vulnerable to all sorts of further violence (Deere and León 2001). Land dispossession creates a lower status for rural women, which can include frequent domestic violence (possibly exacerbated by rising alcohol consumption), the use of rape as political violence, and being subjected to low-paying or unpaid agricultural jobs.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Poverty and lack of education hinder women's participation in formal politics, and this gender inequality is another sign of women's exclusion from the public realm. Few reach office at the local level, and fewer still at the national level. In 2013 a UNDP report mapped the state of Indigenous political participation in Latin America. Only fourteen of Mexico's five hundred lower-house representatives were Indigenous; four of them were women (2012–15). In Guatemala Indigenous people occupied 19 out of 158 seats in Parliament, three of them women (2012–16). Of 130 parliamentarians in Peru, only 9 were Indigenous people, 2 of them women (2011–16). In Bolivia, where Indigenous peoples are the majority of the population, 41 of the 130 members of parliament are Indigenous, and 9 of those are women.

Only 4 Indigenous women (and 1 Afro-Ecuadorian) were among the 138 members of Ecuador's Congress in 2014: Estela Acero Lachimba and Betty Jerez from Alianza País, Rosa Muñoz (elected for Chimborazo through a highly contested electoral alliance between Alianza País and Pachakutik), and Lourdes Tibán (Pachakutik). Indigenous were considerably less present than non-Indigenous women, who represented nearly 40 percent of all congressmembers. Indigenous women are underrepresented in regional office as well. In Chimborazo women dropped from twenty-three out of seventy-two council members in 2004 to only thirteen in 2011. The overall proportion of women in regional office remains low and at times declines.

The irony is that Ecuador has historically been at the vanguard of women's political rights. It was the first Latin American country to grant women suffrage (in 1929). It was the second country to establish electoral quotas for women after the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. Female participation in Congress doubled between 1998 and 2005, largely because of the 1997 labor laws and the 2000 reforms of electoral law (Guzmán 2003; Cañete 2005). In January 2014, Ecuador ranked ninth in the world for the highest percentage of women in parliament (41.6 percent; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014). Women have also historically been central in the emergence of Ecuador's modern Indigenous movement. Leaders Dolores Cacuango and Tránsito Amaguaña founded the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians in 1944, and Nina Pacari fought for Indigenous land titling during the many phases of slow agrarian reform through the 1970s. Hundreds of thousands of Indigenous women joined the *levantamientos*, or uprisings, of the 1990s, carrying children on their backs and both managing the heavy food logistics and marching in the frontlines against police blockages (Pacari 1993).

However, women's decision-making power remains limited, and scholars point to the uneven achievements of legislation (Lind 2005), the partial implementation of laws (Vega Ugalde 2005), and the concentration of women at parochial, municipal, and provincial levels rather than in national office (Cañete 2005, 144).[10] A recent increase in women in Congress has been countered by a surge in sexist violence. Elected women in Ecuador face a variety of aggressions, such as exclusion from decision-making within their parties, electoral invisibility, sexist insults by male colleagues (even the president), isolation, and threats. In 2013 parliamentary women were punished by their own majority party, Alianza País, for proposing legislation to decriminalize abortion. The incident caused an uproar and exposed the fact that increasing the absolute number of women in government is not the same as giving women a voice charged with political authority.

Indigenous women are less numerous than non-Indigenous women but face more political intimidation. In Ecuador Pachakutik legislator Tibán suffered frequent verbal aggressions during her six years in office; in 2015, she was beaten to the ground as she was about to enter Congress (*Plan V* 2015). In Bolivia female elected officials face regular attacks. The case of two female politicians assaulted by their male colleagues in May 2017 generated social turmoil not because it was exceptional but because such attacks are becoming normalized. Two female *concejalas* were sexually attacked by their colleagues

in Tapacarí, Cochabamba, a mostly Quechua-speaking municipality. Erenia Villca Nina and Elizabeth Antonieta Ureña were sexually assaulted in a car after a work meeting. Nina told the police that she fought to resist rape, had her underwear torn apart, and then was verbally abused and beaten on the roadside. When Mayor Severino Vargas Zelaya arrived at the scene, he incited more violence against the two Indigenous women and said, "Why haven't you raped these whores?! . . . Rape them, throw them in the river" (Consulado de Bolivia 2017). This assault against elected officials by members of their own party shows that sexual violence is not only tolerated but also encouraged. Sexual violence is also used as a form of political violence to intimidate victims. This case of attempted rape illustrates the trend of political harassment. In 2016 the Association of Bolivian Concejalas registered a total of sixty-five cases of harassment in the country; not one was condemned in court.[11] Since the Law Against Harassment and Political Violence was passed in 2010, 346 women elected to municipal office have reported attacks; only a fourth of the attackers have been sentenced.

Indigenous women are barred from formal politics by sexist and racist practices that intensify the effects of their scarcity of resources, time, and education. In communities, women are assigned roles involving community work and political protests but rarely have decision-making power. Women recall their engagement in the levantamientos of the 1990s as a boost of self-confidence.[12] They took to the streets alongside men and traveled to the capital. Yet women became dispensable when social movements evolved into formal politics. Women were largely mobilized to assure the success of protests, but they were pushed aside when the time for electoral politics arrived. Political parties did not integrate Indigenous women into their lists for the 2000 and 2004 regional elections, making the legal reforms "imperceptible" for Indigenous women (Pacari 2002, 5). Despite a few female leaders who stood out, the vast majority of women have had little decision-making power to shape policy. They now participate in community meetings, but low self-esteem combined with patriarchal practices shut them down. Many complain that their opinions do not count, nor are their interests taken into consideration (Cucuri 2007, 27). According to sexist customs, men's voices represent the collective whereas women's are secondary.

Within their communities, Indigenous women are prey to sexist violence. Outside their communities, they endure more racism than Indigenous men since women are "more Indian." At the polls, they are harassed and

discriminated against for their limited education and lack of proficiency in Spanish. After monitoring discrimination at the polls during Ecuadorian elections, the Q'ellkaj Foundation (2005) concluded that most discriminatory practices are directed at Indigenous women in the form of verbal, psychological, and even physical aggression. The foundation reports that many Indigenous women are denigrated as "Maria." The case of the congressional delegate Hilaria Supa in Peru reveals how gender biases combine with socioeconomic discrimination to discredit Indigenous women. When Humalista congressperson Hilaria Supa, a Quechua woman, was appointed as president of Peru's Commission on Education in Congress, her Fujimorista colleague Martha Hildebrandt decried her cultural incapacity. Hildebrandt ridiculed the fact that the Commission on Education would be presided over by someone with "such a low intellectual and academic level" while defending herself against any racist interpretation: "It's not that she is Indian, if she was an Indian graduated from Oxford I would not oppose it" (*El Comercio* 2010). Hildebrandt stepped down from the commission in protest. If Supa had graduated from Oxford, and been socialized as such an education entails, she would most likely not have been labeled as Indian. In fact, Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo (who received a PhD from Stanford University and was a visiting scholar at Harvard) was never labeled as an Indian even though he was born on an impoverished Quechua farm and grew up shining shoes. He was instead defined as a specialist in the economics of education of those with Indigenous ancestry. Such episodes reveal the multifaceted oppressions at play against Indigenous women. Their demands are sidelined as secondary and their struggles rarely conceived of as political.

There are exceptions, like the case of Pacari in Ecuador. Pacari went on to become the first Indigenous vice president of Ecuador's national legislature; she was appointed foreign affairs minister under President Gutiérrez, then moved to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Yet her powerful leadership was insufficient to bring gender equity to the forefront of Indigenous politics. Overall, Indigenous women are vulnerable to institutional exclusions and are still largely missing from mainstream politics. This is perhaps why the Zapatista National Liberation Army chose a Nahua woman, Maria Jose de Patricio Martinez, to run as their candidate in the 2018 Mexican presidential election. In combination with other structural forms of violence like illiteracy, poor health, and low income, political exclusion contributes to exceptionally high levels of physical violence against individual women.

THE INTERLOCKING ROOTS OF VIOLENCE

Gender-based violence constitutes one of the major challenges to human rights globally, yet it is even more systematic and involves more layers of oppression when it happens in Indigenous contexts. Violence against Indigenous women is widespread from the southern Andes to Canada. In Ecuador, beatings are many women's daily bread, but this permanent threat remains largely invisible and difficult to measure. Governments do not bother to collect data. Victims, in turn, have little incentive to report the crimes to inefficient justice systems that often harass more than they protect them. Public policy is still disturbingly absent. This is not specific to Indigenous cultures or to Ecuador. Rather, what is specific to Indigenous women is a geography of oppression at the intersections of gender inequality and ethnic discrimination.

Reports collect evidence largely based on ethnographic and qualitative analyses, and the levels and forms of violence against Indigenous women are deep enough to be defined as epidemics. The evidence available shows that domestic violence is condoned by sexist institutions, both within Indigenous and ordinary systems of justice. Beyond the courts, it looms as a larger problem embedded in the colonial legacy of sexual violence as a tool of conquest.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Domestic violence against Indigenous women in Ecuador takes myriad forms, ranging from emotional to physical aggression. Psychological violence through verbal abuse, mistreatment, and threats undermines the already low self-esteem of women who have little incentive to believe in their rights and capabilities. Physical violence is commonplace, with similarly devastating consequences for women's mental and physical health.[13] Given the lack of specific data, one approach for assessing the situation of Indigenous women is to look at regions that are predominantly Indigenous. Isabel Goicolea's (2001) research in the Amazonian province of Orellana indicates that women perceive gender inequality as their most pressing concern. She cites as the biggest problems husband beatings (84 percent), men drinking too much (56 percent), economic problems (52 percent), and husbands humiliating their wives (48 percent; Goicolea 2001, 196). Women and health workers link physical and psychological forms of violence. Her interviews reveal that alcohol abuse and community opinion exacerbate men's violence and boost their sense of honor and patriarchal roles. In

other words, gossip, infidelity, and prostitution reinforce collective expectations of machismo. Meanwhile, the scarcity of resources, poor infrastructure, and patronizing attitudes among health-care staff all limit women's access to state programs designed to secure reproductive health.

Rates of violence are high across Chimborazo, and effects range from broken bones to vaginal burns from chili sauce to torture and assassination.[14] The abuse is intense and frequent, compromising women's physical integrity and their sexual and reproductive health, and often putting their lives at risk.[15] Domestic abuse appears to be highest among Indigenous groups, with physical and psychological violence affecting 44 and 45 percent of families, respectively (CEPAR 2005). Among couples, psychological abuse is most common and affects 45 percent of women, followed by physical (38 percent) and sexual violence (21 percent). Girls are particularly vulnerable. Studies estimate from 41 percent (CEPAR 2005) to 76 percent (CONAIE 2009, 143) of Indigenous girls under fifteen years of age are victims of physical abuse. Although sexual and domestic violence is commonplace (Cucuri 2007), it is typically dismissed as a matter to be resolved in private (Pequeño 2009a). In the city of Alausí, domestic violence affected 83 percent of women in 2004, mostly on a recurring basis and in the conjugal realm because of alcoholism and jealousy (CEPAR 2005). In the town of Saraguro, province of Loja, the Casa de la Mujer de Saraguro shelters about five thousand women escaping domestic violence every year. Flor Cartucho has welcomed Indigenous, peasant, and mestizo women during the fourteen years she has worked there and says Indigenous women suffer the most because they are women, Indigenous, poor, and, on top of it all, illiterate.[16]

Systematic violence results in growing fear and anguish, public health problems, and the erosion of trust in social relations. This trend is accentuated among Indigenous women, who have, in practice, little or no access to the mechanisms of justice. The few victims of physical and sexual violence who look for institutional support contact *comisarías de la mujer* (3.7 percent), normal police stations (2.5 percent), churches (1.2 percent), health institutions (0.3 percent), and women's organizations (0.2 percent; CEPAR 2005). Comisarías de la mujer are designed to attend victims of domestic violence. The result of feminist demands, they were some of the first public policies created to respond to high levels of violence against women in Latin America. In countries like Brazil and Peru they are police units, whereas in others, like Ecuador, they administer justice.[17]

The comisaría de la mujer in Riobamba, the capital of the Chimborazo province, received more than three thousand cases in 2010, and the foundation

Nosotras con Equidad, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that helps victims of violence, had over one thousand cases. Women revealed the extent of the sexual violence they had suffered during workshops on gender-based violence across the province (Cucuri 2007). A girl's first sexual experience, they said, is often rape, and victims tend to be shamed, blamed for being "easy." When a rape leads to pregnancy, girls either must marry the rapist to normalize the relationship or try to get rid of the child by killing the infant at birth (Cucuri 2007). Some young mothers take extreme measures to escape the stigma of rape resulting in pregnancies by committing suicide or abandoning a newborn baby in a cemetery to be eaten by dogs. In Chimborazo women report being discouraged from pursuing a public life, having male friends, or even combing their hair so as not to attract attention. Although women are gaining some freedom, external control over their bodies and beatings from husbands remain all too common.

Sexuality has a complicated legacy embedded in colonial violence. Karen Powers (2005) discusses how Spanish patriarchy permeated colonial Latin America and how Indigenous women were disenfranchised by gender ideologies. Other scholars argue that processes of republican state formation strengthened patriarchy. Erin O'Connor (2007, 22) explains that men gained new rights, whereas women were further subordinated within marriage, and suggests that nation-making in Ecuador modernized patriarchy. Without falling into truncating paradigms that define Indigenous women solely as victims of rape, we must understand the extent to which the sexuality of Indigenous women has historically been a space in which to establish colonial authority. In Ecuador landlords fully controlled the bodies of Indigenous women until the 1960s. It is known in the collective memory transmitted orally across generations that Indigenous girls were married at an early age to be placed under the protective authority of husbands. This was a way to minimize sexual attacks from landlords, priests, and majordomos. But landlords still "inaugurated" the young brides under the infamous *derecho de pernada*, and priests raped them, supposedly to instruct them about sex. In Chimborazo the hacienda Llinllín was particularly notorious for the sexual exploitation of Indigenous women. Mama Jacoba recalls getting married when she was "just a girl" after attempted rapes by the landlord (Lyons 2006, 167). This form of institutionalized rape lasted at least until the abolition of the huasipungo in 1963.

But if the huasipungo ended, its legacy is indelible in the bodies of Indigenous women who are still violable. Arranged marriages at early ages are going out of fashion, but rape is rampant. Across the province, women complain about

sexual obligations: more often than not, they are expected to be sexually available to their husbands. Whereas men have affairs rather openly, often maintaining multiple families, women's infidelity is taboo and severely punished, sometimes with death. When husbands engage in extramarital affairs, spouses are often accused of being bad wives.

Indigenous victims of gender-based violence are left alone to fend for themselves. Violence against Indigenous women is largely invisible because it is actively dismissed both among non-Indigenous organizations and Indigenous sectors. Cases of violence are rarely discussed in community assemblies, and male authorities refuse to acknowledge the problem. This invisibility was latent in a special 2006 UN report about Indigenous human rights in Ecuador that does not mention gender issues. Similarly, Ecuador's National Women's Organization (CONAMU) rarely paid attention to violence against Indigenous women, discounting it as a cultural problem and seldom tackling it through the office of cultural affairs. These examples show that violence against Indigenous women tends not to be treated seriously, whether it is within the community or in the dominant society.

FIGURE 4. Blanca and her mother at the market of Guamote, the largest in the highlands, which circulates over half a million dollars a day (2008).

For Indigenous women, domestic violence is like a disease, a sort of illness men contract, in part because domestic violence is correlated with alcohol abuse. Husbands beat women when they return home drunk, and children know their fathers become violent when *chumadito* (Boira, Carbajosa, and Méndez 2016, 12).[18] The violent behavior linked to alcohol has led many families to convert to Evangelical faiths in Chimborazo. The Evangelicals condemn alcohol use as a sin and preach about a pure life without vices—as women say, "Without vice there is no abuse" (Andrade 2004). It was in response to dominical violence that Ecuador's government prohibited the sale of hard liquors and beer on Sundays between 2010 and 2016.

Violence against women is also perceived as an acquired illness because it spread with colonial power structures. Sexual violence is not an Indian tradition, it is a historical tool of patriarchy and colonialism. Andrea Smith (2005) explains that sexual violence was a tool of genocide in the United States, and the rape of Indigenous women during the huasipungo in Ecuador cannot be understood merely as individual acts of violence. Rapes were part of a larger strategy to destroy Indigenous peoples, their dignity, and the foundations of community life. The logic of sexual violence against Indigenous women structures colonial policies to this very day. Racialized colonization dehumanizes Indigenous people into dirty, bestial bodies that do not count. Smith (2005,10) compares the rape of Indigenous women to that of prostitutes who are "rapable" because they are considered inherently dirty and undeserving of respect.

The engrained racism among Ecuadorian elites leads them to ignore or even naturalize sexual violence against Indigenous women. The official speeches of President Correa, calling Indigenous authorities "ignorant" and "savages," reinforce the process of bestialization of Indigenous others. Inevitably, racist stereotypes portray Indigenous relations as more violent than mestizo ones. But violence against women is not an Indigenous exception; rather, it is a colonial legacy that affects women across Ecuador and throughout Latin America. Ecuador's 2011 National Survey on Family Relations and Gender Violence reported that six out of ten women had suffered violence and that almost 98 percent of physical violence against women came from their partners (Boira, Carbajosa, and Méndez 2016). Feminicide has been on the rise nationwide. In January 2017, the rate of feminicide doubled compared to 2016, with a woman killed every thirty-two hours.[19] There are few studies available on rural women; most information on violence against women comes from urban areas. For instance, almost fifteen thousand complaints were filed in Guayas during 2016.

But violence against Indigenous women is invisible in official accounts. Despite the lack of data, however, Indigenous women agree on two things: violence is significant, and very few women denounce it.

THE REMACHE CASE

Few cases of violence ever surface legally. One of the few that gained attention was the case of congressional delegate Estuardo Remache, who was charged with domestic abuse in 2006. Once a grassroots leader in Chimborazo, then president of ECUARUNARI, Remache was elected to Congress for Pachakutik in 2005 and was soon after appointed president of the Human Rights Commission there. He represented Ecuador's multiethnic, inclusive democracy. Yet in 2006 he was charged at the Comisaría de la Mujer y de la Familia of Riobamba, Chimborazo, with beating María Lucrecia Nono, then twenty-eight years old, his partner of twelve years and the mother of his five children (ages ten, eight, six, four, and two). Multiple police reports detail the nature and extent of the violence perpetrated by Remache against Nono: photos of bruises and black eyes accompany descriptions of repeated verbal, psychological, physical, and sexual aggressions. In 2006 Remache's partner presented herself three times at the special police station for women seeking help for domestic abuse. She received no help, and the violence did not stop. The Remache case is emblematic because it epitomizes the acceptability of violence against Indigenous women in Ecuador.

Police reports indicate a history of multifaceted abuse.[20] According to Nono, the violence started after Remache learned that she had undergone a contraceptive surgery without his consent. At first, he publicly accused her of being a "whore" and a "woman of comfort"; Nono reported being repeatedly accused of infidelity and sexual promiscuity while Remache engaged publicly in extraconjugal affairs. Beatings were followed by forced sexual relations and tight control over her social interactions. He locked her in the house, forbade her from seeing family and friends, blackmailed her, and forced her to give up work outside the home. Nono felt vulnerable to his power as congressional delegate. At the time of her last complaint, in October 2006, medical and photographic evidence supported her descriptions of severe physical abuse, such as kicks to the stomach and punches in the face.

In the end, the aggressor suffered less punishment than the victim. The Forum of Parliamentary Women, then composed of all nineteen women serving

in Congress, expressed indignation and forced his removal from the Human Rights Commission. He was also suspended from Congress for sixty days. But Remache never bothered to appear before the relevant *comisaría* in Chimborazo. Instead, he used legislation on Indigenous justice to request the case be dismissed so that the conjugal matter could be addressed through traditional systems within his community. Meanwhile, Nono faced high costs for denouncing her aggressor. Her children were forcibly removed from her, Remache's family pressured her to drop all charges if she ever wanted to see them again, and her family members were fired from jobs at the municipal office. Isolated and scared, Nono eventually returned to the police station, accompanied by Remache's brothers, to give a coerced declaration in which she dropped all charges. The declaration rejects the authority of ordinary justice and accuses the comisaría of violating family honor and intimacy by letting a private matter become a national "spectacle." Nono's lawyer is attacked for letting "a small and domestic problem" become a political issue, and her advocating for individual women's rights over communal justice is classified as part of "orthodox judicial norms."[21]

Twice Nono came back to report more abuse. She struggled until October 2006, after which she gave up on a lengthy, inefficient judicial process that seemed to put her more at risk than it provided her safety. With no judicial system to protect her or hold Remache accountable for his violent behavior, Nono had few alternatives. Divorce is not a common practice among Indigenous peoples in Chimborazo, nor did Nono have viable economic options to provide for her children outside the community. At last, she abided by her male community leaders' directives to reject the state legal system and resume the relationship. Hemmed in by cultural and economic pressures, Nono felt compelled to return home.

Pachakutik showed little support for women's rights during this case. While some CONAIE leaders played ostriches, burying their heads in the sand, others publicly supported Remache. Lourdes Tibán, a prominent Indigenous politician and then-president of the Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE), went along with party politics and backed Remache's impunity. Turning a blind eye to gender-based violence (and Nono), Tibán publicly supported the authority of communal justice over the case (calling on ordinary justice to stay out of Indigenous culture) and went out of her way to pressure police officials at the comisaría in Riobamba (threatening to close it unless they dropped the case). Remache's strategic defense invoking

Indigenous autonomy reveals how Indigenous justice can be used as a tool to shield the accused from accountability instead of to protect victims.[22] Ecuador's Indigenous movement has undeniably been a pillar in the process of democratization, yet the movement reproduces the gender violence and inequality present in the larger non-Indigenous society. Ultimately, the Remache case shows a violent overlap of oppressions at the intersection of state marginalization and gender inequalities within Indigenous communities.

JUDICIAL FAULT LINES: STUCK BETWEEN GENDER BIAS AND ETHNIC EXCLUSION

When it comes to seeking justice, there are no good options available to Indigenous women (Sieder and Sierra 2010; Salgado Álvarez 2005). Ordinary justice might consist of a normative framework based on gender equality, but in practice it is inefficient, costly, and discriminatory. Indigenous justice, while accessible, immediate, and geared toward reconciliation, tends to silence cases of domestic and sexual violence. The Remache case vividly illustrates the vulnerable situation of Indigenous women. When seeking redress from violence, they are caught between inefficiency and injustice.

Gender equality is not one of the strengths of Indigenous justice (Pequeño 2009b; Zolezzi 2009). While Indigenous justice offers democratized access and speedy resolution without ethnic discrimination, its valuable focus on reconciliation nevertheless tends to come at the expense of women's rights. The Remache case is far from exceptional. Like state systems worldwide, many community justice systems across Latin America perpetuate patriarchal biases detrimental to women (Otzoy 2008). Aura Cumes (2009) insists that state and Indigenous justice fails Maya women in Guatemala. When cases go public, women are judged by men in accordance with patriarchal structures. In Mexica communities, it is common for cases of domestic abuse to be ignored in community councils or for victims to be punished instead of their aggressors and to be marginalized by social sanctions that shame them as "bad wives" (Sieder and Sierra 2010). During my first visit to Chimborazo in 2004, an elderly woman told me that her niece had been whipped with her husband after he had attempted an escape with a lover. She justified the punishment by saying that her niece had to learn to be a "good wife."

Such gender-biased justice is commonplace in conjugal matters. Cases of adultery reproduce the same double standard that applied to white women

under patriarchal colonial law. Adultery is tolerated for men, whereas women are severely punished for it (Powers 2005). Sometimes, women are even blamed for provoking their husbands' infidelity, as in the case just mentioned. When Mariana Yumbay stood as the sole Indigenous woman among the judges in the Supreme Court of Justice in the province of Bolívar,[23] she expressed frustration that conjugal conflicts, especially adultery, made up a disproportionate number of justice rulings in Indigenous communities. Indigenous justice can fall into the trap of regulating the private sphere, and when it does so it reveals a stark patriarchal bias detrimental to women.

Indigenous justice faces the challenge of gendered accountability. Customary judicial systems must integrate women into political processes and protect them from patriarchal legacies in the community. Indigenous justice in the Andes is, by definition, oral and contextual, decided on a case-by-case basis. This can be a strength or an opportunity for the abuse of power. Indeed, cultural discourses are often used to mask power inequalities. For example, certain communities limit women from participating in assemblies (Pequeño 2009b; Vintimilla 2009). The problem is not customary justice itself, but who defines custom and for what purpose. Currently, Indigenous cultures are largely defined by leaders who tend to be men. When abused and manipulated, culture can become an arbitrary tool. In the Remache case, for instance, ancestral procedures were subject to significant power inequalities. Rachel Sieder and María-Teresa Sierra (2010) emphasize structural factors to explain Indigenous women's lack of access to justice in Latin America. Like the state, Indigenous justice must tackle gender inequalities if it is to produce fair, democratic societies.

State justice, in turn, faces the challenge of (not) producing results. In theory, women are protected by Law 103 Prohibiting Violence Against Wives and Family, and they can seek protection from abusive husbands at *comisarías*. In practice, however, these measures are often poorly implemented and fall short of producing results, and many women remain vulnerable to the violent behaviors of their husbands. The widespread inefficiency of the judiciary in Latin America is a major challenge to democracy that continues to hamper state legitimacy despite ongoing efforts toward reform. Violence against women is particularly vulnerable to judicial impunity and discontinuity. Nationally, a mere 11 percent of the cases brought to the comisarías result in a sentence or resolution, only 8 percent result in conviction, and 2 percent of victims receive compensation (Camacho and Jácome 2008). The judicial system is inefficient. More than two-thirds of the victims of domestic violence in Guayaquil report that abuse continues in

the immediate aftermath of their filing charges. Because aggressors are rarely arrested, and if arrested are held for no more than three days, many women are afraid of denouncing their abusers. In fact, police officers warn women of potential retaliation before they file a complaint. Although more than 40 percent of married women report having experienced domestic violence, less than half of these victims seek institutional help (CEPAR 2005). Reporting cases of domestic abuse to the police is often a waste of time and money.

Indigenous women experience judicial inefficiency in its most negative and condensed form. Ordinary justice is not only particularly inefficient, it is also often virtually inaccessible (Pequeño 2009a). Most of the thirty-one comisarías that existed in 2008 were clustered in larger cities, whereas five rural provinces, some with large Indigenous populations, had none.[24] Indigenous presence and a lack of comisarías are strongly correlated—the more rural the province, the fewer the state institutions and therefore the less accessible the judiciary. Only 11 percent of women who use the comisarías reside in rural areas, and a comisaría's jurisdiction is limited to its parish. The province of Chimborazo has only one comisaría in its capital, Riobamba. Nono was only able to take her case to the single comisaría in Chimborazo because her parish was under the jurisdiction of Riobamba. Most Indigenous women reside outside the jurisdiction of a comisaría and as a result do not have access to this legal resource. Additionally, Kichwa women and non-Indigenous men in the comisarías often do not understand each other, not only because of linguistic differences but because they speak different cultures, too. Women find it difficult to understand legal terms even when they speak Spanish; policemen tend to tell women to go back home to solve "disagreements" with their husbands. In most contexts, ethnic and gender discrimination coalesce to create even stronger disincentives to report abuses.

State justice does not serve the interests of Indigenous women because it was, from its inception, not designed for their protection. Indigenous mechanisms of justice are accessible but often imbued with gender bias. The overlap of two legal systems could provide double the protection for Indigenous women; instead, it further interlocks the roots of oppression.

INTERSECTIONAL INJUSTICE

Indigenous cultures around the world are extremely diverse, yet many tolerate pervasive bias against women. Domestic violence is prevalent from Aboriginal communities in Australia (McGillivray and Comaskey 1999) to Sami societies

in the Arctic (Kuokkanen 2007). Cultural explanations are clearly inadequate to account for the systemic violence that permeates different Indigenous realities across borders. Gendered explanations also fall short of explaining why Indigenous women are raped, mutilated, and murdered in much higher numbers than non-Indigenous women. According to the Native Women's Association of Canada, about twenty Native women and girls are murdered annually. If this rate were to be proportionately transposed to non-Native women, it would be equivalent to eighteen thousand missing Canadian women since the late 1970s. In the United States, rates of violence against Native women are two and half times higher than for any other population. The Department of Justice estimates that more than one in three American Indian and Alaska Native women will be raped during their lifetimes, compared to less than one in five in U.S. society as a whole (Amnesty International 2007).

Domestic abuse only accounts for part of the violence against Indigenous women. For them, sexual violence is entangled in racist violence committed by men from outside the community. North American statistics are staggering: at least 86 percent of reported cases of sexual violence against Native women are committed by non-Native men. Only Indigenous women face such disproportionate levels of sexual violence committed by outsiders. Sexual violence against non-Indigenous women is usually committed by individuals of the same race. In 2004, 65 percent of the rapists of white victims were white, and 89.8 percent of the rapists of African American victims were African American (Amnesty International 2007). A study by Human Rights Watch (2013) showed that police officers are oftentimes the abusers of Native women. Not only have police authorities demonstrated decades of apathy toward addressing the disappearance of Native girls on the infamous "Highway of Tears" in British Columbia, but officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been guilty of raping Native women, beating handcuffed girls they were called to help, and racially insulting their victims while assaulting them. Appropriately titled "Those Who Take Us Away," the report confirms what many Indigenous communities around the world know from experience. Indigenous peoples do not trust state authorities but fear the violence they inflict.

Justice systems everywhere are grossly failing Native women and girls. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights organized an unprecedented hearing in 2011 to examine how U.S. policies have created a human rights crisis for Native women. Amnesty International produced the in-depth report *Maze of Injustice* (2007), explaining how jurisdictional loopholes make it difficult, if

FIGURE 5. From an early age, girls are in charge of caring for the animals. Here, a young shepherd watches over sheep in the highlands above Zumbahua, province of Cotopaxi (2005).

not impossible, to address sexual assault efficiently. Complex legal arrangements created by the U.S. federal government impede tribes from prosecuting non-Native men who commit crimes on tribal territory, which leaves women unprotected and gives impunity to the rapists. Sexual violence against Indigenous women goes unpunished more frequently than among other minority groups. The prevalence of poverty increases alcoholism and hopelessness in Indigenous communities, and Indigenous women's extreme poverty undermines their access to legal recourse. Judicial authorities turn a blind eye to contexts of violence and in doing so deny justice to victims.

Violence against Indigenous women is inseparable from larger processes of colonization that have taken over Indigenous territories. Systematic violence against Indigenous women is a global problem because it is entangled with colonial state-making. Sexual violence was a tool of conquest and has now become inscribed in the operations of states. Colonial states used Indigenous women to establish their authority, centering women in the crucible of conquest (Powers 2005). Contemporary forms of sexual assault on Native women reveal the lasting effects of this assault on Indigenous peoples, which range from attacks on tribal

authority over natural resources to Indigenous self-determination. The colonization of the Americas was largely performed through the sexual conquest of women's bodies, contends Smith (2005), and today's continuing sexual violence against Native women signals an ongoing genocide against Native peoples. It is not surprising that justice systems fail Indigenous women: they were not designed to protect them in the first place. Justice systems are made by states to defend their sovereignty. There are inherently inadequate for peoples who have been historically excluded as the "uncivilized" and who are not considered part of the "modern" nation-state. The legal system is the primary enforcer of exclusion from the state, and it works against Indigenous peoples rather than for their protection.

Indigenous women know they need their own justice systems to combat deeply rooted violence. Tribes in the United States are trying to protect women by restoring tribal jurisdiction, notably to prosecute non-Native men who abuse women in Indian country. Reports and ethnographies continue to denounce the failures of state judiciaries, while the International Indigenous Women's Forum (FIMI) proposes to defend Indigenous women through more Indigenous autonomy. In all of these scenarios, Indigenous systems of justice must count on the participation and decision-making power of women. Native systems of justice need women if they are to break free from colonial judicial systems.

CONCLUSION

I have underscored the complex fabric of Indigenous women's vulnerability, stressing the historical meaning of indigeneity in relation to the state and analyzing the overlap of exclusions that enable extreme violence against them. Women recognized as Indigenous face the highest levels of structural poverty, more gender-based violence, and the least access to justice. Indigenous women today work against oppressions that are both a legacy of the colonial past and perpetuated by contemporary democratic politics in Latin America. This analysis of accumulated discrimination based on gender and ethnicity allows us to specify their exclusion as well as to understand why violence against Indigenous women is at once alarmingly high and yet particularly invisible.

2

THE INHERITANCE OF RESISTANCE

My grandparents were leaders, my mother and my father were leaders, . . . leadership is something we are born with; it's in the blood.

—SIMONE AMADO, TERENA LEADER, 2015

FOR CENTURIES, women have battled Spanish and Portuguese armies, resisted the colonizing practices of the state, and led struggles for autonomy. During the first decades of the colonial encounter, the priest Gaspar de Carvajal (1934) chronicled women ready to battle Orellana's men during the first Spanish journey down the Amazon River. Centuries later, across the continent, Euclides da Cunha (1902) remarked on the omnipresence of women in the Rebellion of Canudos: they outnumbered men two to one and fought "like fanatics" (Hecht 2013, 55). In the Andes, women led powerful anticolonial rebellions alongside their partners, proving gender complementarity. The Aymara general Bartolina Sisa fought the Great Rebellion along with her partner, Tupak Katari, and led the 1782 siege of La Paz (Ari Murillo 2003, 2016; Del Valle de Siles 1981). Sisa led her own troops: an Indigenous army that kept terrified Spanish colonizers under siege for at least eight months in La Paz. She was only captured by royalist forces after military reinforcement was dispatched from Lima to regain control over La Paz. On September 5, 1782, she was brutally tortured, executed, and her severed head publicly displayed in La Paz. Before she was hung, her tongue would have been cut off in a symbolic act of silencing of the larger Indigenous rebellions she represented. Another Aymara general, Gregoria Apaza, controlled even the priests when she led the siege of Sorata (Mendieta 2005). Micaela Bastidas Puyucawa was a political advisor to her

husband, Tupak Amaru II, and organized military logistics for the rebellion that took over Cuzco in 1780.[1] Manuela Léon overpowered soldiers with Fernando Daquilema in the Yaruquis uprising against taxes and labor exploitation in nineteenth-century Ecuador. Like men, women were blacklisted by colonial states, persecuted as military threats, and feared for their cold-bloodedness. In more recent examples, Dolores Cacuango and Tránsito Amaguaña changed the course of Ecuador's history when they led peasant strikes in the 1930s, then founded the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI). These women should not be understood as historical exceptions, but rather as proof of a solid legacy of political agency that persists until the present. It is the norm rather than the exception for women to partake in Indigenous struggles. So why are so few women in Indigenous politics today?

Indigenous women have a long history of political leadership that has led to their unexpected absence from contemporary politics. Their stories of rebellion reveal their inheritance of political resistance across generations. Women first contested against colonial armies, then against oppressive independent states, in positions of leadership, in courts, and through daily acts of resistance (Silverblatt 1987). However, official history hardly remembers the female leadership of Indigenous rebellions and has failed to record the significance of many more nameless women. They have been kept anonymous in the archives of the New World, erased from history records in selective processes of nation-making that reinforced the tale of impotent Indians facing powerful colonizers (O'Brien 2010; Den Ouden 2012; Lamana 2008).[2] Their experiences survived not only in the form of storytelling, but also in the inheritance of resistance. I explore stories of female leadership as a reminder that the politicization of Indigenous women predates feminist politics in the West. These stories subvert familiar understandings of Indigenous women as passive and propose new understandings of the present.

The invisibility of Indigenous women today is more related to our failure to recognize Indigenous and feminine forms of agency than a result of their de facto marginality. Some official efforts aim to reverse this trend, especially among leftist governments interested in co-opting Indigenous symbols of resistance against colonial oppression. Some of the Indigenous women leaders who shaped Latin American politics have recently and strategically been revived as national heroines. For instance, Bolivia's Congress declared Sisa a national hero two centuries after her death, and the date of her execution now marks the International Indigenous Women's Day. In Ecuador,

Amaguaña was positioned as a national hero when President Correa invited President Morales and Rigoberta Menchú to attend her funeral in homage to her lifelong struggle for Indigenous rights. However, these exceptions have not compensated for the colonial narratives that largely obfuscated the participation of Indigenous women in processes of state formation, which is compounded by the lack of female leadership in contemporary Indigenous politics. Indigenous women's powerful legacy of resistance should have secured women's voices in modern ethnopolitics. Ironically, however, the institutionalization of Indigenous politics in the 1990s has not benefited men and women equally. Proportionally fewer women work in Indigenous politics, and even fewer stand among elected party members. Positions of power are usually occupied by men. Indigenous women have been left behind by "successful" party politics.

The following sections explore women's political leadership from colonial times to the twentieth century, emphasizing the historical trajectory of their active contestation. I trace colonial histories of insubordination, focus on the experiences of Dolores Cacuango and Tránsito Amaguaña, and appraise women's presence in recent mobilizations. I finish by questioning the absence of women in formal ethnopolitics today and suggesting that the recognition of Indigenous movements as formal parties in Ecuador may have adversely impacted women's participation.

COLONIAL INSUBORDINATION

In 1757 the great Cherokee chief Atagulkalu refrained from negotiating with an all-male European council in South Carolina because their women were not present. Pressed by the Europeans, he impatiently inquired of Governor William Henry Lyttelton, "But where are your women?" The powerful role of women caused considerable colonial anxiety in negotiations with the Delawares, and in 1758 a young man had to explain to a delegation from Pennsylvania that the Delawares were a "nation of women" (Fur 2009). Across the Americas, women have long been shaping Indigenous diplomacy with European settlers and resisting invasion, many becoming lasting icons of insubordination. Gender is fundamental to understanding the colonial encounter because colonizers had to deal with a world where women held social status and political authority unimaginable in Europe.

Women were not any less dynamic in politics when colonizers concealed (or misunderstood) their role in pre-Columbian societies.[3] From the Aztec to the Inka empires, women ruled with their male counterparts in systems of governance that valued gender complementarity, the notion that feminine and masculine are opposites that complement each other (Harris 1980; Estermann 1998; Yáñez del Pozo 2003; Webb 2012). The masculine and feminine are two sides of a coin; one is incomplete without the other, and together they form a unity. This tension between opposites that together achieve equilibrium implies both that we need the other to realize the self and that everything exists along this continuum: for the masculine *inti* (sun) there is the feminine *killa* (moon), for every masculine plant there exists its feminine opposite. This dual complementarity, related to notions of reciprocity, was the crux of Andean world views. It organized Andean politics, from relations with nature to systems of inheritance, and determined patterns of authority in the ayllu, the precolonial system of government. This principle of gender complementarity explains why women and men led rebellions together: Bartolina Sisa and Tupak Katari in La Paz, Micaela Bastidas and Tupak Amaru II in Cuzco, Manuela León and Fernando Daquilema in Riobamba.

In Ecuador, women held significant political authority, managed economic property, and enjoyed autonomous lineages of inheritance. Seventeenth-century testaments indicate that Native women in Quito continued to strongly influence socioeconomic dynamics (Salomon 1988). Historians have found a significant female presence among *kurakas* in the central highlands of the Audiencia de Quito (Coronel Feijoó 2015a, 2015b).[4] For instance, the Titusunta Llamota sisters were in charge of peoples and territories; they engaged in diplomacy and negotiated authority over communities with other kurakas between 1780 and 1810. Juana Guara, who inherited political authority from her father in 1690, made sure her people never worked without pay. The kurakas María Magdalena Pudi and María Caiche were so politically significant that the colonial government granted them political authority over the peoples of Baba and Pimocha (Londoño 1997).

Karen Powers (2005) analyzes the conquest of America as a gendered collision that demoted Native women across classes. But women did not passively accept the colonial order. They continued to exercise their usual leadership, first in public, then underground, practicing acts of insubordination throughout colonial times. Aztec and Maya systems based on gender parallelism and complementarity gave as much political power to women as men, whereas the

Spanish conquest brought patriarchal systems that precipitated a drastic decline in the social and political status of Native women. In the Audiencia de Quito, the significant presence of women among kurakas evolved into active contestation as colonial pressure tightened. A series of small and larger uprisings spread in the late eighteenth century as a reaction to Indian tribute, forced labor, and the end of kurakas' political autonomy. Records are uneven, but it is clear that women played an integral part in leading and sustaining many of these uprisings. If their dynamic leadership of rebellions surprised colonial authorities, it was all but exceptional.

We have abundant evidence that women led numerous attacks on the colonial order. Women were among the organizers of the rebellion of Guano, one of many acts of resistance across Spanish dominions following the first census of 1776, which prepared a tax system (Moreno Yánez 1985, 203). Baltazara Chiusa was among the leaders who led both Indians and mestizos to resist the census and invade the Elén Hacienda of Guano in 1778. They retreated, but Chiusa and three other Indians were quartered as punishment and their chopped limbs exhibited in nearby towns as public warning. In 1780 women rebelled with sticks and stones in the town of Baños to protest the imposition of taxes on alcohol. The leader, Martina Gomes, received two hundred lashes as punishment for launching the uprising; her companions Juana Sanchéz and Andrea Velastaqui received one hundred leashes each. All three were forced to walk the streets with their heads shaved, which caused the uprising to be known as "the shaved women's rebellion" (Moreno Yánez 1985, 260). Also in 1780 was a rebellion against the census in the town of Quisapincha. Official archives described women at the frontlines of a thick crowd of Indian and mestizo insurgents; one of its leaders was Rosa Señapanta, "an Indian not embarrassed by her sex" who defended herself with rocks (Moreno Yánez 1985, 245). Expressions of colonial insubordination were widespread in the late eighteenth century, as was women's leadership. Unfortunately, data on their leadership are scarce for two reasons. First, uprisings are poorly recorded because they countered colonial narratives of Spanish control and authority. Second, women's roles were repeatedly left out of historical records, dismissed as irrelevant by colonial discourses that masculinized processes of nation-making.

Three women led the historical uprising against taxes in Guamote on February 27, 1803: Lorenza Peña, Jacinta Juaréz, and Lorenza Avemañay. The representative for the Audiencia de Quito reported that women were as equally present in that uprising as in prior ones, indicating that this gendered leadership

was no novelty to the authorities. Lorenza Avemañay, a healer, became the leading strategist of the insurgency. She believed that the rebellion should employ tactics similar to those used by the Spaniards to succeed, and she followed their military style. Her Indigenous army, largely composed of women, took the colonial enemy by surprise after Sunday Mass, killing multiple officials before authorities in Quito were able to send hundreds of men to suffocate the rebellion. Avemañay's leadership was barely recorded in official archives, but more than half a century after her death she was still remembered in popular songs as a heroine of Indigenous resistance. Historian Ketty Romo-Leroux (1997, 69) suggests that women like Chiusa and Avemañay are heroes of Indigenous resistance. Nearly two centuries after their deaths, patriotic history books sponsored by the Ecuadorian government revived these women as heroines of national history.

Female participation was central to one of the most emblematic Indigenous rebellions in the history of Ecuador. Manuela Léon and Fernando Daquilema together led the 1871 insurgency in Yaruquis, Chimborazo, to protest abusive church taxes and forced labor that would build a national roadway. Their joint leadership shows how gender complementarity played out in Indigenous acts of resistance. The uprising was a response to violent tactics of state-making under the presidency of García Moreno. Thousands of people mobilized across the province of Chimborazo, killing at least seven officials in charge of collecting the *diezmos*, or tithes, and thereby igniting a strong military response from Quito. As the insurgency expanded, Léon is said to have ordered the burning of houses, battled soldiers, and killed their leader, Miguel Valliente, whose eyes she allegedly took out with her own *tupo* (Costales 2002).[5] Oral histories among her descendants say that she took his eyes as vengeance for his raping of women.[6] When government soldiers regained control over Cacha, they imprisoned hundreds of people. Léon was the first one to be executed, burned in front of a crowd of two hundred people in the central square of Riobamba. Daquilema was executed after her in the public square of Yaruquis. Some accounts of the Yaruquis rebellion imagine Léon as a madwoman with an insatiable appetite for violence who mutilated white victims (O'Connor 2007, 142). Although judicial condemnations of Daquilema and Léon have disappeared from Chimborazo's official archives and their histories have been consistently misplaced, they have been revered as icons of resistance across social sectors.

Far from being passive or absent, Indigenous women regularly took up arms and died in combat, with their partners or alone. For instance, Juana Calcán

was shot with her infant daughter on her back as she led an uprising in 1899 (Becker 2008a, 5). These women exercised forms of leadership as diverse as their social backgrounds. Erin O'Connor (2007, 143) insists that women's roles in rebellions are to be understood as an extension of their normal community functions to unusual circumstances, not as extraordinary acts. As contemporary states in Latin America become more democratic, they make an effort to rewrite their national history into more inclusive forms. In Ecuador in 2009, for instance, the Ecuadorian Institute for Research and Development of Women in a book celebrating patriotic women for the bicentenary of independence identified multiple Indigenous women as icons of national liberty. The volume opens with the Chiusa sisters, Baltazara and Manuela, who coordinated the 1778 attacks against Spanish officials in Riobamba. One chapter pays homage to the many anonymous women who participated in the Guazabaras rebellion, which resisted Spanish colonization in the Amazon region through the second half of the sixteenth century. Celebrating cultural and political leadership as well, the book dedicates another chapter to *kuraka* María Duchicela Namguai back in the seventeenth century. Born in 1620 in Yaruquis, Chimborazo, Duchicela was an icon of Quito's social life and is remembered for promoting the legal recognition of her people. The book closes with Lorenza Avemañay, the leader of the 1803 uprising in Guamote.

Through the nineteenth century, Indigenous and non-Indigenous women actively engaged in political life. Their power did not go unnoticed; it generated despair among conservative sectors. In an 1835 letter, President Rocafuerte called for the exile of Manuela Sáenz and warned against women's political activism. He cautioned that Sáenz was more dangerous to Quito than Madame de Staël was to Paris, saying that women were fomenting a revolutionary spirit and were more dangerous than an entire army of conspirators. Women taking up arms and leading rebellions surprised the colonial elites, who had difficulty explaining them and often failed to account for them (O'Connor 2007, 141). It was more frequent for women to engage in politics through institutional contestation. Kimberly Gauderman (2003) argues that seventeenth-century Spanish society was highly decentralized, which gave women more opportunities to exercise political authority than is often acknowledged. Convents were autonomous cities within a city where women enjoyed considerable socioeconomic power and at times successfully rebelled against the clergy's male dominance. For instance, Catalina nuns in seventeenth-century Quito battled Dominican male dominance for almost twenty years. This led to battles within convent

walls and eventually involved multiple religious authorities from the bishop of Quito and the archbishop of Lima all the way to King Charles II and the pope (Powers 2005, 177).

Legal courts were an important site of Indigenous resistance. Spanish colonial rule associated sovereignty with the idea of jurisdiction (Stern 1982), and the initial invasion was marked by a burst of legislation that defined the rules of conquest and exploitation. But the colonial rules that codified exploitation also determined Native legal rights and procedures to claim them and therefore gave Indians a (restricted) venue to legally obstruct or subvert colonial dynamics. Native populations made the most out of the few legal opportunities available and used Spanish juridical frameworks to resist colonization.[7] By the 1550s they were "flooding" the audiencia of Lima (Stern 1982, 115), and despite all their legal, economic, and social disadvantages, Indigenous peoples won important legal victories. In Peru, a literate Indigenous woman in Socos successfully defended her hectares of land in court, and the community of Tiquihua won legal action to protect their land from don Cristobal de Serpa's takeover (Stern 1982, 116). Already in the sixteenth century, legal tactics were a major strategy for protecting individual, ayllu, and community interests.

Indigenous women were active litigators throughout the hemisphere. In Quito, market women were autonomous actors who engaged in litigation, quarreled with government officials, and manipulated competing legal jurisdictions (Gauderman 2003, 92; Deusen 2015). Indigenous women became watchdogs of community land in Spanish courts. Susan Kellogg (1995) points out that Tenochcan women engaged in litigation to a degree almost unparalleled throughout the New World. They constituted well over half of the plaintiffs in property disputes in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mexico (Kellogg 1995, 85). With the erosion of the judiciary after Mexican independence in 1821, however, the few rights and privileges held by Indigenous women during the colonial period were lost (Kanter 1995). Over time, women ceased to initiate lawsuits independently, and husbands had become the primary parties to lawsuits by the end of the nineteenth century. Gauderman (2003) contests the paradigm of female subordination altogether and shows that women in colonial Quito were legally active entrepreneurs until the Council of the Indies shifted property rights and legal authority over to men in 1787.

There is no doubt that the colonial order disenfranchised women, but rendering them invisible only generated alternative sites of resistance. Irene Silverblatt (1987) argues that even when they seemed most subordinate, Andean

FIGURE 6. Aurora Flores never married. She shares a room with her sister in the community of Cecel Ayron, Chimborazo (2007).

women were pursuing less obvious forms of contestation. As colonial regimes considered men innately more suited for politics and reorganized property along patrilineal modes of succession, they undermined the customary Andean gender dynamic of dual authority. The new order disenfranchised women politically, harassed them economically, and abused them sexually. But women resisted on the reproductive front, practicing contraception, abortion, and infanticide so as not to contribute children to the forced labor system (Powers 2005). And Andean women continued their religious leadership by presiding over rituals, acting as confessors (thus filtering the information that reached Catholic priests), and preserving spiritual knowledge. Pushed to the margins and framed as witches, women invented daily, more hidden, forms of resistance to pursue their culture of contestation.

Andean women were doubly dismissed from hegemonic narratives, both as women and as colonized subjects, to become the imagined peoples without history in colonial memory-making. Pierre Clastres argues that the history of peoples without history is that of their struggles against the state (Scott 2009).

Since they always resisted state-making, first the colonial and then the republican, Indigenous women could not fit into self-aggrandizing histories that emphasized national unity. Just like peasants, Native women were inevitably expunged from archival histories (Scott 2009, 34). This should not lead us to understand them as passive. Rather, they fueled insubordination during colonial times, then vehemently fought against the oppression of republican states. Indigenous women were active among the Indigenous, rural subalterns who shaped processes of nation-state formation (Mallon 1995). Some of them, in fact, were crucial in negotiating a social contract with the state in twentieth-century Ecuador.

CACUANGO AND AMAGUAÑA: FOUNDING ECUADOR'S MODERN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

Women have been central to the formation of Ecuador's modern Indigenous movement. When the feudal huasipungo system increased its abuse of Indian laborers, women organized resistance and pursued autonomous agendas. In the first half of the twentieth century, Indigenous peoples gained allies in, then coordinated with, communist sectors (Becker 2008a). Women led various rebellions, and two of them became lasting icons of struggles for social justice. Dolores Cacuango (1881–1971) and Tránsito Amaguaña (1909–2009) paved the way toward Indigenous emancipation. They were among the leaders of the historic 1931 peasant strike in the Pesillo hacienda, Cayambe, which was violently repressed by the army and novelized in Jorge Icaza's novel *El Huasipungo* (1934). They were founding members of FEI, the first organization of and for Indigenous peoples. Cacuango and Amaguaña started FEI in 1930 along with Angelita Andrango, Brigida Pilataxi, and Elena Tamba, but the government quickly forbade Indigenous meetings, pushing FEI into irregular, clandestine meetings in the mountains.[8] FEI was legally founded in 1944 as a rural branch of the Workers' Confederation of Ecuador, a Marxist union allied with the Communist Party, thus linking Indigenous demands with workers' rights in the class struggle. FEI became the main political voice of Indigenous claims in the highlands with Cacuango as its president. Both women spent much of their long lives advocating for Indigenous ownership of land, bilingual education, and cultural dignity. They were influential and indispensable, framing interethnic political alliances and setting Indigenous agendas across the region for further generations.

Dolores Cacuango is perhaps Ecuador's most iconic figure in the struggles for Indigenous emancipation. She was born a *huasipunguera* in 1881 on the Pesillo hacienda, the largest in the province of Cayambe, and never attended school. She spoke only Kichwa until she was sent to Quito as a domestic servant at age fifteen. When she learned Spanish, she grasped the extent of the exploitation of Indigenous peoples and the breadth of the class divide. Cacuango was still a young woman when she started denouncing the inhumane treatment of Indigenous laborers on the haciendas, especially the lack of food, health care, or rest. As soon as she organized laborers, she was persecuted by hacienda owners, who tried to kill her or have her sent to the Galapagos (a jail at the time). When her huasipungo home was burned down, she was forced into hiding, barely escaping with her youngest child.[9] In the 1920s, the Communist Party played an important role in support of Indigenous laborers: invigorating labor demands, organizing collective action, and providing a political space in which to claim workers' rights. Cacuango actively contributed to the creation of rural unions and deepened ties with communist sectors. She became a committed communist and a fierce military leader, notably leading the Indigenous assault on the military barracks of Cayambe during Ecuador's 1944 "Glorious Revolution" (Becker 2008a).

Cacuango's leadership forged interethnic alliances committed to social justice. In fact, her political leadership predated the national Indigenous movement and influenced a political culture that goes beyond Indigenous concerns to collaborate with popular sectors. She was a founding member and the first treasurer of FEI. Later, she gained national prominence through the Communist Party. She was an illiterate Indigenous woman who debated with Congress, met with Ecuador's president, and advocated for workers' equality in rural and urban areas from Bogotá to Guayaquil. She spoke passionately—captivating large crowds and bringing together mestizos and Indigenous peoples in eloquent discourses (Bernal Carrera 2007). In one anecdote she recalled how she learned the 1938 Labor Code by heart and was able to publicly denounce a minister for cheating on the enforcement of labor laws to protect the interests of the *patrones*, the wealthy estate owners who controlled land.[10]

Cacuango's defense of Indigenous dignity revolved around two core issues: the redistribution of land ownership and bilingual education. Language and land were two sides of the same coin and shaped Indigenous economic and cultural capital as much as civil rights in interactions with the state. Cacuango advocated a bilingual education system for Indians and

by Indians (Rodas Morales and Cotacachi 1989). She first started with clandestine schools offering a Kichwa education for rural children; then in 1945 she created four rural schools in Moyurco, San Pablo Urcu, Pucará, and La Chimba. These schools gained the support of the Ecuadorian Feminine Alliance, Quito's first feminist organization. Nela Martínez and María Luisa Gómez de la Torre, communist companions of Cacuango, became central figures in the creation of the FEI schools.[11] But communist involvement was perceived as a threat in the context of the Cold War. In 1963 the military dictatorship closed the rural schools for fomenting communism and probably also as a tactic to erase the "Indigenous problem" (Madrid 2012, 78). Kichwa schools fell back into a clandestine existence. Cacuango, who remained illiterate all her life, relentlessly stressed the importance of educating children in their own Native language. "Mama Dulu," as she was later remembered, died before the state recognized bilingual education in Spanish and Kichwa in 1988.[12]

Decades after her death, Cacuango's words on the force of collective action echo far beyond her native Cayambe. She is popularly remembered for saying, "We are like the grass of the highlands, always growing back even when torn apart." Cacuango is now recognized as a pioneer of Ecuador's modern Indigenous movement. Her strength and resilience were praised from Ecuador to Europe. She was portrayed by the world-renowned artist Oswaldo Guayasamín, and at least three biographies celebrate her life achievements (Rodas Morales 1998a, 1998b, 2005). UNESCO paid homage to her legacy on the occasion of the 2009 International Women's Day with a photography exhibition in Paris, "The Seeds of a Dream." Mama Dulu was aware of the universal scope of her struggles and is remembered for having said that others would continue the fight. Unequivocally influential, she paved the way for Indigenous rights to gain recognition on the international stage.

Cacuango's struggle, which still inspires generations, was itself inspired by a legacy of political contestation inherited from women before her. Her influential leadership was not the result of serendipity but rather a testament to the agency of Indigenous women in centuries past. She inherited her rebellious soul and political clarity from prior generations of women, like Bartolina Sisa and Manuela Léon, and trained in leadership skills with her elders (Bernal Carrera 2007, 37). She transmitted what she learned, inspiring and mentoring younger women in their quest for social justice. One of them was Tránsito Amaguaña, who followed in Cacuango's footsteps by making history into the twenty-first century.

Tránsito Amaguaña Alba, born in Pesillo in 1909, was deeply influenced by the political leadership of her mother, Mercedes Alba, who organized Indigenous resistance with Dolores Cacuango (Miño Grijalva 2009). With a spirit rebelling against exploitation, discrimination, and violence, she, like Cacuango, became involved with rural unions in her teens, quickly joining the Communist Party and mobilizing the workers' strikes that preceded agrarian reform. She too was persecuted by hacienda patrones and by state police for fueling conflict. She often hid from authorities in the páramos, climbing as high up as the Cayambe glacier to escape imprisonment and eating vegetables left in the fields to survive.[13] Like Cacuango, she became an iconic leader of social struggles in Ecuador—and Latin America.

Amaguaña and Cacuango shared similar experiences. They often met, spending years landless and homeless after losing their huasipungos. When I interviewed Amaguaña in her late nineties, she recalled walking from Pesillo to Quito over twenty times (barefoot to save the soles of her shoes) to support workers challenging the government, calling upon both the church and politicians to abolish huasipungo exploitation. It was her desire to continue Cacuango's dream of a bilingual education system that led to her first arrest. Twice she was made a political prisoner. Amaguaña struggled along with Cacuango, and many other women accompanied them. Women were so numerous in the uprising at the Olmedo hacienda that they took over the leadership of the movement (Rodas Morales 2009, 39). Women had no rights in the state system and were therefore not entitled to receive huasipungos in the hacienda; they depended fully on men. Yet Indigenous women considered themselves kurakas entitled to political authority. They fought against exploitation—struggles initiated by their ancestors—taking over the uprisings in Olmedo with a determination anchored in historical legitimacy. Dolores Cacuango, Tránsito Amaguaña, Rosa Cachipela, Mercedes Catucumba, and Angelita Andrango commanded the actions and led the committees that went to negotiate with Quito officials in the 1930s. With their enflaming speeches, Mama Dulu and Tránsito designed alliances with the unions and organized the logistics.

Amaguaña gave international scope to Ecuador's Indigenous movement. She boldly voiced Indigenous indignation and collective demands from the National Congress in Quito to political forums in Europe. During her years in FEI, she traveled first through Ecuador to organize Indigenous demands for agrarian reform, then undertook international efforts to support broader workers' struggles. She participated in meetings from Riobamba to Cuenca, fighting for the

rights of everyone everywhere and allying, for instance, with the Federation of Littoral Workers in the coastal region (Rodas Morales 2009, 52). Her militancy gave her international prominence in the Communist Party, taking her first to Cuba—where she met with a young Fidel Castro in 1961—then on a transatlantic journey to Moscow in the capacity of Ecuadorian delegate from the International Communist Assembly (Rodas Morales 2009, 58).

National authorities declared Amaguaña a heroine of liberation when she reached her nineties, and Pichincha's provincial government provided her with a small monthly stipend. When she died in 2009, just short of her hundredth birthday, the village of La Chimba was taken over by a national(istic) celebration. Accompanied by Bolivian president Evo Morales, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchú from Guatemala, and a flock of Ecuadorian state officials and press, President Correa commemorated her legacy emphatically. A dense crowd marched and carried her coffin, and following the presidential discourse, a shamanistic ceremony was performed out in the highlands and broadcast on television. Like Bartolina Sisa in Bolivia, Amaguaña was revived as a leader of the social justice movement and appropriated in leftist governmental discourses with their heroic imagery of nation making. She is now remembered as a powerful symbol of resistance, invoked both by the Indigenous movement and by governments that claim to side with the oppressed against global exploitation.

The struggles of Cacuango and Amaguaña transcended Indigenous concerns. Both advocated for labor rights well beyond huasipungo exploitation, and both allied with political sectors to combat oppression in all its forms (Becker and Tutillo 2009). They were important figures in the Communist Party, with enough political agility to make interethnic alliances that would strengthen the legitimacy of Indigenous claims. In addition, they articulated Marxist ideals of class struggle with the needs of Indian worker-peasants living under the huasipungo system in the Andes. They used communist ideals to expand the visibility and legitimacy of Indigenous struggles yet were independent from foreign ideologies. Their ethnic priorities surpassed homogenizing communist agendas. While their politics endorsed international communist goals, they remained loyal to local agendas focused on autonomy. They embodied Indigenous demands by blending land and language, economics and education, from grassroots experiences to international politics. When they pressured state officials in Quito and engaged international allies to render their struggle more legitimate, they presaged contemporary struggles for self-determination and cultural recognition.

However, recognizing the resistance of Indigenous women is not to say they were not victims of violence. I do not want to romanticize Indigenous women's position in society in my effort to show their influence on struggles for emancipation. State and Indigenous patriarchies often reinforced each other to Indigenous women's disadvantage (O'Connor 2007, 144). Even if women's capacities were recognized by their families and communities more than by the state, women were often at a disadvantage in terms of legal and economic rights. For instance, patriarchal laws on property expanded Indigenous men's control over family land. O'Connor (2007, 143) argues that the masculinization of Indian-state relations in the late nineteenth century undermined not only women's status as community defenders, but also their relations with their male peers. Such discrepancies are clear in the personal stories of these two public leaders, both of whom lacked property and found themselves in dire economic conditions.

Amaguaña's life reveals that notions of gender complementarity did not prevail, and she endured a personal life marked by abuse, violence, and loneliness. She was married at age fourteen to an older man to avoid sexual violence from patrones who "came only to rape" (Reinoso 2004). Violent and alcoholic, her husband started to beat her on their wedding day, setting the tone for a marriage that was to be marked by intense physical and verbal abuse. At fifteen, she was already walking for days, carrying a baby on her back, to attend meetings in Quito. Her return home was often met with violence, and her husband accused her of using political activism as an excuse to seek out mestizo lovers. He beat her often, once almost to death; she reacted only once, provoking a two-day battle that only stopped when neighbors intervened out of fear that the spouses would kill each other. The short-lived relationship ended when she was about to turn twenty-two, leaving her alone with small children and nothing but some corn to live on.

Living as a single woman on the hacienda had serious economic consequences. Only men were entitled to plots of land and remuneration, leaving nonmarried women without houses or income of their own. Women outside of marriage were either living with family members or homeless, dependent on others to survive and extremely vulnerable to social and sexual exploitation. After marriage, Amaguaña lived with her parents. A second partner accompanied her for a couple of years before leaving her. Later, she lived with Alberto Tarabata, a teacher in the rural schools who shared her political struggles but who died soon after from alcoholism. Each time she lost a partner she also

lost a means of living and had to invent a new way to survive. The highland hacienda structure depended as much on gender as on racial domination. It restricted Indigenous women's political and economic power and increased their vulnerability to the patriarchal system within their homes (O'Connor 2007, 182).

Women lost land rights under the hacienda system, though they recovered limited property rights after the huasipungo was abolished. (Under the huasipungo, plots of land were usually passed down through male members of a family.) Notwithstanding these gains, the 1964 agrarian reform failed women and continued a system of land ownership associated with the male head of the household (Deere et al. 1999). As in other parts of Latin America, agrarian reform turned out to be patriarchal and gender discriminatory (Deere and León de Leal 2001; Jacobs 2010). Lands were redistributed for a price to cooperatives, and single women did not have enough money to pitch in. Amaguaña, who spent her life walking the páramos, mobilizing resistance and advocating for Indigenous rights, had no income to buy her share of land when the agrarian reform was inaugurated. Unable to benefit from the land redistribution she had spent her life fighting for, she had to remain on the small parcel in the cold highlands that President Galo Plaza had granted her. For years, she lived alone in a humble adobe *choza* miles above the village.[14] At ninety-six years old, having buried all her children, she came down to the village and moved in with her daughter-in-law Guillermina. She spent the last years of her life in a small windowless cement room, with one naked lightbulb hanging from the ceiling and a door facing the fields. When I visited her, she was ninety-eight years old, ate *machica*, and proudly identified as a communist.[15] She did not care for the biography of her I had brought as a present; instead, she inquired about the current president. She sang old carnival songs, tapping the floor with her stick. When she left her bed, she walked slowly on still muscular legs to go pee in the grass outside, like she had always done.

Amaguaña finished her life lucid but in poverty and mostly forgotten by Indigenous and state authorities. The gender-based violence she suffered in her marriage added to the structural economic violence she endured for being Indigenous—a complex web of violence and opportunity. Her story is testimony to the contradictions inherent in the life experience of many Indigenous women: fierce political actors who are crushed by interlocking systems of violence.

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE 1990 UPRISING

Indigenous women have been resisting oppressions for centuries, yet each political context comes with its own challenges and opportunities. Ecuador's uprisings in the 1990s made visible the political power of a new generation of Indigenous women. Some confronted heavily armed military battalions while others, having completed university studies, fought in the judicial system. Whatever form their activism took, women were fully engaged and they felt a new sense of dignity that strengthened their own political awareness and self-confidence. It was a time when Indigenous women's agency became more recognizable to society at large.

Ecuador's Indigenous movement took an institutional turn in the 1990s. In June 1990, a massive Indigenous *levantamiento* paralyzed the country for over a week, shocking elites and receiving international attention. Protests emerged from land claims. Decades after the agrarian reform, many land conflicts remained unresolved. In the 1980s, a study listed over two hundred land conflicts still unresolved, and by the end of the decade CONAIE declared the Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform its public enemy (Becker 2011). The uprising was originally planned by CONAIE to pressure the government into recognizing a plurinational state. Before the scheduled mobilization, however, protests took on lives of their own, with thousands of people locally taking the initiative to contest unresolved land claims. This historic nationwide uprising forced the government to negotiate with the Indigenous movement. Subsequently, a series of powerful mobilizations throughout the early 1990s not only showed the resilience of Indigenous protest, but also marked a critical juncture for the consolidation of ethnopolitics in Ecuador. Women were particularly influential, mobilizing forcefully in the protests. Yet as relations with the state were redefined, women's strategies adapted to changing realities.

A large body of scholarship has tackled the significance of Ecuador's 1990 uprising (Van Cott 2007; Lucero 2008; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Yashar 2005). The Indigenous movement demonstrated a powerful capacity to mobilize the masses, drawing hundreds of thousands of people to protest. Indigenous movements had gained an unprecedented visibility in public life and a voice in national politics. This shifted the balance of power to establish the Indigenous movement as a dominant social force, as a legitimate and influential contender in political power struggles. Léon Zamosc (2005) suggests that the uprisings created enough momentum to turn Indigenous politics of influence into politics

of power. Donna Lee Van Cott (2007) identifies the mobilizations of the early 1990s as a transition from Indigenous movements to Indigenous parties, and she labels emerging models of ethnopolitics in the Andes as radical democracies (Van Cott 2008). More scholars have explored the mobilization of Indigenous voices, variation in electoral success, and the impact of local governments on reshaping democracy in general (Lucero 2010; Cameron 2010; Madrid 2012). However, this rich literature, which provides detailed case studies and in-depth analysis, has given little or no attention to the massive role of women in the uprisings, leaving in obscurity once again the underlying gendered aspects of ethnopolitics.

Women were fully part of the 1990 levantamiento, an overwhelming mobilization that symbolized Indigenous overtaking of urban spaces (Almeida 1993, 183). In the province of Chimborazo, where the agrarian reform had been extremely slow, over sixty thousand people chanted their claims in Kichwa in the city of Riobamba. Descriptions and images of the events show women throughout the uprising, blocking roads and marching toward urban centers, with or without their husbands, but often carrying children on their backs. Leading and mothering were complementary acts of collective care. Women were at the front of the march that surrounded a military offense in Gatazo, Chimborazo, that ended in confrontation after one of the two hundred soldiers shot into the crowd, killing a protester. Women were also among the protesters shot in Colta. In the province of Imbabura, women were numerous in the communal assemblies that transformed the Inti Raymi parades into cultural armies (Almeida 1993, 177). Mama Juana Morocho, then in her sixties, recalled vividly how women were the soldiers in uprisings in southern provinces like Azuay, fearless in their encounters with police battalions.[16] From the north to the south of the Andes, women took to the streets alongside men and worked to strategize blockades. They worked on the frontlines, managing roadblocks with children on their backs, camping in Quito, and facing military forces up front. They also assumed responsibility for the daunting task of arranging the logistics of food and shelter, which took place behind the scenes, to facilitate the week-long occupation of public spaces.

As in the past, women played influential leadership roles. Blanca Chancoso participated in the occupation of the church of Santo Domingo in Quito, the symbolic act that ignited mobilizations across the country. Chancoso was a leader from Imbabura's Indigenous and Peasant Federation who learned her activism from her grandmother; she had been one of the early coordinators of

ECUARUNARI in 1979 and stood among the founders of CONAIE.[17] Like Avemañay, Chancoso believed in the necessity of extra-legal actions to force the government into negotiating land rights, a theme repeatedly overlooked by political and economic elites. She was one of the people who occupied Santo Domingo's church, on a hunger strike, until agreements were reached. Nina Pacari was also influential in the uprising. Born María Estela Vega Cornejo in the northern province of Imbabura, Pacari studied law in Quito prior to advising Kichwa communities in Chimborazo to secure land rights after the last wave of agrarian reforms in the 1970s. She studied law and learned the ropes by defending Indigenous access to land titles after the agrarian reform in Chimborazo. She became a key negotiator with the state during the uprisings and continued in a solid political leadership role long after the mobilizations ended.

The uprisings of the 1990s made Indigenous women visible to the larger mestizo society. Pacari realized that non-Indigenous sectors, which were often opposed to women's roles in the protests, did not understand notions of gender complementarity (Almeida 1993, 180). In *Sismo étnico en el Ecuador*, Chancoso insists that women had always been active in protest. Often fighting as a collective with nameless leaders, women represented their communities. For instance, the women of Cajas fought as a collective in the name of the Asociación Agrícola del Cajas, and when a woman died it was a part of the community who died, not an individual woman (Almeida 1993, 135). Chancoso argues that Indigenous women had always been present but that their participation was rarely recognized and even less publicized. Dominant society began paying attention to Indigenous women after the levantamiento, adopting a gendered gaze that saw identity politics where women were fighting for land rights. Indigenous women's political activism was not new, but it was now inescapably visible.

Indigenous women's leadership reverberated institutionally. Chancoso's leadership expanded within regional and national organizations. Pacari, in turn, became arguably the most influential woman and one of the most influential persons of her generation in the Indigenous movement. She had begun acting as CONAIE's legal advisor in 1989, supporting land claims in Chimborazo in 1990 and becoming a main negotiator with the state on issues of land rights in the following years. In 1997 she was named director of CODENPE. The same year she was elected as a representative from Chimborazo for the coming Constitutional Assembly, which recognized the pluricultural and multiethnic dimension of the Ecuadorian state. In 1998, as a member of the political party Pachakutik, she was the first Indigenous woman to be elected to Ecuador's legislature and

became the first Indigenous person to be appointed second vice president of Congress, tremendously increasing the voice and visibility of all Indigenous peoples in Ecuadorian politics. President Lucio Gutiérrez made her minister of foreign affairs in 2003, a position she resigned from soon after to protest the administration's neoliberal policies. She was appointed to UNPFII to work on the portfolios of the Administration of Justice, Traditional Knowledge, and Gender. In 2007 she was appointed judge in Ecuador's Supreme Court. Pacari was a protagonist in the consolidation of a plurinational state, defending rights to self-determination through linguistic, territorial, and political autonomy. She reached the highest levels of national and international decision-making, proving that Indigenous peoples were valuable actors beyond national politics.

Women's contribution to the 1990 uprising was powerful and public enough to generate recognition within Ecuador's Indigenous movements. Inspired by the legacy of Cacuango and Amaguaña, ECUARUNARI founded the Dolores Cacuango Leadership School for Women in 1996.[18] It was created to nurture new female leaders and led by Chancoso for over a decade. The school was designed to increase women's self-confidence, public-speaking skills, and ability to elaborate political agendas and to promote economic and cultural opportunities for women who often lacked both. Its mission statement points to the inheritance of resistance and celebrates the "natural" leadership women have traditionally maintained within Indigenous communities. Unfortunately, the school has since crumbled because of inadequate funds, mismanagement, and internal discord. Classes ceased after the 2013 ECUARUNARI's Women's Assembly and are now limited to occasional workshops on women's rights, self-esteem, and provincial leadership.

The role of women in the Indigenous uprisings that shook Ecuador throughout the 1990s resonates with women's participation in the Zapatista movement that shook Mexico in 1994. Zapatista women combined colorful Maya clothing with guerrilla-like balaclavas to fight at the frontlines. The force of women is tangible in the leadership of Zapatista commander Ramona (Rovira 1996; Zwarenstein 2006). Once a street vendor who spoke no Spanish, Ramona became one of seven female leaders on the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee and the first Zapatista official to publicly appear outside of Chiapas. It was she who represented the Zapatista army in the 1996 National Indigenous Congress in Mexico City. She is one of many more Indigenous women who participate in politics of liberation and exercise influential leadership (Gutiérrez Chong 2007). In 2017 the Zapatistas took another step and elected an Indigenous woman as a representative for the Mexican presidential election.

FIGURE 7. Indigenous women were numerous among the thousands of Ecuadorians who marched through the streets of Quito against the indefinite reelection of President Correa in August 2015.

Women's participation in Indigenous mobilizations across Latin America today is the fruit of historical processes of contestation. Indigenous women emblematize political agencies that are neither marginal nor accidental but coherent within a lasting culture of political protest. Once we recognize the participation of Indigenous women in processes of state formation, we are surprised to find so few of them in ethnopolitics today. The challenge, then, is to account for the limited presence of women in contemporary politics. Instead of strengthening women's historical influence, the institutionalization of the Indigenous movement in a formal political party seems to have dissipated women's voices and leadership.

GENDER INEQUALITIES WITHIN ECUADOR'S MODERN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

The transition from movements to electoral politics was extremely successful. Indigenous movements first created CONAIE in 1986, then the independent

electoral party, Pachakutik, in 1995, which sent twelve representatives to Congress after its first election. However, the emergence of ethnopolitics seems to have left most women behind. Proportionally speaking, there are few Indigenous women politicians, and rarely are those involved in national agenda setting. The first Indigenous woman to run for CONAIE's higher office was Mónica Chuji (Kichwa Amazónica) in 2014. A Kichwa from Amazonia, she was a student of environmental studies, a former minister of communication, and a legislator in Ecuador's 2008 Constitutional Assembly. Chuji was by far the most qualified candidate, but she lost to Jorge Herrera, president of the Indigenous Movement of Cotopaxi. CONAIE's presidents to date have all been men: Miguel Tankamash (Shuar), Luis Macas (Kichwa Saraguro), Antonio Vargas (Kichwa Amazónico), Leonidas Iza (Kichwa Panzaleo), Marlon Santi (Kichwa Sarayaku), Humberto Cholango (Kichwa Kayambi), Jorge Herrera (Kichwa Panzaleo) and Jaime Vargas (Ashuar). Only one woman has led ECUARUNARI, Chancoso, who acted as president of the organization in its first years and was elected vice president in 2016. It took nearly twenty years for Pachakutik to elect its first female coordinator, Fanny Campos. The 2013 election of Campos, a non-Indigenous mestiza politician without prior experience in Indigenous community organizing, shows that Indigenous women remain excluded from positions of leadership even within Indigenous organizations. In 2014 Pachakutik counted only two women among twenty-four provincial coordinators, Mariana Fajardo in Zamora and Olfa Vivanco in Loja, and only one woman among five governors elected to office, Guadalupe Llori in the Amazonian province of Orellana.[19] Only four Indigenous women served among the 137 members of Congress in 2014, even though women constituted about 40 percent of parliament. Lourdes Tibán was the first female candidate to represent Pachakutik in the 2017 presidential election. Tibán, from Cotopaxi, won the primaries with over 40 percent of the votes but opted out of the campaign for a multiparty alliance. Different indicators seem to point in the same direction: principles of gender complementarity were dropped—and Indigenous women started to lag—as Indigenous movements became institutionalized.

Despite their historical leadership, few Indigenous women work in the ranks of the Indigenous movement and fewer still at the top. Pacari (1993) has called for the redress of this inequality, whereas Chancoso claims that men and women used to organize together before Indigenous movements entered national politics and gender entered indigenous politics. In the 2015 Women's Assembly of ECUARUNARI, Indigenous women complained that they were excluded from

formal politics, endured discrimination from provincial leaders, lacked access to communication, and faced alone the overload of household chores.

Zamosc (2007) has identified undemocratic practices during the initial institutionalization of Ecuador's Indigenous movement. If the Indigenous movement was fundamental in the process of democratization, it nevertheless has helped perpetuate hierarchical, undemocratic practices when it comes to gender. In fact, the marginalization of women and their concerns is one of the most problematic aspects of ethnopolitics in Latin America today.

Various factors atrophy the leadership potential of Indigenous women. They face gender and ethnic harassment at the polls; they are discriminated against when running for office in their communities.[20] Community politics has come to be considered the realm of men, and local politicians often propagate sexist attitudes. Women receive little encouragement to pursue political careers outside their homes and are instead expected to fulfill family chores and housework, and many have to seek permission from skeptical and jealous husbands to commit to political responsibilities. Discrimination in the mainstream society conflates harsh working conditions in rural communities and sexist customary laws that accentuate political exclusion (Cumes 2009; Sieder and Sierra 2010). Some testimonials reveal more overt forms of violence: women are undermined in public office, their achievements overlooked or dismissed; some report being raped by their male counterparts, notably during the 1990 levantamiento; and various high-ranking women report being told, "Si eres compañera, tienes que compartir todo."[21] Female leaders suffer intense public discrimination for their political activities and are perceived as "public" women. At a subtler level, politically active women tend to be ostracized within the daily life of the community.[22]

National politics require Indigenous women to vote, just like any male or mestizo citizen, but Indigenous communities often exclude them from decision-making processes within their own communities through formal and informal mechanisms. The communal voting system tends to be organized on the basis of one vote per home, but the head of the household often decides the family "consensus."[23] Many women feel silenced by men.[24] Men's opinions tend to prevail to the detriment of women, who are trivialized as less capable of reason and less suited for politics. Men "give orders to women," they "know better," and they "explain things to the women who don't understand anything" (CESA 1993). Mariana Fajardo, Pachakutik coordinator for the province of Zamora, complains that all too often she is the only woman to partake in political meetings with twenty or more men. Women are dynamic activists at grassroots levels

but frequently report feeling intimidated when they consider running for office. According to Fajardo, women think of themselves as less capable than men and receive little encouragement to take positions of leadership. The intangible violence that oppresses and censors women's political voices manifests as physical and economic forms of violence that leave permanent scars on Indigenous women's identities (Poeschel-Renz 2003).

Institutional efforts to even out political opportunities have so far been too slow and too occasional to really tackle the exclusion of Indigenous women from the political arena. The culture of machismo that permeates the highest institutional levels became apparent when the Indigenous movement aborted the formation of an Indigenous women's organization. In 1996 Pacari and Chancoso joined Teresa Simbaña, Vicenta Chuma, and Rosa Bacancela to found the Confederation of Indigenous Women of Ecuador (CONMIE). CONMIE was an offshoot of the 1990s uprisings like the Women of All Red Nations (WARN) created in 1974 was an offshoot of the American Indian Movement (AIM) and echoed the first Mapuche women's organization created in 1991 (Paillalef 2002): Indigenous women organizing partially in response to the sexism they confronted within emancipation movements.[25] The organization was immediately perceived as a threat to the unity of the national Indigenous movement, sparking accusations among leaders of CONAIE, the Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indians, and ECUARUNARI. Originally, CONMIE had around fifteen hundred members across eight provinces. After sustained harassment, intimidation, and threats to the women founders of CONMIE, the Indigenous movement proposed a deal: the founders would abandon CONMIE in exchange for positions of leadership within CONAIE.[26] Women like Pacari and Chancoso accepted, thus leaving behind gendered approaches to Indigenous politics to follow political career paths focused on mainstream ethnopolitics. Since then, they have identified themselves as Indigenous rather than female representatives, advocating for ethnic rights rather than a gender-oriented agenda in their political struggles.

The history of CONMIE, with its weakness and disarticulation, is the result of a conscious effort of the male Indigenous political leadership to undermine a women's initiative perceived as a critique of the sexist hierarchies of the Indigenous movement.[27] They began to frame women's concerns as external to Indigenous politics, as not only peripheral but also imported feminist perspectives that did not belong to Indigenous agendas. To this day, CONMIE suffers from institutional pressure and discrimination, working as best it can without

FIGURE 8. Carmen Lozano, coordinator of women and the family at ECUARUNARI, faces armed police forces during a protest in defense of rights to self-determination in Quito (2014).

a budget or an office. The organization was weakened from the start, never able to gain political relevance or to build a forceful political agenda. In a way, it was never really born. This case reveals only part of the tension between ethnicity and gender. CONMIE was framed as a threat to the political cohesion and mobilization capacity of Indigenous struggles and purposefully suffocated from the beginning.

The national Indigenous movement never embraced the initiative of CONMIE and created instead branches dedicated to women and the family within existing structures. For example, ECUARUNARI created a commission on women and the family, and CONAIE launched a program on gender. In recent years, Indigenous organizations have initiated some efforts to integrate women into their agendas. Yet a decade after the historical uprising, CONAIE had yet to draft a national agenda for Indigenous women. Overall, the Indigenous movement remains resistant to gendered agendas, often invoking gender complementarity but doing little to redress women's exclusion from decision-making.

The discrepancy between ideals of gender complementary and women's absence in contemporary Indigenous politics is not unique to Ecuador. In Bolivia, notions of gender complementarity can serve to reproduce women's political exclusion from communal institutions and newly created municipalities (Pape 2008). Olivia Harris (2000) points out that women are excluded from communal meetings largely controlled by men. Patriarchy uses constructions of gender complementarity as a facade to maintain Indigenous women in subordinate positions. Rather than producing equality, the rhetoric of gender

complementarity can explain the stark contradictions in terms of Indigenous women's politics, as they mobilize for protest but fail to reach positions of authority. Sarah Radcliffe (2002, 150) warns that the fulfillment of Indigenous rights does not automatically guarantee women's rights in what she terms "communal patriarchies." That is why many Indigenous women pursue organizations of their own. In Peru, Indigenous women's organizations maintain affiliations to the male-dominated mixed-gender organizations, producing what Rousseau and Morales Hudon (2017) call gender parallelism.

The invisibility of women among the Indigenous leadership today is evidence of discriminatory and violent practices in the name of political cohesion. Further, it indicates that the Indigenous movement is characterized by hierarchical and *machista* practices that have excluded women in new ways since the 1990s. The recent silencing of women's voices in institutionalized politics calls for gender-focused reforms within Ecuador's Indigenous movement. For this, we must understand what pushed contemporary ethnopolitics to undermine women's contribution and discard the very political forces that consolidated Indigenous legitimacy through leaders like Cacuango and Amaguaña.

ETHNOPOLITICS WITHOUT WOMEN?

Indigenous women activists have long confronted multiple patriarchies, some inherited from the hacienda system and others sustained within their communities. Historians have examined how processes of conquest and nation-making eroded Indigenous women's political and economic status (Powers 2005; O'Connor 2007). Despite a paradoxical position at the intersection of activism and subordination, Indigenous women have proven to be fundamental actors in uprisings against exploitation. They have been at the frontlines of political protest from colonial times to the early 1990s. Yet if women remain central to Indigenous struggles, they have also become marginalized from decision-making. Despite the larger trend toward democratization, their interests and leadership are tangential to the progressive institutionalization of Ecuador's Indigenous movement.

Rather than concluding that Indigenous women's rebellious activism has gone extinct, I suggest that they face new adversities in a very disjunctive process of social and political transformation. The legal recognition of Indigenous rights in the last decades paradoxically reinforced gender inequalities, further hampering

women's political power. Three factors merit careful scrutiny. First, the assimilation of Indigenous peoples as individual citizens has often come at the detriment of women's status. For instance, the redistribution of land under various waves of agrarian reform reinforced patriarchal land tenure. Second, the support of Liberation Theology to Indigenous struggles may have been a double-edged sword. While the Catholic Church was an important ally of Indigenous struggles for land in the 1970s, the church's political activism also reproduced and legitimated both traditional and new forms of gender ideologies in Indigenous communities. Third, the Indigenous movement began to play by the sexist rules of mainstream politics, forging a formal political organization to compete in the electoral system. All three are highly gendered processes that can, to a large extent, explain the gender disparities that followed the consolidation of ethnopolitics.

Agrarian reforms and citizenship both tend to be highly gendered processes. Indigenous women lost land rights in various historical moments, along with political power within their communities. Carmen Deere and Magdalena León de Leal (2001) explore the gender discrepancies in agrarian reforms throughout Latin America and in Ecuador. As men gained property titles, they also gained authority as the heads of households, accentuating the gender gap. More importantly, the agrarian reform that started in 1963 brought much more than a simple redistribution of land. It ignited a process of recognition of Indigenous peoples as Ecuadorian citizens. Prior to that, Indigenous people were sold like cattle. They were attached to parcels of land and treated as the property of landowners, which only ended when agrarian reforms allowed Indigenous peoples to own land in the sixties.[28] Acquiring land of their own unleashed other fundamental social and political rights. In 1978 suffrage became universal. The government abolished literacy requirements, finally granting individual political rights to the largely rural and illiterate Indigenous population.[29] Until then, Indigenous peoples were not considered citizens and had been banned from organizing (Becker 2008a). Agrarian reform marked the end of the huasipungo and the end of political subjugation and economic exploitation. Indian peasants became citizens, and the state started a process of assimilating them into the larger Ecuadorian mestizo society. Nira Yuval Davis (1997) articulates how concepts of nationhood affect gender relations. Despite worldwide processes of decolonization, modern democratic politics have effectively excluded Indigenous women from power (McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat 1997).

The redistribution of land rights to Indigenous men as the heads of households reproduced in Indigenous society the gender fault lines that prevailed

in mestizo society. In Chimborazo, for instance, the Naula family remembers that men, as the heads of the households, were the ones to claim land titles. The voting certificate was one of the legal documents they had to present to pursue land claims. Thus, the redistribution of land titles along gender lines accentuated gender inequalities in political participation, as men had more incentive to vote than women, just as they now migrate to the cities because of economic motives whereas women are more likely to stay in communities. Through the 1960s and 1970s, Indigenous women who had no opportunity to acquire land had little legal or administrative incentive to vote. The Naula family lived on a parcel of land acquired by the grandfather through land redistribution programs, for which he had to present his voting certificate, but his wife never voted in her life even though she died at nearly one hundred years old in 2007.[30] As men voted to acquire land titles, they socialized in the mestizo world, learning its language and social and legal codes. Gender inequalities were thus increased beyond what had existed under the huasipungo system, creating an education gap that kept women working nonpaid jobs in the highlands while men were progressively integrated into national politics and the capitalist market economy of urban centers. Men's opportunities to participate in politics grew faster than those of women, whose leverage to negotiate with the state declined. The emancipation from the huasipungo, for which Cacuango and Amaguaña had fought so hard, meant that Indigenous men acquired more citizenship rights than women in the process of being integrated into mestizo society. Women became more susceptible to institutionalized gender norms prevalent in the nation-state and endured different economic realities than men. This made them "more Indian" (De la Cadena 1992). As the ethnic gap started to be redressed, a gender gap developed on political, economic, social, and cultural fronts. In other words, while citizenship stopped excluding people on the basis of their ethnicity, it continued to exclude Indigenous women on the basis of their gender.

A second factor to take into consideration is the influence of the Catholic Church in consolidating Ecuador's modern Indigenous movement. Liberation theology played a significant role in opposing the exploitation of Indigenous peoples under the huasipungo. Salesian missionaries fostered Indigenous mobilization in the province of Cotopaxi, strengthening educational systems and access to resources (Martínez Novo 2008), and the Catholic Church promoted social action in impoverished rural communities through the Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (Yashar 2005). The bishop Monseñor

Leonidas Proaño sided with the oppressed peasantry, legitimizing Indigenous land claims and thus inciting a power shift to their advantage. He created the Popular Radio Schools of Ecuador in 1962 for promoting literacy, education, and evangelization among Indigenous peoples. In Chimborazo, where land conflicts were particularly intense, Proaño declared the Catholic Church an Indigenous ally and redistributed some land to Indigenous communities. A renown defender of Indigenous rights, he came to be known as "the Indians' Bishop" or the "Red Bishop," and he contributed politically and philosophically to the emergence of today's Indigenous movement (Arrobo Rodas and Arrobo Rodas 2008).

Proaño remains an icon with a legacy of religious activism that is hard to overstate. CONAIE's flag represents a mountain surrounded by the colors of Pachakutik and portraits of two individuals: Dolores Cacuango and Monseñor Proaño. At the 2014 Women's Assembly, three portraits representing icons of Indigenous liberation stood at the foot of the speakers table: Monseñor Proaño with Dolores Cacuango on the left and Bartolina Sisa on the right. Indigenous communities decorated a ceremonial stone honoring his legacy up in the *páramo*, close to the eternal snows of the Chimborazo volcano. His influence was so powerful that his successor, Bishop Victor Corral, was selected to mediate negotiations between the Indigenous movement and the Ecuadorian state in 1990 (Lyons 2001). The church, which had historically treated Indigenous peoples as wards incapable of political authority, was now supporting their claims to land.

Liberation theology helped to free Indigenous peoples from violent exploitation in a society that remains largely Catholic. Yet this proved to be a double-edged sword. Liberation theology played a positive role in validating Indigenous claims and influenced the making of the modern Indigenous movement. It allowed the Catholic Church to maintain its legitimacy among Indigenous populations, and its *mission civilizatrice* continued unabated as newly emancipated Indigenous peoples blended Christianity with modernity. For the Catholic Church, supporting Indigenous peoples was not only an ethical thing to do but also meant access to the largest population in the highlands, expanding its institutional and ideological reach. In effect, Indigenous peasants gained emancipation from the huasipungo system but failed to emancipate themselves from religious authority. Today, rural Chimborazo, with the country's densest population of Indigenous peoples, retains a strong religious influence with Catholic and Evangelical churches competing for parishes (Andrade 2004). The support

FIGURE 9. An Evangelical wedding in Cecel Ayron, Chimborazo (2007). During the ceremony, the pastor asked the spouses to love each other and the wife to obey her husband and care for him.

of the Catholic Church meant a conservative perspective on gender roles that to some extent consolidated religious influence among highland populations who benefited from land redistribution. Liberation theology validated Indigenous emancipation but also reinforced patriarchal values that encouraged women's submissiveness to men, along with their role as mothers within the family rather than as political leaders at the frontlines. In the long run, the church's support for agrarian reform maintained a sexist ordering of gender relations that benefited male privilege to the detriment of women.

Finally, conventional politics are anything but woman friendly. Cohorts of feminist scholars have analyzed gender as a core feature of state-making, warned that all nationalisms are gendered (and dangerous [McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat 1997]), and identified patriarchy as the axis of state modernization (Agarwal 1988). In Latin America, patriarchy was also central to nation-making, with gender and race standing on equal footing in the reproduction of systems of domination (Mallon 1995). The consolidation of European states dramatically impoverished Indigenous women's political, legal, and economic status in society (Powers 2005; Gauderman 2003). In Ecuador, Erin O'Connor (2007,184)

argues that state formation is the ultimate source of patriarchal paradoxes in nineteenth-century Indian-state relations. As the state modernizes, therefore, it reinforces the masculinization of Indian-state relations, in which the capacity of Indigenous men to interact with the state increases whereas that of women diminishes.

Feminist scholarship has analyzed gender inequalities in formal political systems across the world. Everywhere, political parties have a minority of women in their ranks, and decades of quotas have only raised the world average of women in parliaments to about 20 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). Ecuador ranks among the top twenty countries worldwide in percentages of women in national parliaments. It was the first Latin American country to grant suffrage to women (in 1929),[31] and it launched an ambitious system of gender quotas early on, yet few women were elected to office or appointed to influential positions with decision-making power. The gender bias prevailing in world politics also impacts Indigenous women because ethnopolitics conformed to gender standards to enter the mainstream. Women are relegated to grassroots organizing, while men compete in high politics. The institutionalization that made Ecuador's Indigenous movement a democratic force is ironically what deepened gender hierarchies at its core.

The combination of these various factors undermined Indigenous women's participation in contemporary ethnopolitics, and the formal recognition of Indigenous rights by the state of Ecuador created new obstacles for Indigenous women. Gendered inequalities permeated Indigenous organizations as they evolved from social movements in the political periphery into formal parties running for presidential office. As Indigenous movements evolved into legitimate, institutionalized political voices, women benefited from newly institutionalized rights in international treaties and the national Constitution. Yet they also experienced intricate layers of gender-based inequalities.

CONCLUSION

I have made a case for the long-standing agency of Indigenous women in Ecuador. Examining the mobilization of women from colonial rebellions to the construction of the modern Indigenous movement, I have marshaled evidence regarding the extent and decisiveness of their participation in the politics of contestation. My historical analysis at the intersections of gender and ethnicity

seeks to locate the power of Indigenous women while at the same time expanding conceptual premises of political agency. In positioning Indigenous women strategically, it invites several concluding observations.

First, I contend that Indigenous women have always taken part in politics, and the historical evidence points to the scope and scale of their participation. Indigenous women are by no means political bystanders. They are not new to political struggles either, but rather inheritors of legitimate authority. Despite lingering gender and racial discrimination, Indigenous women are pivotal, enduring actors in Ecuadorian politics. Indigenous women have repeatedly mobilized in struggles against exploitation, and they have often done so in positions of leadership. Indigenous women have at key moments been political insiders who influenced power struggles. In that sense, social scientists must take their work seriously to comprehend the key characteristics of political struggles in Latin America.

Second, recognizing the enduring legacy of political leadership among Indigenous women is particularly relevant to understanding the paradox of their invisibility today. Women like Cacuango and Amaguaña are widely recognized symbols of Indigenous resistance, yet female leadership is less in evidence since the institutionalization of Indigenous politics. Indigenous organizations include fewer women in positions of leadership and largely exclude them from formal positions of power. Despite what I call the inheritance of resistance, Indigenous women face significant adversity in contemporary ethnopolitics, which shows us how the consolidation of Indigenous peoples in formal politics has frequently also aggravated gender inequalities.

Third, the marginalization of women sheds light on disjunctions between the discourse of equality and practice of discrimination within Indigenous politics. While political mainstreaming might have accentuated gender discrepancies within Ecuador's modern Indigenous movement, the movement is nevertheless responsible for practicing—and at times encouraging—gender discrimination. Ecuador's Indigenous movement is undeniably a pillar in the process of democratization, as many scholars have argued (Van Cott 2008; Madrid 2012), yet Indigenous politics reproduce violence toward and inequality of women. Indigenous organizations such as CONAIE and Pachakutik have been key actors in the consolidation of inclusive democracy. But their discourse of social justice has so far coexisted with sexism, creating a gap between what the movement preaches and what it practices. I would like to emphasize that the Indigenous movement must be held accountable to practicing the social justice it preaches

within its own ranks. The lack of women in the Indigenous movement cannot be downplayed as a mere inheritance of colonial violence. It is embedded in current political cultures that must be critiqued and struggled against with the same sense of urgency gender inequality inspires in non-Indigenous political contexts.

3

INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANA MARÍA Guacho uses the same tupo to hold a *chalina* around her elderly shoulders when walking unnoticed through the streets of Riobamba as when speaking at the UN headquarters in New York City.[1] She embodies the unexpected politics of Indigenous women, at once vernacular and worldly. Like many women from the Andes, Guacho received little formal education. She worked hard as a young woman and left her village to escape an abusive marriage. She gained leadership skills through community organizing across the Chimborazo highlands, navigating racism and sexism. Eventually, Guacho's voice reached international venues in Europe and the United States and later the UN Forum for Indigenous Peoples, where she became an official representative in 2006. Guacho's trajectory illustrates how Indigenous women may be oppressed by dynamics of subalterity while at the same time they act internationally.

Women like Guacho remain invisible in mainstream analyses of global politics. Their experiences tend to be dismissed as ethnographic anecdotes irrelevant to the international state system. One reason is that Indigenous peoples tend to be perceived mostly as local recipients of global dynamics, not shapers of international rights. Another reason is that international relations, the discipline that explains world politics, provides selective accounts of the international and operates according to positivist modes of inquiry dismissive of various political

peripheries. Indigenous world views, like most colonial experiences, are discarded as subjective and particular by processes of knowledge production that use rational and objective criteria to forge universalizing epistemologies (Epstein 2014). Critics have confronted international relations' inability to recognize the significance of Indigenous world views, especially its understandings of sovereignty (Lightfoot 2016; Shaw 2008), and denounced disciplinary borders that exclude other experiences of the international (Tickner and Blaney 2013). Indigenous women like Guacho are not colorful backdrops; they constitute the international. If we are to understand world politics, we must account for peripheral experiences of the international, including those of Indigenous women.

I discuss Indigenous international relations in response to theoretical calls to think beyond the nation (Appadurai 1993) while looking within it (Chatterjee 1993). Scholars of the postcolonial invite us to provincialize Europe (Chakrabarty 2000) and ask what places lie "beyond" stateness (Tickner and Blaney 2013). Indigenous world views provide what Donna Haraway (1988, 581) calls an epistemology of location, opposed to the disembodied "vision from nowhere" claimed by Western science. They offer a situated experience of what international relations may look like outside the state. Indigenous politics cannot be divorced from the study of world politics: they stand as the other that informs stateness (Beier 2009b). If the Indigenous is an identity relational to the state, and co-constitutive of it, then by default it is intrinsically international, since the international is organized around sovereign states. Indigenous worlding does more than simply expand ways of practicing global politics; it forms a different register altogether. Indigenous worlding should be understood as a postcolonial embodied consciousness that permits both theorizing in consciousness and embodied *experiences* (Epstein 2014).

Indigenous women's politics must be approached from an international perspective for two reasons. First, they actively participate in world politics, transforming these practices in significant ways. They have built transnational networks, participated in global Indigenous movements, and shaped international law. While Guacho attends the UN forum, others are organizing transnational meetings and raising their voices at the Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala. Indigenous movements achieved the passage of UNDRIP (2007), guaranteeing the international recognition of Indigenous self-determination. In such processes, Indigenous movements push legal reform onto international organizations such as the UN, and these international interactions, in turn, frame Indigenous repertoires (Morgan 2011).

Indigenous politics are intrinsically "glocal" (Brysk 2000) in the sense that they routinely articulate local claims with international frameworks.

Second, indigeneity is international by its very nature. Claims for self-determination, including those of Indigenous women, are situated outside the state. Indigenous peoples have long litigated for territory in an international system that permitted colonial appropriation of Indigenous lands as terra nullius, and colonial settler governments have long had to negotiate with Native nations. Settler states have systematically denied Indigenous sovereign authority but nevertheless treated Native peoples as distinct legal entities. Exploring Indigenous peoples' relations with the state not only tells us something about Indigenous peoples, but also something about the very state system that developed partly in response to the Indigenous challenge. At the same time, this exploration allows us to imagine a politics outside the state system. Indigenous experiences offer different ways of knowing the world.

This chapter situates Indigenous experiences in the international. While prior chapters discussed the gender dynamics at stake within Indigenous movements, this analysis is concerned with establishing the international location of Indigenous politics. Indigenous knowledge is intrinsically *inter*national, that is, *between* nations and across and *outside* the nation-state. I start with key examples of Indigenous women's transnational activism to illustrate Indigenous ways of world-making, showing how Native women across the Americas articulate local concerns in international forums such as the Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala. I then explain how Indigenous politics have historically been *about* the international. I analyze how Indigenous rights appeared first in international law, initially at the ILO, and later were consolidated as universally accepted principles at the UN. Finally, I suggest that we think about indigeneity as a politics located outside the state, one that challenges the international status quo. To do so, I discuss Indigenous resilience in the face of the terra nullius doctrine that forged the foundations of today's international system of sovereignty.

WOMEN OF THE ABYA YALA: TRANS-NATION ACTIVISM IN THE AMERICAS

Decades of transnational activism among Indigenous women in the Americas have produced a dense web of organizations. Indigenous women have mobilized

across borders and turned local concerns into international agendas addressing a specific intersectionality of oppression that inscribes women's issues within Indigenous claims. From Chirapaq in Peru to the Native Women's Association of Canada, Indigenous women have built collaborative networks to defend their rights internationally.

The Enlace Continental de Mujeres Indígenas de las Americas, or Continental Network for Indigenous Women, was one of the first initiatives to connect Indigenous women transnationally. It emerged in 1993 as a platform for almost thirty organizations in nineteen countries and meets every three years to discuss continental concerns, such as women's status in customary law. Enlace was founded by grassroots organizations like Chirapaq to inform and lobby international spheres of decision-making. In 2004 Enlace gathered four hundred Indigenous women to design recommendations that were adopted at the third session of UNPFII. The 2010 meeting, in turn, planned strategies to reinforce women's leadership between civil society organizations, national governments, and international organizations. In 2017 Enlace presented a report on the various forms of interrelated violence against Indigenous women—political, psychological, sexual, economic, and environmental—to the fifty-seventh session of the UN Committee on the Status of Women.

Another important global platform is FIMI, which has coordinated Indigenous women's networks in South and North America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific since 1999. It was conceived to strengthen the voices and methodologies of Indigenous women in international processes of decision-making. The organization coordinates capacity building and leadership, notably with the Indigenous Women's Fund. It promotes alliances with other social movements, encouraging dialogues between Indigenous women and feminist movements for more inclusive movements and plural feminist identities. In 2005, for instance, FIMI organized "Indigenous Women's Visions of an Inclusive Feminism" at the International Forum on Women and Development in Bangkok, Thailand. That same year, FIMI partnered with MADRE, the international women's human rights organization, and became a member of the UN Task Force on Violence Against Women. FIMI became an international reference for how Indigenous women can collaborate with the UN system to influence national policy.

International networks like Enlace and FIMI created a dynamic web of regional events called *encuentros*, or encounters. The 2004 Encuentro de Mujeres Indígenas (Indigenous Women's Encounter), attended by women from Oaxaca,

Chiapas, and Guatemala, inspired sister venues like the *encuentro* of Indigenous women of Mesoamerica in 2006. These, in turn, spurred focalized events, such as the South American encuentro on violence against women and Indigenous women's rights (2007) and Ecuador's encuentro for Indigenous women writers (2011). The trend was palpable at subnational levels, too, as Indigenous women were also organizing locally. In Peru, for instance, nearly seventy Indigenous and Amazonian women belonging to thirty-four different organizations met in 2004 to denounce the continuing violence and discrimination against Indigenous women in the context of land expropriation, pollution, and the exploitation of resources on their territories. They issued a declaration based on the UN's International Decade of the World's Indigenous People and the World Conference Against Racism to demand the official use of Indigenous languages and the creation of a special *defensoría* for Indigenous women to address gender violence in a decentralized manner.

Encuentros multiplied and focused on varied regional issues. Colombia's encuentro of Indigenous women in the sierra of Perijá (2009) discussed women's rights in conjunction with territorial displacement. In Mexico, the encuentro of Indigenous women from the mountain region tackled geopolitics (2010); Bolivia's encuentro of Indigenous and community women broadcasters explored media as a tool of emancipation (2010). Ecuador's encuentro of Amazonian women gathered members of Shuar, Kichwa, Achuar, Sapara, Shiwiar, Waorani, and Quijos communities to discuss territorial and environmental concerns with delegates of national organizations like CONAIE and ECUARUNARI in Puyo (2013).

Indigenous women took their concerns to recognized feminist venues such as the Encuentro Feminista de América Latina y del Caribe, or Feminist Encounter of Latin America and the Caribbean. For three decades, Encuentro Feminista has been a critical site in which to collectively reimagine feminist politics in Latin America (Alvarez et al. 2002). Women from all venues come together—activists and peasants, scholars and sex workers, politicians and teenagers. In 2009 Indigenous women made their voices heard at the eleventh encuentro in Mexico City. They organized dozens of panels that attracted large audiences to challenge hegemonic feminism, debate class inequalities, and identify pragmatic strategies for increasing institutional diversity. The event closed with an Indigenous Women's Declaration that emphasized the significance of cultural diversity in women's rights.

Although encuentros are off the radar, they should not be trivialized as isolated events. They are the threads that, woven together, form international

decision-making. For instance, the Alliance of Indigenous Women from Central America and Mexico has coordinated regional agendas at the UN Women office (formerly UNIFEM) since 2004. This platform articulates forty Indigenous women's organizations from across the region within the UN Women framework. In Ecuador, UN Women embarked on a project with the Association of Women from Rural "Juntas Parroquiales" in 2009 to strengthen advocacy networks through information and communication technologies. In other cases, UN Women has facilitated Indigenous women's politics by generating international forums. The 2007 UNIFEM conference on Indigenous women and ancestral justice gathered dozens of women (and some men) from Latin America in Quito to systematize information and identify strategies for action. Through the event, women defended community justice and emphasized their role within it while opposing their systematic exclusion from decision-making positions. The conference was an opportunity for them to discuss issues too difficult to bring up within their own communities or the Indigenous movement. For instance, they expressed concern that most Indigenous justice systems were not addressing violence against women in a satisfactory manner because most judges were men. They insisted that both state and Indigenous systems had the responsibility to secure women's rights and participation in the administration of justice, and they denounced the frequent cover-up of men by men that results in the violation of women's rights (Lang and Kucia 2009).

These various venues show that Indigenous women consolidated vibrant networks in the aftermath of the 1990s uprisings. They articulated agendas in international organizations like the UN, in regional encuentros, and in transnational feminist movements. They also successfully wove their priorities into important Indigenous venues like the Abya Yala continental summits.

ABYA YALA CONTINENTAL SUMMITS

Women were key actors in the construction of a continental Indigenous platform. They were dynamic participants in all the ad hoc regional meetings that preceded the creation of the Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala. They attended the 1980 Encounter of Southern Cone Indian Organizations in Ollantaytambo, Peru, and were among the four hundred Indigenous delegates who claimed rights to self-government and justice at the 1990 Continental Encounter of Indigenous Nations. The event took place in Ecuador around the theme "Five Hundred Years of Indigenous

FIGURE 10. Women hold the *wuipala*, a symbol of Andean cosmovision, during a march in Quito.

Resistance" just after the country had experienced its largest Indigenous uprisings. Women also attended the continental encuentro of Indigenous Nations in Temoaya, Mexico, three years later.

Indigenous continental summits are important events. They strengthen transnational organizing, consolidate a hemispheric platform, and influence agenda setting in the region and beyond. So far, five Abya Yala summits have attracted thousands of Indigenous people from the Americas to discuss a range of concerns. The first summit took place in Teotihuacan, Mexico, in 2000 and the second in Quito in 2004. Both addressed themes of coordination and alliances across the Americas. The third summit, in Guatemala, gathered activists from twenty-four countries around the theme "From Resistance to Power" (Becker 2008). This summit was inspired by the presidency of Evo Morales in Bolivia and focused largely on electoral paths to politics. In 2009 the Puno summit attracted sixty-five hundred delegates from the twenty-two countries of the Americas and about five hundred observers from various social movements. The summit revolved around themes of plurinational states and the Kichwa concept of sumak kawsay (living well), which had been integrated in the constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador. The fifth summit gathered nearly four thousand people on

the Indigenous *resguardo* of La María Piendamó in Colombia's Cauca region. In a context of growing violence against Indigenous human rights defenders and legal warfare against Indigenous authorities, the summit pledged to actively resist extractive industries on Indigenous territories.[2] The sixth summit was planned to take place in Honduras in 2017, but the assassination of Berta Cáceres and other Indigenous leaders in the region undermined its organization.[3] In January 2017, supporting organizations like CAOI discussed alternatives to the summit.

Summits have been meaningful because they successfully articulate local needs in global terms. For instance, activists framed grassroots claims to food sovereignty within UN norms to shape the 2007 UNDRIP. Summits have also been important for spurring the creation of new organizations, like the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations and Nations of the Continent. They fuel parallel initiatives like the Continental Summit of Indigenous Communication of Abya Yala, which strengthens Indigenous media as a tool of self-determination. The communication summits have been held in Cauca, Colombia (2010), Oaxaca, Mexico (2013), and Cochabamba, Bolivia (2015). They promoted Indigenous media to reframe historical narratives, revitalize ancestral languages, and support community radio. They resonated with other efforts to spread emancipation through journalism and the arts, like Mexico's National Congress of Indigenous Communication (which was in its fourth edition in 2012) and Colombia's International Festival of Indigenous Peoples' Cinema and Video.

Although Indigenous women contribute to the success of hemispheric Indigenous movements, their voices are often left out when it comes to summit decision-making. Their response has been to create a Women's Summit within the summit. Cecilia Velázquez from CONAIE strongly defends the need for a Women's Summit: "We can't speak of constructing plurinational states without the participation of Indigenous women. The World Social Forum in Brazil said that another world is possible with the participation of Indigenous peoples. We also say that the construction of plurinational states is only possible with the presence of Indigenous women" (Becker 2010a, 73). The Women's Summit was brainstormed during the Guatemala summit and planned to launch at the fourth summit in Puno, Peru.

The First Continental Summit of Indigenous Women of Abya Yala gathered over two thousand women in Puno, Peru. On the eve of the summit, an opening march led participants to an auditorium where three panels discussed solidarity

and reciprocity, violence and racism, and the importance of women for democratic practice. Special sessions looked at plurinational states from women's perspectives and drafted proposals on issues related to collective rights, democracy, alternative development models, violence and discrimination, communication, and identity. An executive secretariat coordinated eighteen countries along regional networks to establish a continental agenda. Blanca Chancoso believes the Women's Summit strengthened women's voices and self-esteem, rebalancing the joint contributions of women and men in Indigenous struggles. On one hand, it recognized the centrality of women in Indigenous struggles, who were becoming insufficiently valued and invisible. On the other hand, it created a strategic space in which to denounce widespread violence against Indigenous women, identify regional trends, and tackle legal obstacles. Magdalena Sarat Pacheco, a Maya Quiché member of the summit's coordination committee, stressed the importance of an autonomous continental forum *by* and *for* Indigenous women: they were not responding to external priorities but developing their own intersectional agendas.

The second women's summit was highly anticipated, and most countries organized local preforums followed by a meeting at national headquarters to elaborate country agendas. Delegates met in Lima to establish an Andean agenda between Peru's National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining, Bolivia's National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu, Colombia's National Indigenous Organization, and Ecuador's ECUARUNARI. The second summit met in Cauca, Colombia, two days prior to the opening of the fifth Abya Yala summit. Women (and a few men) broke into seven thematic working groups: women's rights in the context of collective rights, models of development, extractive industries on Indigenous territories and violation of women's rights, violence against women and access to justice (customary and ordinary), world view and identity, communication (customary and intercultural), and youth. Long workshops used collaborative methods to develop a declaration concerned with the mega-projects forced upon Indigenous territories without prior consultation. Women's leadership then permeated the larger Abya Yala summit: female delegates led plenary sessions, speeches acknowledged women's leadership, and women were invited to join decision-making councils.

Women's call for a coordinated, continent-wide mobilization against extractivism was picked up in workshops and adopted in the final summit declaration. Although the activists made progress, many leaders expressed concern that their agendas would end up sidelined as they usually are. Chancoso,

who was in the summit's governing committee, admitted that the summit had included women's concerns better than prior continental meetings but that it was not enough. This time, the women decided to go a step further by publicly calling on Indigenous movements, as well as states. The Declaration of Indigenous Women made it into the Final Declaration of the Fifth Abya Yala Summit and called for coherence and accountability within Indigenous movements. Principles of sumak kawsay, they urged, should be put into practice. At the closing plenary session, women representatives openly denounced gender violence, accusing their male counterparts of silencing them. They demanded and proposed measures that would guarantee women's access to justice and political participation within their communities: alternation between men and women in positions of leadership and a code to regulate access to positions of power by men with records of domestic abuse. The women also called upon states. They demanded a voice in public policy and insisted on the need to coordinate Indigenous and state legal systems. They denounced human rights abuses, notably violence against women in Chiapas and Mapuche territories, asked Bolivia's government to compensate victims of police repression in the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park,[4] and demanded to be formally included in Colombia's peace process.

Indigenous women politics are plural and international; their politics are powerful because they stir exchanges that bridge Amazonian communities and UN norm-making. This use of international politics to advance women's rights in their communities has made Indigenous politics more visible, intelligible in non-Indigenous realms. For instance, indigeneity becomes a theme for development programs focused on gender, whereas feminist movements are expanding their understanding of claims for self-determination. In that sense, women's politics of intersectionality function as a translation of Indigenous claims. Indigenous women pursue a new generation of rights through their singular ways of practicing the international.

Indigenous women's politics are trans- and international not because they are more apt to engage in international politics than other women's movements; rather, their politics are inherently international. Indigenous women defend their intersectional agendas in international spaces because these are the arenas most favorable to Indigenous politics. Indigenous rights have emerged in the *inter*national realm, where nations negotiate *among* nations. It is *the* space where Indigenous peoples can defend their rights to self-determination as nations. Indigenous rights are anchored in international law, and the consolidation of

international human rights has only confirmed the international as the prominent space for Indigenous women's politics.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRADLE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Indigenous rights were crafted in international law. The ILO discussed the rights of Indigenous workers as early as the 1920s, but it was the emergence of a global human rights regime that gave momentum to Indigenous claims. The 1945 UN Charter first placed people above states, then the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights established the international prominence of human rights. In practice, however, neither declaration improved the lives of colonized peoples. European signatories continued their historic roles as colonial states, and France waged a brutal war against Algerian independence from 1954 to 1962 (Fanon 1965). In the Andes, states signed both UN declarations but continued Indigenous forms of slavery such as the huasipungo until the 1960s, well beyond abolitions of slavery and declarations of human rights. Bolivia and Ecuador abolished the labor bondage of Indigenous peoples in 1953 and 1963, respectively.[5] The appropriation of Indigenous lands and bodies was so normalized in the international society that UN member states saw no contradiction in signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights while simultaneously pursuing colonial violence in non-European regions. This is evident in the list of signatories to UN declarations. Only fifty-three member-states originally signed the UN Charter because many African countries were still colonies of European powers. In contrast, 191 states signed the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993, a declaration many consider to be the first to be truly universal because it includes the votes of postcolonial states. The international human rights system was not concerned with Indigenous autonomy per se, but it provided the legal foundations for Indigenous peoples to advocate for a specific declaration at the UN. The concept of human rights enabled Indigenous rights because it moved the locus of international law away from the state and recognized principles of self-determination, which later legitimized anticolonial struggles, as well as Indigenous claims.

Global human rights enabled Indigenous claims both legally and politically. Legally, human rights norms coincided with Indigenous demands even when they did not explicitly recognize them. The 1949 Convention on the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide protected ethnic minorities, and the 1969 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination protected minorities from discrimination within states. In 1966 the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights established the rights of *peoples*, as nations, to self-determination. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the most ratified legal declaration in the UN system, made an explicit reference to Indigenous individuals. Politically, human rights resulted in the explosion of anticolonial struggles on the international scene, which further invigorated Indigenous claims to self-determination.

Indigenous activism forced the UN to create special venues to address Indigenous priorities. The UN welcomed the WCIP in 1975, and after being pressured by the 1977 NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, the UN Economic and Social Council created the WGIP in 1982, which evolved into a permanent body. The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was created in 2000 as an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social Council and meets annually around a theme, which, coincidentally, was Indigenous women in 2004. Activism was equally forceful in regional contexts. The Inuit and Sami Councils, for instance, secured permanent seats in the Arctic Council. Striving for a culture of cooperation, they attend each other's executive meetings and guarantee a strong presence in international organizations, taking turns to represent the Arctic in UNPFII (Plaut 2012; Shadian 2013). Indigenous global politics are, as Sheryl Lightfoot (2016) puts it, a subtle revolution.

Indigenous politics proved not only viable, they also shaped the international. Yet demands by Indigenous nations for recognition as proper subjects of international law only gained traction with the ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. These two legal milestones consolidated rights to self-determination and turned Indigenous legislation into one of the most dynamic areas of international law (Anaya 2004).

FRAMING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AT THE ILO

It is rather surprising that the first entity to discuss Indigenous rights was a technical, bureaucratic organization concerned primarily with regulating labor standards. The ILO, created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, is the oldest international organization and the only lasting organizational legacy of the League of Nations. For decades, it was the only

body drafting international legislation for Indigenous peoples. The ILO was ahead of its time in discussing Indigenous rights, with studies and expert committees on Native labor as early as the 1920s, an Andean Indigenous Program in the 1950s, and the only two conventions to define Indigenous peoples' rights through the twentieth century. This long history of involvement with Indigenous issues, however, was mostly at odds with Indigenous priorities. Indigenous peoples resisted ILO conventions until Convention 169 finally adopted the concept of self-determination in 1989.

The ILO's early debates on the fate of Indigenous workers were not concerned with emancipatory ideals. In a century-long historical analysis of the ILO, Luis Rodríguez-Piñero (2005) shows that the original discussion of Indigenous rights was concerned with the imperial dimensions of international law rather than with Indigenous peoples. The Colonial Code had set specific international standards to "civilize" peoples in "primitive stages of development," and when the ILO discussed Native labor in 1926, it largely justified colonial exploitation (Rodríguez-Piñero 2005, 115). African delegates justified extreme labor conditions for peoples they labeled as savages; the Latin Americans denied the existence of Indigenous populations altogether. Brazilian state representative Mr. Sabrosso opposed a resolution on Native labor at the seventh session of the ILO: "In all of Latin America colored and native labor does not exist" because "there is no difference among workers"; furthermore, "all are citizens" and enjoy the "same rights and the same freedom" (Rodríguez-Piñero 2005, 1). Twenty years later, Latin American delegates admitted the existence of Indigenous labor but opposed creating minimum legal standards. The Mexican delegate attributed Indigenous difficulties to their "social retardation" and believed this "cultural" problem could be solved through international conventions.

It took a long time for the ILO to move away from colonial debates to consider Indigenous emancipation. The first relevant statement to be adopted was Convention 107 on Indigenous, Tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in 1957. Convention 107 articulated Indigenous rights within the larger emerging international human rights regime, thereby creating some minimal level of international scrutiny. It established Indigenous rights rarely found elsewhere in international law, especially with regard to land, cultural practices, health, and education. Yet the convention fell short of Indigenous expectations in at least two ways. First, it fell halfway between a legally binding convention and a policy recommendation. Member-states defended technical recommendations with obligations rather than a legal treaty and watered down the supplement

called Recommendation 104. Although most Latin American nations favored a convention, some still asserted they had "solved" the Indian problem in their countries, and El Salvador insisted that no Indigenous populations lived within its borders (Rodríguez-Piñero 2005, 236). Second, Convention 107 was criticized for seeking integration over autonomy. Despite support for anticolonial struggles, it was flawed by assimilationist language, protecting Indigenous workers "not yet integrated" into states. Indigenous peoples, international jurists, and human rights advocates around the world condemned ILO 107 as assimilationist and racist.

Convention 107 was flawed, but it was a first attempt to make Indigenous peoples subjects of international law with territorial rights. Article 11 established Indigenous peoples as international legal subjects with rights of ownership over their traditional lands. This was simultaneously undermined by Article 12, which confirmed the sovereign right of exception to states: peoples could not be removed from their land without their free consent *except* for reasons of national security or economic development. Convention 107 legitimized a world system organized around sovereign states, and its assimilationist tone implicitly denied Indigenous autonomy. But it recognized land as intrinsic to the material survival of Indigenous peoples, therefore establishing Indigenous peoples' historical precedence over land. This legal precedent was important not only because it recognized the territorial dimension of Indigenous rights. It also tied the universal understanding of indigeneity with the specific colonial experience of "encounter" in the Americas (Rodríguez-Piñero 2005). Regions like Asia preferred other understandings of indigeneity and pushed for wording such as "Tribal and Semi-tribal" in the title of Convention 107. This conceptualization led to a homogenous notion of indigeneity that obscures the multiple experiences of colonized peoples and, consequently, the many ways of being Indigenous.

ILO Convention 169, adopted in 1989, became the most powerful and most invoked international treaty for Indigenous rights. It was the first treaty to explicitly affirm Indigenous rights to self-government and to validate the distinctiveness of Indigenous cultures, thus moving away from assimilation. The choice of the word *peoples* in the plural marked a legal stand on the collective nature of Indigenous rights, bridging the political controversy between individual versus collective human rights, even though Article 3 says the term should refer to international law. The convention's legal milestone was to guarantee principles of autonomy, participation, and prior consultation, thereby

guaranteeing Indigenous territorial autonomy vis-à-vis states. Article 14 reiterated Indigenous ownership over land, consolidating a legal framework that associated territory with the integrity of Indigenous cultures. Article 15 stressed rights over natural resources and procedural warranties against removal from ancestral territories. It was the first international treaty to recognize Indigenous customary law and to assert Indigenous authority both within communities and in relation to states. ILO 169 proclaimed Indigenous rights to participate in policy affecting Indigenous territories and defined Native people as full citizens while respecting their right to live according to their own structures and traditions. In doing so, ILO 169 validated a model of differentiated rights against homogenizing forms of citizenship.

ILO 169 quickly became an Indigenous Magna Carta of sorts, a tool for legislative and policy change supporting Indigenous claims. Most Latin American states ratified it, helping pave the way for the emergence of new legal paradigms. ILO 169 is now enshrined in all constitutions across Latin America, used by national courts, and systematically invoked to support Indigenous collective rights. In the Andes, ILO 169 ignited a broad, deep range of constitutional reforms. Colombia, a strong defendant of Indigenous rights during the ILO negotiations, was the first Latin American country to constitutionalize Indigenous justice in 1991 (art. 246);[6] Peru moved toward legal pluralism in 1993 (art. 149); and Bolivia's 1994 constitutional reform further developed Colombia's legal language (art. 171). Ecuador and Venezuela recognized Indigenous judicial autonomy in 1998 (art. 191) and 1999 (art. 260), respectively. Within a decade, Andean countries had formally accepted Indigenous systems of justice.

ILO 169 provided the international legitimacy, if not always the legality, for Indigenous uprisings that transformed national politics. Ecuador's powerful mobilizations erupted immediately after ILO 169. The Indigenous movement had been demanding land redistribution for decades, gaining momentum with the foundation of CONAIE in 1986; ILO 169 provided international legitimacy to back land demands. Indigenous movements successfully pushed Ecuador's government to ratify the convention, which became the central legal reference supporting Indigenous demands during the 1998 constitutional reform.[7] Today, Indigenous groups use ILO 169 to expand constitutional rights, such as the recognition of Indigenous justice and rights to prior consultation. For instance, Waorani women invoked ILO 169 to protest the intrusion of Brazilian oil giant Petrobras within the Yasuni National Park in 2005. They leveraged the failure to inform Waorani peoples and the meager environmental assessments conducted

FIGURE 11. Kañaris vote on the public square of Girón during a self-organized prior consultation on whether the government should allow oil drilling in the Yasuni National Park.

to force the state to retract permits for oil exploration. In 2009 CONAIE filed a lawsuit against the state alleging that the new mining law was unconstitutional for not consulting Indigenous peoples whose territories would be affected by mining activities, as mandated by ILO 169. Four years later, its sister organization, ECUARUNARI, sued the government over its proposed water policy for not complying with the right to prior consultation as prescribed in national law and Convention 169. In her 2013 congressional address, Alicia Cahuilla, vice president of the Waorani Nation, claimed ILO rights to prior consultation as she denounced the government's plan to drill within the Yasuni National Park and demanded compensation and territorial restoration from the seven oil companies operating within Waorani territory without Waorani consent.

Rights to self-determination emboldened Indigenous people to defend their land and rivers. After years of being denied a state-led consultation, people organized their own community-based consultation in the highlands of Kimsakocha, Ecuador. In a 2011 consultation not authorized by the state but legitimized by the presence of international observers, community members voted 93 percent in favor of defending water rights against industrial gold mining

(Pérez Guartambel 2012). Such autonomous forms of prior consultation are becoming increasingly common in Latin America. In Guatemala, over sixty community-based consultations occurred between 2005 and 2013 (MacLeod and Pérez Crisanta 2013). Indigenous petitioners increasingly demand consultation prior to development projects or concessions on their lands in national and international courts. Far from being "just a piece of paper," ILO 169 is a legal tool regularly used to defend Indigenous peoples from multinational companies and governments alike.

TWO LONG DECADES: THE AWAITED UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

ILO conventions created legal precedents to stimulate Indigenous rights within the UN system, but member states remained extremely reticent to embrace principles of self-determination. UNDRIP was adopted on September 13, 2007, after two decades in the making; it was the longest, most debated treaty in UN history.

The saga started in the 1970s, when Indigenous groups from the Americas issued a draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere, which pressured the UN to recognize their status as a distinct legal category. Their claims were first addressed with the creation of WGIP as a subsidiary organ to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which operated at the lowest levels of the UN hierarchy. WGIP catalyzed various initiatives and played a fundamental role in drafting the future UNDRIP. Yet it was only the launch of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples in 1994 that ignited serious political efforts to create a UN declaration.

The initial UN International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (1994–2004) called for international cooperation among states to address problems in the areas of human rights, culture, the environment, development, education, and health. However, the proposed goals were too ambitious and far-reaching to allow member-states to reach a consensus; they strongly resisted Indigenous rights to self-determination because of the implications for sovereignty. This decade-long failure to approve a declaration forced the UN to launch a Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (2005–2014) to continue the lengthy negotiations. Perseverance paid off: the two UN decades proved to be a milestone for Indigenous peoples globally.

First, the two decades greatly expanded Indigenous participation in world politics. Indigenous participation in WGIP soared from forty-eight organizations in 1983 to five hundred by 2005 (Corntassel 2007, 153). The decades led to the creation of UNPFII, the first international body dedicated exclusively to Indigenous issues, with sixteen independent experts who meet every May at the UN headquarters in New York as an advisory board to the UN's Economic and Social Council.[8] Over six hundred Indigenous delegates attended its first historical session in 2002. The forum was designed with an open attendance policy to allow any Indigenous person or representative to participate in the annual conferences, thus breaking with the elitism of most UN organs. UNPFII introduced nonstate deliberation to international negotiations. Ecuador's Indigenous women participated in negotiations from the start, including Ana María Guacho. Pacari, a prominent Indigenous leader from Ecuador, was nominated to UNPFII by Indigenous vote (2005–7). Her appointment made clear the role of women's leadership in taking the Kichwa struggles of the Andean highlands to the corridors of power.

Second, the two decades mainstreamed Indigenous affairs at the UN (Corntassel 2007). They promoted Indigenous norms and various bodies throughout the UN system. Indigenous activists strategically essentialized indigeneity to reconstruct peoplehood and defend cultural politics of self-determination in international law-making (Escárcega 2010). The UN Commission on Human Rights (subsequently renamed the Human Rights Council) created in 2001 a special rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples to monitor and report on Indigenous concerns under the authority of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The first rapporteur was anthropologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who was followed by James Anaya in 2008. Anaya, a scholar of international law who offered legal defense to Indigenous causes, was the first Indigenous person to hold this position. An Indigenous woman from the Philippines, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, became the third rapporteur in 2014. Tauli-Corpuz has articulated local Indigenous politics transnationally for over twenty years as an activist in the Asian Indigenous Women's Network, founder of the NGO Tebtebba, and former chairperson of UNPFII. Another body signaling the mainstreaming of Indigenous issues was the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, created in 2008 to provide expert thematic advice to the Human Rights Council. Indigenous peoples had finally achieved a visibly differentiated legal status within the international system.

Third, and most significantly, the decades achieved their goal of getting an UN declaration accepted. In the works since 1985, the declaration was finally passed in 2007. After lengthy negotiations that lasted over eleven annual sessions, 144 countries reached a consensus with opposition from only four countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. The Anglo-Saxon pack resisted throughout the process the word *peoples*; they understood correctly that the plural indicates national status (existence as "a people") and preferred the continuance of a diminished status for Native peoples focused on individuals ("people"). UNDRIP did not contain new provisions on human rights, but it was the first legal document dedicated to Indigenous rights in the UN state system. UNDRIP gave universal validity to notions developed by ILO 169. It reaffirmed principles of equality and nondiscrimination, interpreting how international human rights legislation should be applied to Indigenous peoples. It sealed the universal recognition of the principle of self-determination (art. 3), including rights to land, territories, and resources (art. 25–30). It also became the first international treaty to explicitly recognize equal rights for Indigenous women. Article 40 states that all rights are equally granted to men *and* women. As minor as this wording may appear, it can be a powerful tool of legal advocacy when backed up with other international norms like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Sovereignty was the crux of the negotiations. Many member-states refused language on self-determination that they considered a threat to territorial integrity. The compromise between state and Indigenous authority is article 46, which clarified that no text included in the declaration could be interpreted as "authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States." This last article in the declaration meant that states were prepared to support self-determination if it remained consistent with (and subservient to) their sovereignty. With this last article safeguarding their sovereignty, states recognized that Indigenous rights have significant conceptual implications for the organization of political authority. They understood that legalizing Indigenous autonomy within states would inevitably affect sovereignty and, by extension, the foundations of international law.

As with all UN declarations, UNDRIP is marked by legal ambiguities, not least over territoriality. It is not legally binding and lacks enforcement mechanisms. Yet it goes beyond all prior international legislation on Indigenous rights in content and ratification, including ILO 169. The four countries that originally

opposed the 2007 declaration subsequently endorsed it. The United States was the last country to endorse UNDRIP and did so only after preparing a "signing statement" expressly confining the UN principles within the existing "federal Indian law" model of domination. The universal recognition of Indigenous rights by UN member states may appear like one more international document with little impact on the daily lives of millions of Indigenous peoples. But it represents a tectonic change in international law. For Native scholar Sheryl Lightfoot (2016), the Indigenous rights regime entails a complex reordering of sovereignty that changes the international status quo: UNDRIP has formalized the existence of nonstate forms of political authority in world politics.

WORLDING WITHOUT STATENESS

Although Indigenous peoples are not states, their politics have been inherently international. Their existence has historically challenged the self-assigned authority of Westphalian sovereignty in the Americas; their permanence continues to do so. Contemporary Indigenous movements have consolidated an Indigenous rights regime based on principles of self-determination, clearly detaching themselves from the sovereignty of modern states. This distinct legal status constitutes an authority situated outside—and beyond—the sovereignty regime.

LEGAL RESISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TUTELAGE

Vine Deloria (2006) claims that conquest masqueraded as law and that the history of Indigenous resistance against colonization was largely a legal battle.[9] Indigenous peoples fought back with the colonizers' tools. They deployed an extensive legal arsenal to counter European claims to sovereignty, making connections between their own legal systems and those of the colonizers. Early on, Indigenous peoples navigated distinct legal realms we would today characterize as international. In eighteenth-century New England, Mohegans, Niantics, and Paugussetts were actively litigating against the Connecticut General Assembly (Den Ouden 2005). Mary Momoho frequently defended Eastern Pequots' land rights in court, denouncing the violation of territorial agreements in 1683 and census tactics seeking to erase Indian presence from the land in 1713 (Den Ouden 2012, 7). Native Americans litigated against British occupation, leading

King George III to issue the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which demarcated British colonies on the Atlantic coast from the Indigenous lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. But Native litigation challenged more than territorial borders and political authority. It defended a Native law of nations. Native communities used legal systems to fight colonial states in what were de facto inter-nation relations.

Indigenous peoples led similar legal battles in Latin America. From the first moments of conquest, Andean peoples brought lawsuits before Spanish judges (Mumford 2008). In Colombia, the hereditary chief of the Muisca town of Turmequé, who went by the Spanish name don Diego de Torres, fought a legal battle against the Spanish authorities from 1574 until his death in 1590 (Rappaport and Cummins 2011). He produced innumerable legal petitions in an attempt to regain rights over his chiefdom and used colonial laws to formulate precise legal complaints addressed to King Phillip II, twice crossing the Atlantic Ocean to visit the royal court in Spain. Susan Kellogg (1995, 85) has shown that Aztec peoples actively engaged in litigation over property and that women made up half of all plaintiffs and defendants. The same pattern is evident in Ecuador. In colonial Quito, elite Native women engaged in litigation to manage property (Salomon 1988), whereas market women often defended their economic interests in court (Gauderman 2003).

Legal claims varied across the Americas yet made for a similar story everywhere. Native populations asserted their rights over property and territory in the colonizer's language. Scholars of law and empire argue that Indigenous peoples were active in making, changing, and interpreting colonial law and, by extension, in shaping the emerging international Westphalian order (Benton 2001). In other words, Indigenous litigation was so sophisticated that it pushed European colonial states to justify their land grabs in increasingly institutional ways. Then as now, Indigenous contestation produced sophisticated legalities defying Westphalian authority. So much so that historians suggest European sovereignty should be understood as a counterclaim in reaction to Indigenous legalities rather than as an original discourse (Belmessous 2011).

Although Indigenous lawmakers were dynamic contestants in the international system, colonial states have historically tried to dismiss them as legal minors (some postcolonial states still do). During colonial times, Spanish jurisdiction considered Andean peoples minors in the legal sense (Mumford 2008). Modern states replaced colonial systems but maintained legal tutelage over Indigenous populations, developing norms of trusteeship or guardianship. This

concept permitted states to ignore Indigenous legal authority and justify European legal dominance through civilizational claims (Wallerstein 2006). During the infamous Berlin Conference in 1885, European powers divided Africa among themselves. Signatories gave themselves the right to "watch over Native tribes," to care for "their moral and material well-being," and to bring them "the blessings of civilization" (art. 6, chap. 1). Indeed, the concept of guardianship can be traced back to the 1550 Valladolid debate, when Bartolomé de Las Casas and jurists of the Spanish school argued against the enslavement of Natives and land grabs by colonists in the Americas. Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, Las Casas's opponent, equated the moral status of Indians to that of women to justify tutelage. In 1938 the British North America Act still classified peoples born on the Shubenacadie Indian Reserve in Nova Scotia as wards of the Canadian Crown, a status that gave them the same legal rights as drunks and insane persons (Paul 2013). When Papua New Guinea ceased to be Australia's protectorate in 1973, it fell under UN trusteeship until it could become independent and join the UN as a state in 1975. Today, Brazil maintains legal tutelage over Indigenous groups who are "protected" by federal administrators.

When international law defined Indigenous peoples as wards of the state, it automatically made them unfit for sovereign authority, consequently denying their full participation in the international state system. The colonial notion of trusteeship entailed two simultaneous legal positions: the right of the inevitably European state to "civilize" the non-European savages while simultaneously ejecting Indigenous persons to the no-man's-land beyond the margins of international law. This system excluded non-European peoples from the attributes of sovereignty, and thus from the positivist legal regime designed to assert European colonialism. Denying Indigenous legal authority was a way to preclude Indigenous people from participating in international politics. The League of Nations established the doctrine of trusteeship in its 1919 covenant and disregarded direct appeals by Indigenous groups in Canada and New Zealand. The 1919 covenant designed the "sacred trust of civilization" to help peoples "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" (Rodríguez-Piñero 2005, 21). The League of Nations refused to meet with Haudenosaunee chief Deskaheh, who traveled to Geneva to defend the right of his people to live under their own laws on their own land, which had been stolen by the United States. In 1925 Maori leader T. W. Ratana undertook a similar journey to protest New Zealand's violation of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, which gave the Maori ownership of their own lands. His delegation

was also denied access to the League of Nations. In the Island of Palmas case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration dismissed the binding authority of international treaties made between the Dutch East Indian Company and Indigenous groups; in deciding the legal status of Greenland, the Permanent Court of Indigenous Justice denied the Greenlandic Inuit their right to be heard (Mazel 2009). When colonial governments signed treaties with Indigenous tribes, they freely dismissed them later while international courts turned a blind eye to Indigenous claims.

The question of legal minority is entangled with that of sovereignty. Antony Anghie (2007) argues that colonization was central to the formation of international law, especially to its founding concept: sovereignty. Anghie goes further in suggesting that sovereignty was improvised out of the colonial encounter. Colonial laws framed non-Europeans as peripheral to international law and characterized Indigenous peoples as minors without authority, and thus without property, to create "legal" claims over their land. Anghie sees this legal "dynamic of difference" as demarcating a "universal" European culture from a "particular," uncivilized, Indigenous one. This dynamic of difference is at the core of the sovereignty doctrine in international law; it alienates Indigenous peoples from the sovereignty game and relegates them to the theoretical peripheries of international law. This international legal order has an epistemological dimension: the sovereign cannot, by definition, be Indian.

TERRA NULLIUS: STATENESS THROUGH LAND GRAB

Indigenous politics are fundamentally embedded in the formation of the sovereignty regime, and the formation of states in the Americas (and beyond) is entangled in the appropriation of Indigenous territory. The construction of state sovereignty implied a land grab that could only be possible by denying the legal existence of entire populations. From the moment of encounter, international law approached the Americas as terra nullius—framing Indigenous peoples as lacking sovereignty (Benton and Straumann 2010)—based on the work of the pope, who issued bulls establishing the principle of terra nullius as the basis for the Doctrine of Discovery (Newcomb 2008; Wilkins 2001). This doctrine could only work if Indigenous peoples were framed as "barbarians" who needed to "be brought to faith."[10] It laid the foundations for the invasion of the New World, defining land grabbing as discovery and non-European populations as incompetent (uncivilized) occupants in need of a benevolent guardian.

This framing encouraged European monarchies to develop international treaties dividing the New World among themselves. For instance, Spain, Portugal, and the Catholic Church signed the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 without even knowing the geography of the continent. Cartography was central to this project of conquest. Maps were a form of territorial appropriation, first cognitively, then politically.[11] Colonial then modern states purposefully erased political geographies to impose Westphalian borders. The scramble for the Amazon at the turn of the twentieth century is evidence that modern states continue to disregard Indigenous political authority (Hecht 2013). The 1903 Treaty of Petrópolis, in which Brazil and Bolivia negotiated over a large portion of the Amazon now called Acre, reveals states' lasting sense of entitlement over Indigenous land. In 1905 Guatemala's liberal government mapped Maya territories as wastelands and granted them to militias as the booty of war in a bureaucratic logic of appropriation (Castro and Picq 2017). In the Andes, religious orders maintained extensive parcels of land into the early twentieth century. Jesuits could ride their horses from Ecuador's northern border with Colombia all the way south to Peru, through the highlands, without leaving their property until the state took over many Catholic lands in the early twentieth century. And the political underpinnings of terra nullius are far from eradicated. Lands that were defined as empty by the church and taken for the mission civilizatrice are now defined as empty by modern states with development agendas. Today, democratic governments invoking social justice continue the usurpation of Indigenous territory for the sake of national development, licensing Indigenous land to extractive megaprojects like oil, mining, and hydroelectric dams.

The expropriation of land has played a fundamental role because the consolidation of state sovereignty depended on local non-European populations being dispossessed of their land. States grabbed land and forcibly displaced non-European peoples to clear territories. In the Andes, *reducciones* moved entire communities. In 1569 the Spanish viceroy Francisco de Toledo ordered the General Resettlement of Indians, which moved more than one million Native people of the central Andes to newly founded Spanish-style towns called reducciones. This campaign, a turning point in the history of European colonialism, meant that the state forced an entire conquered society to change its way of life overnight (Mumford 2012). In North America, the infamous Trail of Tears (Deloria 1974) also dismantled non-European societies to erase signs of prior (and competing) political authority. To this day, Native American tribes struggle against the U.S. government's 1887 Dawes Act, an "allotment" policy

that stole Indian Territory by putting "surplus" land into the public domain (Ruppel 2008).

In the United States, the federal government has defined Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations since Chief Justice John Marshall recognized Indian tribes as part of an autonomous political system outside the U.S. nation-state in 1831. In *Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia*, the Supreme Court established "the character of the Cherokee as a state, as a distinct political society separated from others capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself," thereby declaring that the laws of Georgia were not enforceable within the Cherokee Nation (Marshall 1831). Marshall defined the Cherokees as "distinct independent political communities retaining their original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial" (Deloria and Lytle 1984, 17). The U.S. government has legally acknowledged Native peoples an autonomous political authority outside the state. Yet it has simultaneously denied them Westphalian sovereignty, inventing the status of domestic dependent nations and a singular brand of quasi-sovereignty. Native tribes are nations within the U.S. federal government. Today, Native Americans remain trapped in a legal limbo that recognizes them as nations but denies them the right to engage in foreign relations with the world system of states, by definition shutting them out of international politics. Reservations are sovereign territories, allowed to engage only with the U.S. government, not with international governments (Deloria and Lytle 1998).

Principles of terra nullius are not a matter of the past. David Wilkins (2001) analyzes how the Doctrine of Discovery still permeates the U.S. legal system, and Steven Newcomb (2008) argues that the Christian notion of the chosen people is at the core of U.S. federal Indian law. The very construction of the state in the Americas depended on coding Indigenous land as empty of sovereignty, or as "quasi-sovereign" as in U.S. law, so that lesser peoples could not possess the full attributes—and territory—of sovereignty. The Indigenous challenge to sovereignty has never gone away, but it is rarely acknowledged as a foundation of modern politics. As Vine Deloria Jr. (1974) argues in his seminal work, Indians have always been treated as outsiders within the state, yet they have only partially been recognized as autonomous since they were repeatedly denied statehood. The international community of states expresses the same anxiety as does the United States in acknowledging the legal autonomy of Indigenous peoples in UNDRIP. In effect, to recognize Indigenous self-determination is to share sovereignty and redefine legal borders.

FIGURE 12. Taita Chimborazo, the highest mountain in Ecuador (6,268 meters), gives its name to the province.

OUTSIDE STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The legal foundations built five centuries ago by the Doctrine of Discovery still inform contemporary relations between Indigenous rights and state sovereignty: Indigenous peoples are situated outside state sovereignty. They are the ultimate outsiders not because they are pure or authentic, which they are not, but because indigeneity has been the historical looking glass in which modern nation-states see themselves and construct their own nationhood. Whether Indians were excluded from state-making in the Andes (Canessa 2005) or were "disappeared" in New England (O'Brien 2010), they were cast as outsiders unworthy of (and silenced within) political modernity. They are the body politics kept outside the state, whether on reservations or on huasipungos. The Indigenous represents a political and metaphorical *other*, located outside of Europe and outside its sovereignty doctrine, at once relational to the state and external to it.

This location outside the state explains why it is so difficult for UN member states to formally recognize Indigenous self-determination. It explains why indigeneity encompasses different claims contingent on varying histories of nation-making and impossible to strictly define in international law, which refers not to what it encompasses but to what it does not. It explains why state

sovereignty continues to be the main locus of the international legal system. Why largely European processes of theoretical production dismiss Indigenous experiences and invalidate Indigenous processes of knowledge construction. Ultimately, this foundational otherness explains part of our scholarly inability to account for Indigenous dynamics in world politics.

Indigenous peoples were on their lands *before* colonizers arrived. They precede political modernity and therefore the sovereignty regime. The international rights regime clearly establishes this historical precedence. The ILO Convention 169 regards as Indigenous those with "descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions" (art. 1). The UN system follows the Cobo report, a study completed in 1984 by Ecuadorian José Martínez Cobo, who was specially appointed by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to report on discrimination against Indigenous peoples. The Cobo report defines Indigenous peoples as "having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories" (United Nations 2004, 2). What makes nations Indigenous is that they predated the modern state, an existence tangible in ancestral cultures, languages, and territoriality.

This time and space outside of and prior to stateness is the essence of Indigenous politics. It is what differentiates Indigenous movements from other social movements. Indigenous peoples do not seek to expand rights within a state; they seek autonomy from states. Indigenous politics are not merely about culture, social justice, or equality; they are, ultimately, about the locus of sovereignty. Consequently, Indigenous political strategies are profoundly different from those of other political groups advocating equality through further inclusion within the state. Feminist movements demand gender equality and advocate for full inclusion within the social contract. Afro-descendent movements have also historically pushed for civil rights and legal reforms that expand citizenship. In contrast, Indigenous movements seek not integration but autonomy; they do not want more access to the social contract, they want out of it. Indigenous advocacy seeks differentiated rights, asserting political alterity to redefine rather than expand the social contract. This distinction is evident in electoral quotas. While gender tends to be crosscutting, ethnicity tends to be coinciding; that is,

gender first receives quotas within existing parties, and ethnicity usually gets reserved seats in legislation (Htun 2016). The Indigenous claim for autonomy is also evident in the construction of a plurinational state in Ecuador. Indigenous movements have sought self-determination, tacitly using state institutions as tools to gain more autonomy (Altmann 2016). Plurinationalism differentiates forms of governance to reformulate state authority at its core. The declaration of plurinational states in Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009) redefined the state not as a single nation but as an archipelago of various legal authorities. This poses conceptual knots, inviting a political grammar that falls beyond the mutually recognized structures of Westphalian sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous politics are fundamentally international. First, in practice. This is tangible in political praxis across the Abya Yala, be it in the form of continental networks or in legal activism at the UN headquarters in New York. Indigenous women's worlding proves the significance of articulating local women's concerns with inter-national claims for autonomy. Yet Indigenous women's politics signal a larger context: Indigenous politics, women's or not, cannot be anything but international because they challenge state authority outside the state. Second, Indigenous peoples have framed their rights within international law. The consolidation of rights to self-determination at the ILO and the UN signals more than Indigenous activism worldwide. Indigenous activists pursue international rights because it was in international law that their lands and bodies were sold off to facilitate a process of Westphalian appropriation. The international is the primary focus of Indigenous contestation, the starting point for the affirmation of contemporary self-determination. Third, these Indigenous ways of worlding challenge the notion of sovereignty as the core organizer of the international system. As political entities outside the state, Indigenous peoples offer a perspective situated outside the sovereignty regime that shows how colonial power remains embedded in contemporary international law.

The silencing of Indigenous politics is more than a theoretical oversight: it legitimizes the Westphalian structure of world politics. Indigenous *inter*national politics are yet to be validated in the study of international relations. But once we recognize that indigeneity is co-constitutive of the modern state and

the Westphalian system, we will finally understand its potential insights into moving beyond state centrism, reframing international paradigms, and breaking with disciplinary silences.

MUJERES ORGANIZADAS
RECLAMANDO
NUESTROS DERECHOS
Marchamos
Para Cambiar
Nuestras
Vidas
JUSTICIA INDIGENA CON PLENA PARTICIPACION
Y DECISION DE LAS MUJERES

4

SELF-DETERMINATION WITH GENDER PARITY

MOST WOMEN who belong to REDCH have little formal education: only a few finished primary school, and only one attended university.[1] Their hands are as rough as the Andean highland they farm to feed their families; they can milk cows better than they can write. Many have never traveled beyond their valleys or heard the sound of the ocean at the foothills of the Andes. They have traveled their fields, not the world. They are intimate with the black volcanic earth, with the routines of sexist and racist violence, not with international law. Yet together, these women have achieved the passage of gender laws unparalleled in the world. For those who can or want to see, they have proven that peoples forgotten at the margins are worlding in their own ways.

Kichwa women created REDCH to address the high levels of violence in their daily lives; little did they know they were embarking on a journey that would lead them to Ecuador's Pacific coast, to defend groundbreaking proposals to skeptical legislators in the nation's Constituent Assembly, and, in the process, to prove the lawyers wrong. Their advocacy led to the adoption of gender clauses in Indigenous rights protections in Ecuador's 2008 Constitution, which explicitly requires "women's participation with decision-making power" in the development of all collective rights and the administration of justice and territory. REDCH women had to learn the ins and outs of national law and international rights, including CEDAW and UNDRIP.[2] They also had to learn how to

navigate party politics in order to hold various legal systems accountable. Their patient advocacy created a legal precedent for gender equality within collective rights and in the administration of justice. Most impressively, they conceptualized and successfully pursued such original legislation almost single-handedly, with no real allies. Deserted by lawyers, dismissed by the national women's movement, and opposed by Pachakutik legislators, the women of Chimborazo assembled legal strategies themselves and improvised alliances along the way.

I share the details of a story that remains largely unknown, even in Ecuador, because it illustrates how Kichwa women engage with international norms to consolidate rights in local contexts. In the process, I identify the obstacles and opportunities to show what interlegality looks like when Indigenous world views combine self-determination with universal rights. This unprecedented achievement resonates with centuries of Indigenous women's legal activism and leadership. It demonstrates that Indigenous women continue to be relevant in world politics today, despite the invisibility of their struggles. Far from peripheral or isolated, their local achievements have powerful implications for the practice and conceptualization of international human rights.

In what follows, I analyze Kichwa women's claims for gender parity. I first describe their advocacy, from inception to legal achievement, stressing the lack of political support and the legal strategies that paved the way for an agenda situated at the intersections of gender and ethnicity. I then discuss the far-reaching implications of folding women's rights into claims for collective rights. The gender clauses established for Indigenous rights in Ecuador set a unique legal precedent in the world. Indigenous women's struggles may be local, but they made remarkable contributions to international women's rights. In the process, they reconciled old debates on the tensions between gender and multiculturalism and proposed a differentiated practice of universal rights.

A KICHWA ODYSSEY: BRINGING GENDER PARITY WITHIN INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

REDCH is a province-wide, grassroots organization with nearly two decades of experience articulating the needs of about two thousand women activists. The organization had long advocated for women's interests, but it was the 2007 constitutional assembly that precipitated discussions about gender parity within Indigenous justice. REDCH took the opportunity to propose institutional

strategies to improve women's lives in Chimborazo, since neither the Indigenous leadership nor women's movements took their quest for access to justice seriously.

Cristina Cucuri, REDCH's only member to attend a university, was a social worker and activist dedicated to gender issues who was working at the Centro de Desarrollo, Difusión e Investigación Social (CEDIS).[3] In her undergraduate thesis she examined Indigenous women's health in rural areas of Chimborazo, and she went on to conduct research on Indigenous organizational structures for her master's degree.[4] Cucuri had long been thinking about domestic violence as a health issue. When she attended community meetings, she kept a low profile to avoid accusations of being "contaminated" by feminist ideas. Often, local officials who denied the existence of domestic violence in their village excluded her. But she met monthly with ten female delegates from various parishes in Riobamba, and together they launched REDCH as a way to coordinate women's local initiatives across the province. REDCH's members wanted to address the problem of structural violence as a collective, so Cucuri proposed the creation of rural community workshops with Indigenous and rural women across the province to identify their main concerns. The eruption of the Remache case gave their discussions even greater urgency. Indeed, REDCH's workshops soon conducted over 250 community surveys across the province. Cucuri (2007) gathered the findings of these workshops into a book about violence against women in Indigenous communities.

Women's accounts confirmed that widespread violence was the major impediment to their well-being. Testimonials reiterated examples of husbands with lovers who blamed and beat their spouses, of in-laws who accused women of being lazy or unable to cook (Cucuri 2007, 39). Women were pressured not to talk outside the home, whether with friends or to exercise a political position in the community, or to care for their appearance, which men could portray as evidence of extra-conjugal affairs. In extreme cases, these testimonials told of pregnant teens who committed suicide for fear of reprimand by their communities. The workshops called attention not only to physical but also to psychological violence: "They tell us we are stupid. . . . If we seek medical care after being beaten they accuse us of wasting money; they beat us more if we threaten to tell the community" (Cucuri 2007, 40). The evidence gathered by the workshops made it clear that many women saw Indigenous justice as "pernicious" to women and "benevolent" to men (Cucuri 2007, 45). Community leaders were reported to refrain from intervention in family matters that affected women,

such as domestic violence or rape, and to give more attention to stolen animals than to beaten women. Male leaders were depicted as "untouchable," like Remache, because men in positions of authority almost always defended other men (Cucuri 2007, 46). The workshops gave rise to calls for reforms on two fronts: education and justice. On one hand, they proposed education with gender-equal values, as well as education around legislation regarding women's rights. On the other hand, they called for women to be integrated into ancestral councils to achieve impartial justice. "We should do justice; . . . women's groups should call out on men who rape . . . and actively participate in the application of Indigenous justice" (Cucuri 2007, 48). They added that "Indigenous justice should not be separate from the [conventional state] law, they have to go together. . . . Community leaders must know the law; we cannot do what we please just because we are a community. If certain cases are beyond the community's reach then external authorities should intervene" (Cucuri 2007, 48). The workshops identified access to justice as women's most common basic demand.

In short, women wanted to be decision-makers in their community councils. They did not trust the conventional justice system, which to them remained all too sexist and racist. State justice had yet to deliver results on the gender equality agendas brought forward by powerful feminist struggles, and it was even more unlikely that state judges would listen to Indigenous women. In fact, these women nicknamed ordinary justice "archival justice," referring to a system that received complaints yet rarely brought charges or resolved cases. The solution was to bring women into the process as judges in an Indigenous justice system. Although this system also failed women, it was contextual to their lived experiences. Most importantly, it was the legal system closer to their reach and the most malleable. Kichwa women had a better chance of reforming decision-making power in Indigenous councils than in wielding influence in the sphere of state jurisdiction (Cucuri 2007, 46). The workshops thus enabled a collective awareness about women's problems in rural Chimborazo through various testimonies, while Cucuri and Sarah Yayay provided organizational leadership. REDCH's women initially presented their concerns to provincial representatives in charge of policy planning. They then reached out to other women's organizations. When neither listened, they realized that their voices counted for little to either the local government or established social movements and that they needed to rely on their own advocacy.

The opportunity to act came sooner than expected. Within a few months, newly elected president Rafael Correa called for the establishment of a

FIGURE 13. Daily life in the highlands of Chimborazo involves long days of hard labor in the fields during cold weather. The relationship to land is not a burden from the past, but a hope for the future.

Constituent Assembly, which was inaugurated in the coastal town of Montecristi in 2007 for a period of eight months. Ecuador is the country with the most constituent reforms in the region (behind Venezuela), the last one dating back to 1998 (Becker 2011). The Montecristi Assembly proved to be exceptionally democratic and provided a showcase for Correa's "citizens' revolution." Correa promised the most inclusive constituent process in his country's history and convoked all sectors of society to contribute proposals. The president of the Constitutional Assembly, Alberto Acosta, echoed Correa, pledging to incorporate traditionally marginalized sectors like Afro-Ecuadorian and Indigenous peoples. Montecristi provided the perfect opportunity for Kichwa women to bring their own agendas to the national stage.

INVENTING RIGHTS OF THEIR OWN

Throughout 2007, all sectors of civil society mobilized across Ecuador to elaborate policy proposals. REDCH's preparatory meetings attracted women of all ages and backgrounds to discuss how to best to promote lives free from

violence. Since Kichwa women had already been working on local strategies to redress gender inequalities, they were able to elaborate an agenda promptly. Their proposals ranged from reproductive health to banking cooperatives, but they focused mainly on women's participation in community justice. Kichwa women had two goals. First, they sought to incorporate international women's rights within Indigenous forms of governance. They wanted the same access to rights as non-Indigenous women, echoing Sojourner Truth's "Ain't I a woman?" platform of 1851. Second, they hoped to gain political relevance in their communities and asked the Indigenous movement to value women like it valued water and territory. It was an ambitious project. Cucuri still remembers the atmosphere of doubt permeating the room before the decisive vote. They were about a hundred women who all felt their goals were unattainable, but none uttered the word *impossible*. Instead, they raised their hands in unanimous approval. So it began: these women would take their proposal to the Montecristi Constituent Assembly.

The first step was to draft their proposal in adequate legal wording. They sought the legal advice of Ximena Endara, a prominent Quito lawyer specializing in Indigenous rights. They enthusiastically explained their policy goals and collective demands. To their surprise, the lawyer rejected their proposal as technically impossible. Endara declared that collective rights could not be subjected to external standards, especially not non-Indigenous gender clauses. Indigenous rights were collective rights, she argued, and as such fully autonomous. Endara defined gender parity as an individual human right antithetical to concepts of collective rights to culture and determined that individual women's rights were legally irreconcilable with principles of Indigenous autonomy.

Disconcerted, Cucuri and her *compañeras* wondered why women's rights did not belong in their communities and asked the lawyer how international women's rights had come about. The lawyer delved into the mostly European history of women's struggles, explaining the gradual construction of rights from the early suffragettes to CEDAW. Cucuri noticed that this story historicized women's rights in the West. It showed that global women's rights had been first imagined, then created; they were not natural rights but radical ideas that had been progressively accepted through decades of advocacy. As women's rights came to be normalized, they were converted into law. Endara explained that "global" women's rights had been invented to change sexist legal systems in a certain time and place. She was telling the history of individual women's rights, yet she rejected the possibility of constructing Indigenous women's rights within

culture. This was Cucuri's eureka moment: "We Indigenous women also want to invent rights to live better too."[5] Like the women in Europe, she said, Kichwa women were determined to defend new rights that addressed their realities and to pursue better lives within Indigenous communities. The lawyer still declined to take the case.

Without legal help, Kichwa women had to rely on themselves. The lawyer's skepticism had only strengthened their determination. Their claims were partly inspired by the 1994 Women's Revolutionary Law promulgated by Zapatista groups in Chiapas (Hernandez-Castillo 1994; Soriano 2012). Its ten principles had become a model for many Indigenous women. The law secures women's political rights to "participate in the revolutionary struggle" (art. 1) and "community matters" (art. 4), "to occupy positions of leadership," and "to hold military ranks in the revolutionary armed forces" (art. 9). It covers socioeconomic rights "to work and receive a just salary" (art. 2) and rights to health, nutrition, and education (art. 5, 6). The law explicitly guarantees sexual rights: women are free to choose partners, to decide the number of children they have (art. 3, 7), and to refuse marriage. Article 8 explicitly states the right "to be free from violence from both relatives and strangers," stating that "rape and attempted rape will be severely punished."

Comandantas Ramona and Susana had spent four months traveling across communities and listening to women's concerns before drafting the law. The leadership of the Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena unanimously approved the law in 1993, many months before it was officially published in 1994. In a letter, Subcomandante Marcos recalled men's mixed reactions when Comandanta Ramona first presented the law in a Zapatista assembly (Hernandez-Castillo 1994; Marco 2014). Later, many more were startled to find a women's law in the revolutionary pamphlets distributed by the Zapatista Army.[6] The law brought women's concerns to the forefront of Zapatista resistance, proving that claims for gender equality could be combined with claims for self-determination. It established a political precedent that inspired Indigenous women across the continent.

As powerful as the Women's Revolutionary Law may be, it was established by rebellious Zapatista groups. It was not official legislation adopted by the Mexican state. Cucuri continued her search for state-recognized jurisprudence explicitly setting forth Indigenous women's rights. She turned to Bolivia's newly drafted Constitution, which epitomized the expansion of Indigenous rights under President Morales. Indigenous women were central actors in Bolivia's

constituent process, but even after reading the entire Constitution online Cucuri found no explicit mention of Indigenous women's rights. Neither the articles on Indigenous justice (art. 199, 200, 201) nor those on collective rights (chap. 4) offered gender-specific language. Bolivia's constitutional process went a long way toward establishing the collective agency of Indigenous women and creating new political spaces, but it did not secure them a specific place within the sphere of collective rights.

REDCH lacked a lawyer and constitutional models. Luckily, it had international human rights norms. In fact, REDCH claims ended up relying most heavily on international law. The strategy was to hold Indigenous governance accountable to the same international declarations already ratified by the Ecuadorian state. To do so, women combined principles of gender equality from two international treaties, CEDAW and UNDRIP. CEDAW was the framework for advocating women's human rights. Ratified by Ecuador without reservations in 1981, its cornerstone is the principle of equality between men and women and the prohibition of discrimination (art. 1, 2). CEDAW encourages the reform of national laws to embody gender equality (art. 3), calls for changes in discriminatory social and cultural patterns, and establishes rural women's rights to equal treatment in land reform and resettlement (art. 14). Despite its all-encompassing legislation, however, CEDAW does not single out Indigenous women. For this purpose, REDCH turned to UNDRIP, passed that same year, which refers to Indigenous women on three occasions. Articles 21 and 22 encourage "special attention to the rights of women" and the adoption of measures to ensure their full protection against forms of violence and discrimination.[7] UNDRIP's article 44 is extremely concise but nevertheless constitutes an explicit safeguard in international law: "All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female Indigenous individuals" (United Nations 2007, art. 44). This short article became the focal point of REDCH's strategy to push forward an agenda assuring gender parity within collective rights. Kichwa women were not reinventing the wheel: they were simply asking for the local validation of basic rights already recognized internationally.

The final proposal demanded the incorporation of "gender parity" and the "full participation and decision-making of women" into collective rights law. After months of attempts to frame Indigenous women's legal rights, REDCH members faced the most difficult challenge: advancing their dream in the Montecristi assembly. The path toward constitutional change was filled with political

adversity and required organizational efforts that could sustain months of arduous advocacy.

LEFT OUT OF THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S COALITION

It was as challenging to forge political alliances as it had been to find the appropriate legal wording. REDCH sought to ally with women's movements before the Constituent Assembly started, but in the pre-assembly stages, national women's groups had sidelined Kichwa women as cultural minorities whose concerns were deemed peripheral. Montecristi proposals backed by large social coalitions had more of a chance to gain legislative support, and civil society sectors were partnering in different interest groups. It was a key moment to forge social alliances. REDCH reached out to feminists at the CONAMU national meeting, which took place in Chimborazo. REDCH's committee, composed of some twelve to twenty women, prepared an agenda that addressed the plurinational state, the recognition of originary languages, solidary forms of financing, and budget planning with gender parity and interculturality at the provincial level. At the proposal's core was the "full participation and decision-making of women" within Indigenous justice. Over two hundred Kichwa women from across the province gathered to present their agenda to the national women's coalition. At the last minute, however, the meeting was relocated from Riobamba's city center to a rural hacienda turned hotel. It was a politically charged site, given that haciendas had been central in enforcing the Indigenous huasipungo; it was also harder to reach for people without private cars. REDCH members organized travel by bus to the hotel-hacienda El Andaluza, but the police stopped them because dozens of Indigenous women traveling together was perceived as suspicious and evocative of the 1990s uprisings. At the toll station of San Andrés, women were questioned about the purpose of their travel and had to explain they were not planning a roadblock but were on their way to a preconstituent women's assembly meeting.

When the women finally arrived at the meeting site with banners and traditional songs, the owner of El Andaluza denied them entrance. He refused to let Indigenous women in the building on the pretext that their rubber boots would "dirty" his hotel floors. Obviously, the relocation of the national meeting to a place that had until recently exploited Indigenous labor in huasipungo servitude was not the most inclusive choice. Moreover, the conflicts between

rural and urban women at the hacienda further underscored the egregious class inequalities among the women's movements. Since they had rented the conference space, CONAMU's committee members came outside to negotiate the access of REDCH's members. But the owner still refused, and the middle-class urban women did surprisingly little to secure the entry of rural, Indigenous women. Their solution was to meet their Indigenous counterparts outside the building. Urban and mestizo women, lesbians and politicians, young and old representing organizations from the south to the north of Ecuador left their meeting rooms to meet with the Kichwa collective under open skies, on the dark volcanic earth the rural women were so familiar with. During this brief dialogue, the Kichwa women handed their policy proposal to the urban feminists, who then returned to their indoor meeting rooms to resume heated debates on rights to sexual diversity.

The national women's coalition failed to integrate Indigenous voices in every sense. In addition to not insisting on the admission of REDCH representatives, the coalition's leaders refused to incorporate Kichwa demands. Thus, the coalition's final proposal for Montecristi did not mention Indigenous claims or gender parity within collective rights, which were omitted as culturally specific. The message was clear: national women's movements viewed REDCH as an inconsequential political minority. Kichwa women were aware that if their attempts to join a coalition within the mainstream women's movement failed, they would have no chance of winning support from the Indigenous movement. Following the Remache case, Indigenous leaders had further suppressed the problem of violence against women. Both the women's coalition and the Indigenous social movements were presenting broad proposals to the Constituent Assembly, yet neither was interested in supporting REDCH's agenda. Kichwa women had to champion their cause alone.

REDCH's members went to the Montecristi constitutional convention without any coalition partners. International treaties were their best allies. REDCH sent an open letter to all the participants in the Constituent Assembly framing the political campaign they were about to launch. Signed by 120 women, the letter cited Article 44 of UNDRIP to remind the assembly participants that CEDAW's principles of gender equality were valid for Indigenous women, that Ecuador had ratified both CEDAW and the relevant UN treaties, and that the Constituent Assembly was therefore responsible for guaranteeing global human rights for both Indigenous women and men.

FIGURE 14. Kichwa women march with young children on their backs as they demand rights of their own during the preassembly process in Riobamba, Chimborazo (2007).

LOBBYING IN MONTECRISTI

REDCH did not have an easy task making their voices heard on the assembly floor. First, organizational logistics were strenuous. Montecristi is a coastal town eight hours away from the Chimborazo highlands, and REDCH members were, for the most part, peasants with agricultural, household, and family-care responsibilities that were difficult to abandon. Their travels involved immense, practical behind-the-scenes arrangements, especially in securing help to cover their chores at home and in the fields, along with care for children and animals. These arrangements often required new gender roles and extended support, which resignified women's roles in the community. For about a year, women participated actively in advocacy at Montecristi—in person, by phone, and at times through the Internet—taking turns to travel and assure REDCH's place in the assembly. The two main coordinators, Cristina Cucuri and Sara Sayay, often spent half of the month in Montecristi, on duty.

Despite the difficulties, Kichwa women staged three key interventions: at Montecristi's opening, during the negotiations, and before a final vote on the new Constitution. The initial intervention set the tone for months of mobilization.

At the inauguration ceremony, REDCH members joined CONAMU's official presentation to the Constituent Assembly. Instead of quietly accompanying the national women's movement, however, REDCH members pushed their way through the crowds to reach the assembly's president, Alberto Acosta. They articulated their demands and handed Acosta a little yellow book reporting on their situation. CONAMU's leadership reacted negatively, accusing the Indigenous women of fragmenting the broader feminist coalition with their separate proposal, thereby putting the national agenda at risk.

Second, Indigenous leaders within the assembly barred the women from a space reserved for political elites. Initially, Kichwa women had to sneak into the assembly buildings by hiding in the cars of supportive female legislators. Once inside the Constituent Assembly, Pachakutik legislators actively resisted the parity claims for women as "contrary to Indigenous philosophy" and tried to discredit their presentations.[8] Eventually, however, REDCH members were granted the opportunity to present their agenda to the whole legislative floor. Wearing their traditional *anakos*,[9] women gave voice to their testimonies of physical violence and threats; they complained about the complacency that was the custom of traditional Indigenous justice systems. Of all the thematic committees, REDCH was particularly concerned with gaining support in the committee on justice, where they recounted their experiences and supported their testimonials with regional data on violence against women. They told how the first sexual experience of most Indigenous girls was rape. They had few ways to express the extent of the humiliation Kichwa women experience daily but were savvy in using available data on violence, explaining that in the Alausi region over 60 percent of women were victims of domestic violence and only 7 out of 243 organizations in the province were presided over by women. Non-Indigenous legislators expressed puzzlement at the scope of violence against Indigenous women. Male Indigenous representatives, in turn, were baffled that Kichwa women were so bold as to advocate for gender equality in an elitist political venue at the Constituent Assembly. Mauro Andino, the sole Indigenous legislator on the justice committee, was furious. He charged that gender parity within collective rights was a feminist import from the West and was unrepresentative of Indigenous cosmovision. Andino also accused REDCH members of undermining ethnic cohesion during the assembly process. Cucuri and Sayay diplomatically argued that gender equality would strengthen, not weaken, Indigenous politics, yet Andino remained resolutely against all claims for gender parity.[10]

Andino was not alone. Other Indigenous legislators strongly objected to the women's proposals. Moreover, men seemed to be as upset by REDCH's presence in the corridors of power as they were at their gender parity proposal. Instead of engaging in debate over the substance of these proposals, men inquired whether REDCH women were married and had children in a crude attempt to impugn their seriousness.[11] Support was scarce even among other Indigenous women. Margarita Morocho, a legislator on the committee dealing with citizen participation, was the sole Indigenous woman legislator from Chimborazo, yet she refused to support REDCH's proposal. She claimed she had been elected to represent all Indigenous peoples, not only women. This discontent with the gender parity proposal was also expressed by Indigenous female leaders outside the Montecristi assembly. Tibán, today a prominent Pachakutik delegate in Congress, denounced "feminist" demands as "un-Indigenous," declaring on television that a law on gender parity was unjustified because women were already present on Indigenous councils.

Nevertheless, REDCH's proposal gained some allies. Mónica Chuji, elected by Correa's governing Alianza País party, was a strong supporter among Indigenous legislators. Although Chuji sat on the natural resources committee, she actively supported REDCH behind the scenes by helping garner support among other participants. Consolidating alliances within the assembly's justice committee was particularly crucial. Kichwa women were a regular presence in Montecristi, negotiating their way in as they learned the ropes of Ecuadorian legislative lobbying. What saved them was growing support among non-Indigenous legislators on the justice committee.[12] The feminist lawyer Gina Godoy, who was experienced with gender-based violence in Ecuador's coastal region, lent solid support to REDCH's efforts and publicly defended their agenda. Godoy brought REDCH members fully onboard, informing them when the committee would discuss issues related to Indigenous justice and helping to elaborate strategies to pressure legislators into accepting the concept of gender parity. Fernando Vega, the president of the justice committee and a former priest, also turned out to be a crucial ally. As the final vote approached and Indigenous legislator Andino continued to reject the inclusion of women's rights in collective rights, Vega rallied enough support to threaten to reject Indigenous justice altogether in the new Constitution if the committee did not adopt a clause guaranteeing the participation and decision-making power of women. Cornered, Andino reluctantly agreed to clauses explicitly incorporating women's rights within collective rights.

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS WITH GENDER EQUALITY

Kichwa women wanted collective rights legislation to adopt phrasing "guaranteeing the participation and decision-making of women," and they elaborated multiple documents supporting their demand. They wrote an initial letter calling upon the assembly to abide by article 44 of UNDRIP, then followed up with more technical memos explaining why it was crucial to bring gender rights to Indigenous justice and which specific legal language should be added to existing laws. When the Montecristi assembly finally approved a Constitution, 3 of its 494 articles explicitly guaranteed Indigenous women's participation. The only formal request by the Kichwa women that failed to garner support concerned specific wording regarding the "participation in conditions of equality and equity between women and men in all the economic, social, political, and cultural realms." The other Kichwa demands became law.

Most specifically, all the articles defining collective and cultural rights in the Constitution were extended to include language on gender parity. REDCH had made a specific request to the Constituent Assembly to incorporate language on gender parity and equality in six articles dealing with collective rights (art. 1, 9, 10, 16, 17, and 22). It had proposed language inspired by CEDAW for "eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence against girls, teens, and adult women" within culture (art. 26). Like the women who fought for the equal rights of men and women in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (Skard 2008), Indigenous women wanted their inclusion to be stated explicitly. Collective rights became enshrined in Article 57, Chapter 4: "Indigenous communes, communities, peoples and nations are recognized and guaranteed, in conformity with the Constitution and human rights agreements, conventions, declarations and other international instruments." Gender-specific language comes up twice in the twenty-one subarticles that detail collective rights with regard to natural resources, education and the media, and the protection of territories where people live in voluntary isolation. Subarticle 10 explicitly integrates language from CEDAW into collective rights to justice: "To create, develop, apply and practice their own legal system or common law, which cannot infringe constitutional rights, especially those of women, children and adolescents." Article 57 ends with an additional freestanding statement: "The State shall guarantee the enforcement of these collective rights without any discrimination, in conditions of equality and equity between men and women." The most coveted item in the new Constitution

was also the most fiercely debated. Article 171 established women's participation and decision-making in Indigenous justice:

> The authorities of the indigenous communities, peoples, and nations shall perform jurisdictional duties, on the basis of their ancestral traditions and their own system of law, within their own territories, with a guarantee for the participation of and decision-making by women.[13] The authorities shall apply their own standards and procedures for the settlement of internal disputes, as long as they are not contrary to the Constitution and human rights enshrined in international instruments.
>
> The State shall guarantee that the decisions of indigenous jurisdiction are observed by public institutions and authorities. These decisions shall be subject to monitoring of their constitutionality. The law shall establish the mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between indigenous jurisdiction and regular jurisdiction.

Article 171 thus reaffirmed Indigenous autonomy in administering justice and the obligation of ordinary justice to recognize Indigenous jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was the only legal body with the authority to hear appeals to cases administered within the Indigenous justice system. The main change in the 2008 Constitution was the addition of a third external limitation on the scope of Indigenous jurisdiction. Previously, Indigenous justice was only required not to contradict criminal law and international human rights norms; now, Indigenous justice also had to guarantee the equal and full participation and decision-making power of women. In theory, Indigenous women could appeal to the Supreme Court if they were not represented among judges. This gender clause added powerful weight and normative leverage to women's voices.

REDCH's activism achieved for Kichwa women what had seemed impossible only a few months before. In the process, a small group of marginalized rural women from the highlands of Chimborazo made themselves into significant social actors imbued with a new sense of political agency.

EMPOWERMENT WITHOUT IMPACT

REDCH's legal battle achieved much more than rights on paper. In their advocacy, Kichwa women uncovered a political agency of their own. Their efforts before and during the Montecristi assembly crystallized a political power they themselves did not suspect. These invisible, marginalized peasants

from the poor highlands had become confident advocates of women's rights before a national audience of legislators. They had managed to leave their homes, families, and fields to engage in public policy at the highest level. The Montecristi journey transformed who they were, how they perceived themselves, and, not least, how they were perceived by Indigenous and non-Indigenous politicians.

The Montecristi process strengthened women's individual and collective self-esteem. If REDCH members began their advocacy as outsiders, they progressively gained invaluable insights into what politics are made of and became some of the assembly's central actors. For almost a year, they discussed pressing concerns collectively, studied legal alternatives, and mobilized behind a political strategy of their own. At least half of the REDCH members entered the corridors of power in Montecristi, facing politicians they never thought they could interact with and redefining these politicians as "common people."[14] Rural, often illiterate, women acquired the courage and tools to articulate their own needs to political elites. As they participated in the drafting of the Constitution, they became co-creators of the state. REDCH's 2008 advocacy resembled on a minor scale the 1990 Indigenous uprising in that it boosted participants' self-confidence in public and private realms alike.

It is important to stress the extent to which the journey itself was a transformative experience. Most women had never left the cold highlands of the Andes, let alone taken part in national politics. The initiative was bold both logistically and emotionally. They traveled long days in buses to reach hot coastal towns that served ceviche instead of quinoa,[15] where women wore miniskirts instead of the long woolen *anako*. Women managed to create time for politics, and entire families learned to reevaluate women's time. Their advocacy marked a rupture with lives organized around caring for others, from women for whom the community is the only world. It was the first time they had spent multiple days in a row without cooking or caring for their husbands, children, and animals. At first, the Kichwa women activists constantly worried about chores left undone, but guilt eventually dissipated as they enjoyed the freedom to develop other interests beyond their villages. They adapted to other lifestyles and experienced new horizons, at times quite literally. The day they went to the beach near Montecristi was the first time many had seen the horizon over the ocean or listened to the sound of the waves. They took their first barefoot steps on the sand, showing pale legs that had never seen sunshine as they raised their anakos to wade into the water. In that moment, as her peers

walked in the waves for the first time in their lives, Cucuri realized how far they had come together. This collective mobilization was transformative not only in legislative terms but also because it dramatically expanded women's personal horizons.[16]

The advocacy process forged women's self-worth and powerfully validated Indigenous women among the political actors involved in the Montecristi assembly. Feminist and traditional Indigenous movements were initially skeptical if not dismissive of the ability of Indigenous women to participate in politics, and especially to contribute important legal criteria to the Constituent Assembly, but they were subsequently forced to acknowledge the determination and political skills of Kichwa women. Years later, Montecristi legislators (even those who had decried parity claims) lauded the tireless advocacy of Kichwa women. Unfortunately, however, the Kichwa women and their legal achievement struggled to gain broader visibility. Their advocacy had been limited to a small insiders' process that was peripheral to the heated debates over the rights of nature and executive powers that had monopolized the floor in negotiations at Montecristi. Only legislators were aware of the Indigenous gender parity issue and were not concerned when it quickly disappeared off the political radar to make way for other national concerns. The mainstream media never covered the advocacy of rural women in Montecristi or the introduction of a gender clause within collective rights. After the fact, nobody seemed to pay attention to the legal reforms. The gender clause went virtually unnoticed in debates about the new Constitution among intellectuals, activists, or politicians, and to this day very few people know about the law or its history.

The Kichwa women were overlooked like Indigenous women are overlooked because racism affects not only human interaction but also institution-building. Kichwa women achieved powerful change, yet they remained invisible. Like most human rights legislation, the new law has been slow to gain implementation; far from automatic, the translation of law into practice is a slow process of socialization. Nevertheless, the introduction of Indigenous women's rights in constitutional law was a major legal innovation. The legal reform was not just a powerful tool for improving the lives of Kichwa women. It constituted a legal, political, and conceptual milestone in the articulation of Indigenous and women's rights. Far from commonplace, this victory strengthened the implementation of universal rights and diversified the practice of democracy.

DIFFERENTIATING UNIVERSAL RIGHTS

Ecuador's new legislative framework is significant well beyond its effects on Indigenous women. The introduction of gender clauses within justice and collective rights legislation was a milestone in international law that expanded conceptualizations of women's rights. First, Ecuador's law guaranteeing women's participation in the administration of justice is unparalleled in the world. Second, the combination of gender with collective rights goes a long way toward reconciling the tension in the relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality. Third, Kichwa women's demand for "democracy with diversity" contributes to the notion of differentiated rights within national forms of governance, as well as within the broader global human rights regime.

UNPRECEDENTED LEGISLATION

Ecuador's constitutional reform established two unprecedented clusters of fundamental rights. The first is gender parity within collective rights. Indigenous rights that had long been treated as exclusive rights impermeable to external impositions (including from the global human rights regime) were reconfigured to be compatible with internal human rights norms and also made supportive of the rights of women and girls. This transformation dismantled any sense of legal impermeability: collective rights became accountable to international laws on gender equality. Indigenous rights were subject to international gender norms, thus acquiring greater autonomy from the state. The second cluster of rights concerns women's role in the administration of justice. The clause guaranteeing women's participation and decision-making power within the conventional judicial systems meant that Indigenous justice is only valid if it includes women judges with the authority to adjudicate. In both cases, Kichwa women invoked the international norms included in CEDAW and UNDRIP. Theirs was a groundbreaking articulation of international women's rights within collective rights to self-determination, of universal human rights with exceptional rights to culture.

The double significance of this expansion of rights becomes evident when put in international perspective: neither cluster of rights existed anywhere else in the world. Ecuador's Constitution was the first to explicitly include gender parity within collective rights. Over the last decades, Indigenous rights had become enshrined in national legislation worldwide, but never had gender

clauses. Most Latin American constitutions now recognize some degree of Indigenous autonomy, and in the Andes various nation-states declared themselves to be plurinational. Yet no country has established explicit laws for Indigenous women. Even Bolivia's Constitution, which grants the same authority to ordinary and Indigenous justice (art. 179), does not mention women. Ecuador's 2008 Constitution was the first national legislation to address women within collective rights.

These clauses also inaugurated requirements for women's participation and decision-making power in the administration of justice (Indigenous or not). Since the 1990s, affirmative action policies had brought gender equality to the constitutional forefront globally. Two African constitutions have set groundbreaking international standards for gender and sexual rights. Rwanda's Constitution is "committed to ensuring equal rights between Rwandans and between women and men without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and complementarity in national development."[17] It also enshrines the pursuit of equality "by ensuring that women are granted at least 30 percent of posts in decision making organs" (art. 9, chap. 2, "Fundamental Principles") and assuring equal access to elective offices (art. 52) and twenty-four elected seats at specific councils (art. 76). By law, women must compose 30 percent of the Senate (art. 82). Another bedrock for gender equality is South Africa's post-apartheid Constitution, the first in the world to safeguard sexual orientation as a human right (Cock 2003). Founded on provisions of "non-racialism and non-sexism" (art. 1[b]), it contains an equality clause that prohibits state discrimination on grounds of "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth" (art. 9[3]). Both Rwanda's and South Africa's progressive constitutions are internationally acclaimed for setting the highest legal standards in women's rights; yet neither mentions women in the administration of justice.

Gender quotas are a common form of affirmative action that favors women's participation in legislative and executive realms while ignoring gender equity in the judiciary (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). France launched the first parity law in 2000, requiring that half of all candidates for almost all political offices be women (Scott 2005). By 2014, Latin America led the world in gender quotas, with thirteen countries applying statutory quotas (Htun 2016).[18] Women's share of parliamentary seats rose from an average of 13 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2010. Countries in the Andes stood out, and women made up 24 percent and 29 percent of the upper and lower house legislators, respectively.

Quotas explained women's participation in politics regionally and resulted in more gender laws and executive positions.[19] Chile's president, Michele Bachelet, the most vocal supporter of women's rights among female heads of state, pursued the principle of gender parity when appointing her first cabinet. At the local level, her support for gender parity translated to the appointment of women to 50 percent of Chile's governorships, although she later abandoned full parity because it was too hard to implement and constrained her political flexibility (Haas 2010). Quota laws brought women to the highest executive and legislative positions, and at least four Latin American countries elected female heads of state. Yet nowhere did gender quotas target the judiciary.

The presence of women judges is important not only for the sake of equal representation but also because male-dominated judiciaries continue to fail to dispense equal justice to women worldwide. There are still too few female judges; on average, 27 percent of judges around the world are women (Kalantry 2012). Social scientists have long maintained that women judges behave differently from their male colleagues (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010). Personal experiences influence how judges make decisions related to women, especially when it comes to highly gendered social issues like sexual discrimination, harassment, and family life. For instance, U.S. research showed that judges with daughters consistently voted in a more feminist fashion on gender issues than judges who had only sons (Glynn and Sen 2015). In Ecuador, the lack of attention to gender violence is appalling. Farith Simon Campaña (2008) calculates that about 40 percent of charges of violence against women are resolved in Ecuador's criminal system, compared to only 8 percent of cases of sexual and intrafamily violence. Of the total cases of sexual and family violence taken to courts, a mere 3.1 percent result in convictions. If Indigenous systems of justice in Ecuador are predominantly dealing with cases of adultery, as I pointed out in chapter 2, it is even more important that women be among the judges.

Another cornerstone in the 2008 gender clause for justice is the language referring to women's decision-making power. This wording is necessary to grapple with the problem of presence without empowerment (Htun 2016). Women's presence is increasing, even if it remains uneven, but women are disproportionately clustered in "soft" fields like social services and tourism. They are sidelined in less prestigious positions and frequently restrained from advocating "feminist" agendas. For instance, Ecuador's female legislators who asked for a congressional debate on the decriminalization of abortion in 2014 were accused of treason and punished by the governing party, Alianza País. In general, the

stagnation and even reversal of laws permitting abortion across Latin America indicate that women's growing presence in politics is necessary but not sufficient for changing policy affecting gender rights. Women need gender quotas not only to assure them entry into politics, but also to guarantee them effective decision-making power alongside their male peers.

Ecuador's 2008 gender clauses for Indigenous women set legal precedents of international resonance. This pioneering legislation has far-reaching conceptual implications that transgress the conventional borders between universal gender rights and rights to culture. Through their struggles, Kichwa women have made notable contributions to international law, as well as broader theoretical debates on justice and gender.

RECONCILING CULTURAL JUSTICE WITH WOMEN'S RIGHTS

The feminist literature on multiculturalism has long been concerned with the role of "cultural tradition" in legitimating crimes against women. In this context, women's role in Indigenous justice shattered any remaining assumptions about the incompatibility of gender and culture. It reconciled lasting debates on gender versus multiculturalism by showing that individual women's rights and collective rights were not exclusive but could be articulated to design interlegalities that further gender equality.

Susan M. Okin's influential book *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (1999) polarized the debate on gender parity and multiculturalism. On one side, some feminist critics argued that multiculturalism tended to be detrimental to women. Scholars posited collective and women's rights as "conflicting equalities" (Deveaux 2000) and analyzed how cultural defense was used against women in courts (Phillips 2007). Such perspectives denounced jurisdictional exceptions in the name of culture that undermined women's (universal) human rights. They argued that the rights of minorities within minorities should be negotiated within plural liberal states, dispensing with culture to favor an agency-centered multiculturalism (Deveaux 2006; Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005; Phillips 2007). On the other side of the debate, other scholars concerned with minority rights defended cultural claims in struggles for redistribution and recognition (Benhabib 2002). Multicultural citizenship, they argued, serves to redress deeply rooted inequalities embedded in histories of state violence and intervention. Exclusive rights were indispensable to protect cultural groups and ethnic minorities discriminated against in colonial processes. On the policy front, the

UN special rapporteur on violence against women launched the 2007 campaign "Violence Is Not Our Culture" to move beyond the polarization. Underneath the nuances and gray zones of what now constitutes a vast literature, gender and culture were often portrayed as antithetical.

Theoretical problems frequently find resolution in the practical world. Kichwa women's politics resolved in practice some of the theoretical tensions between culture and gender rights. First, their advocacy showed that Indigenous women want both universal women's rights and collective rights to self-determination. They shifted the debate away from an either/or dilemma to claim the complementarity of gender with culture. In doing so, they validated both gender and culture, while addressing shortcomings on both sides of the debate. Second, when the women articulated international women's rights listed in CEDAW within Indigenous rights to self-determination in Ecuador's Constitution, they offered a concrete example of how to translate universal rights within local, cultural contexts. This synthesis showed the fallacy of arguments claiming the incompatibility of women's rights and cultural autonomy. Now debates on either/or can instead privilege how. Third, Kichwa women disavowed scholarly tensions by claiming culture as a tool for greater gender equality. Far from antithetical, gender and culture can reinforce one another to build better justice systems.

The experience of Kichwa women shows that cultural boundaries can be misleading. When they sought to invent rights of their own, these women approached Indigenous culture as a political, intentional construction, not an eternal essence. Their politics were rooted in the understanding of culture as a historical process. Cultures are dynamic, heterogeneous, often fragmented, and always contested, especially when experienced from within. Kichwa politics illustrate Sarah Song's (2007) interactive view of cultures in which majority and minority cultures constantly cross-pollinate each other.

The 2008 gender clause for Indigenous rights signals a confluence of cultures in permanent interaction, mutually constitutive and loosely jointed. This matters for understanding the formation of so-called Indigenous cultural traditions. Majority cultures all too frequently push gendered norms onto minority cultures. Patrilineal rules of membership, for instance, often originate in the dominant culture before becoming a "cultural" trait. The U.S. Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 denied matrilineal forms of political identity to Native Americans who wanted to acquire citizenship. The "civilizing" process imposed gender patterns upon Native cultures, creating gendered membership rules in various communities

like the Santa Clara Pueblo of New Mexico (Song 2007). Marc Rifkin (2011) argues that heterosexual patterns have been imposed on Native Americans as a tool of colonization and that these have created heterosexual norms intended to detribalize entire groups and undermine their territorial governance. A growing literature analyzes the colonial dimension of sexual disciplining, including the heteronormativity of settler colonialism (Smith 2010), origins of sodomy laws in British colonialism (Gupta 2009), lasting sexual diversity in Amazonia (Tikuna and Picq 2016), and reframing of associations of sexual liberation with Western modernity (Rahman 2014).

Cultural preservation is, at best, muddy terrain. The condemnation of cultural practices in minority groups obfuscates gender hierarchies in the majority culture by naturalizing them. As Anne Phillips (2003) pointed out in the case of British courts, cultural defense arguments are detrimental to women when they echo gendered sensibilities in the majority culture. The deference to cultural arguments is often driven less by the respect of cultural difference than by the congruence of patriarchal norms across cultures. This argument helps explain the recurrent "clash" between cultural arguments and feminist rhetoric. Women's rights are often repressed not by cultural difference (the "other") but by cultural sameness. The gender inequalities that affect Indigenous communities cannot be disentangled from the gender inequalities that affect Ecuador's non-Indigenous society.

Universalism is another problem tackled in Kichwa women's politics. Claims to universalism are all too often inflexible and parochial, and they are frequently impermeable to diversity, rooted in a Western locality, and invoked to justify a mission civilizatrice. Immanuel Wallerstein (2006) decries these claims to universal values as a European rhetoric of power, arguing that a truly universal universalism would resemble more a multiplicity of universalisms. Instead, universalism is invoked to assert European superiority over other cultures: to cover up discrimination against non-European cultures instead of recognizing claims for difference. Momin Rhaman (2014) warns us that "Western" narratives provide only a partial account of the development of diversities in modernity. Women's rights emerge in a Western context just like they may emerge in Kichwa communities in the Andes. In both cases, they are part of a complex and often conflicted development of what counts as universal.

Gender has been a central tenet of the Western rhetoric of universalism. Eurocentric cultures invoke feminist principles as pretexts to assault "dangerous" "other" men (Bhattacharyya 2008) while opposing the use of veils by Muslim

women as a cultural otherness allegedly incompatible with Western modernity. States invoke gender-based violence to justify their own use of violence (Amar 2013). In Turkey, veils are part of recent struggles for political agency, but veiled women embody "religious" cultures incapable of secular universalism (Göle 1996). In France, the 2004 ban forbidding Muslim girls from wearing headscarves in public schools claimed to be defending universal (secular) gender equality. Far from securing women's rights, however, the law is symptomatic of racist policies against North African immigrants (Scott 2007). Claims to "universal women's rights" are embedded in Europe's lasting tutelage of cultures it has considered unready for secular modernity (and thus unable to become, for example, fully French), similar to the way that Israel uses LGBT rights to pinkwash its violent occupation of Palestine. Gender is an unlikely ally of minority claims because it tends to be misused for discriminatory purposes more than to actually promote women's well-being.

The politics of Kichwa women resemble those of veiled women in France defending their cultural autonomy. Women in minority groups rarely feel represented by universal agendas that all too often disqualify their claims and ask them to adopt modern European norms as the solution to their problems. They see universal rights as historical constructs that ignore their lived histories. The question of who defines universalism is as intricate as the question of who defines culture. Feeling unrepresented, minority women often seek rights within cultural autonomy. Ecuador's 2008 case is interesting because Kichwa women did not discard universalism altogether. Instead, they used nuanced claims to universalism to promote and strengthen cultural diversity. Kichwa women articulated their process during the workshops in Chimborazo when they suggested changing the customs favoring patriarchy through the introduction of community mediators advocating collective human rights. "Both customary law and the Constitution advocate human rights, . . . these values must be implemented in our communities" (Cucuri 2007, 48). Where community justice fails women, they argued, other legal authorities should be able to intervene.

Like the parity movement in France, Kichwa gender politics seek to expand definitions of universalism. The French parity laws were not about gender quotas, but about redefining notions of universalism (Scott 2005). The *paritaires* sought recognition of the universal physical difference of sex. They pushed difference onto universalism. In Ecuador, in contrast, gender clauses represent an effort to adapt universalism to Indigenous contexts. The Kichwa women claimed universalism within Indigenous contexts not to undermine Indigenous autonomy

FIGURE 15. Most Indigenous women work the fields. The potato, native to the Andes, comes in thousands of varieties, like the *oca* pictured here.

but to strengthen it. Universal rights are not used to assimilate minority groups within the majority culture. Instead, they are brought into Indigenous culture to legitimate difference, to validate Indigenous systems of justice autonomous from the state. In different ways, both the paritaires and Kichwa women pursued the diversification of what constitutes the universal and where it is located.

"DEMOCRACY WITH DIVERSITY": DIFFERENTIATED UNIVERSAL RIGHTS

Kichwa gender politics offer a differentiated approach to universal rights. Cucuri explains REDCH's advocacy as a quest for "democracy with diversity."[20] Different women live different lives, she insists: some women are single mothers in cities while others care for large families in rural areas and work fields in the highlands. They all face gender-based violence, but the solutions need to be differentiated to account for their specific realities. Different places call for different solutions. Successful policy approaches to gender-based violence speak to women's contextual realities. Rural women, for instance, may be much better protected from violence by owning land titles than by the creation of police

stations or gender quotas, which are useful in other contexts. A woman who owns land knows that she can support herself by farming or renting the parcel and is in a stronger position to terminate an unsatisfactory marriage. Feminist economic theory argues that this fallback position increases women's bargaining power and participation in household decisions (Agarwal 1994, 1997). A study in Kerala, India, found that women's ownership of assets, whether a dwelling or land, can be a deterrent to domestic violence (Panda and Agarwal 2005). Some women need a room of their own (Woolf 1929); others need fields of their own (Agarwal 1994). Remedies should be adaptable to women across cultures and legalities.

Diversity within democracy resists homogenization because women are oppressed by multiple, intersectional identities (Crenshaw 2001). For instance, police support is often not available to immigrant and rural women. In the United States, immigrant women who are victims of domestic abuse frequently feel they cannot get police protection for fear of being deported. In Ecuador, too, Indigenous victims of domestic abuse do not trust the police forces of the state that permanently discriminates against them. In addition, comisarías de la mujer are clustered in large cities, and few rural women can abandon their fields for a shelter to escape domestic violence. Indigenous women are tied to daily agricultural chores that limit their movement; they need distinct mechanisms to access justice, and they seek different contents when it comes to resolution. Once we recognize that women's experiences are not all the same we can better respond to their needs.

Kichwa women confronted state homogeneity in pursuit of justice. They addressed gender-based violence based on their cultural and corporal experiences. Indigenous justice is the best system of justice for Indigenous women because it is the most sensitive to their realities. It is more readily adaptable to their needs than other systems of justice and thus constitutes the most effective terrain on which to pursue legal politics. Indigenous justice speaks what William Roseberry (1994) calls a "language of contention," a new rights-based politics of citizenship that provides opportunities for actors to experiment with a plurality of possibilities.

"Democracy with diversity" enables a strategic interlegality. International, national, and local legal systems are not self-contained entities in isolation. Rather, they interact with and reconfigure each other. The very term *interlegality* refers to a legal porosity that results in the mutual influencing of two legal orders (Hoekema 2003). In the case of Ecuador, international norms

permeated Indigenous systems of justice, but the gender clause brought CEDAW's international norms into community-level justice to expand mechanisms of accountability for women's rights in local communities. Ecuador's 2008 Constitution actually deepened an interlegality that already existed. The previous 1998 Constitution already required Indigenous nations to abide by Ecuadorian criminal law and international human rights treaties. In addition, the 2008 Constitution required Indigenous peoples to uphold international women's rights. Anna Tsing (1997) offers a useful way to think about democracy with diversity when she writes that "universalisms, ironically, are a flexible medium for translation." Going beyond the opposition between particulars and universals means that a greater array of claims is available for strategic appropriation in the "service of specific goals and local systems of alliance" (Tsing 1997, 266). At the same time, this process continually rewrites the meaning of the universal. Diversity is a flexible medium in which to translate democracy and make it available for strategic appropriation. To put it more accurately, the universal can only be realized through concrete particularities, which constantly produce new meanings of the universal. For Tsing, the process of translation is a negotiation between universals and particulars, not as opposites, but in a "heterogeneous continuum," undermining any notion of the purity or stability of the original term (Tsing 1997, 253). My analysis of the integration of gender norms within Indigenous justice in Ecuador is one example of particular universals in the making.

This entanglement of particulars and universals creates a legal porosity that works as a two-way street, impacting both Indigenous and state law. In one way, interlegality strengthens Indigenous autonomy as it validates distinct legal perceptions. International law tends to be the business of sovereign states, but interlegality increases the ability of Indigenous communities to abide by international norms. With greater legitimacy comes greater responsibility. Moreover, the strongest legal systems are the most used ones. The more rights women have under Indigenous jurisdiction, the more likely they are to use them. In that sense, interlegality strengthens Indigenous justice by socializing it. In another way, this legal porosity makes universalism commensurable with Indigenous realities. Indigenous contexts resist the homogeneity of universal rights, thus interlegality indirectly contributes to decolonizing international law. Indigenizing universal rights also expands their functional meanings (and who gets to define them). Interlegalities generate cross-pollinations that affect the practice and concept of dominant law, an integral part of every culture.

Scholars have provided insightful explanations on how international human rights law cascades from global to local contexts, diffusing the norms that structure the international order. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1996) analyze the alliance of civil society organizations with international actors to pressure governments to respect global human rights as a "boomerang effect." Thomas Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) delineate the socialization of international norms as a "spiral effect" in five stages: repression, denial, tactical concessions, the adoption of human rights norms on a prescriptive status, and the institutionalization of rule-consistent behavior. This model of socialization is based on the assumption that states seek to increase their international status and that international society promotes norms to its members. Following a similar line of inquiry, Sally Engle Merry (2009) grapples with the process of enacting international law locally. She suggests that international women's rights must be framed in local terms to efficiently resolve gender inequalities. These approaches have contributed valuable insights on the mechanisms of norms diffusion; however, I try to go beyond the boomerang and spiral arguments to place greater emphasis on the role of local actors. My case study provides a counterpoint to those that depict human rights emerging internationally before spiraling down to local contexts and local actors as lagging behind on civilizational projects. Interlegality is a valuable complement to these approaches because it does not presuppose (global) norms makers and a (local) norms receivers.

Song's interactive view of cultures is particularly insightful here. Local sensibilities can affect dominant legal orders, too. For instance, Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) concepts relating to the "pursuit of happiness" were incorporated as founding principles into American democracy (Johansen 1982).[21] Norwegian law accommodated Sami legal perceptions (Svensson 2005). And Aboriginal interventions in criminal courts affected Canadian law (Proulx 2005). There are many more cases when Indigenous legalities have been incorporated into dominant legal systems. André Hoekema (2005) calls this bottom-up influence "interlegality in reverse." In such cases, "cultural" laws may bring an intercultural tone to majority law. However, Indigenous legal sensibilities do more than add intercultural perspectives to national law: they disrupt the homogeneity of international law. Kichwa women's advocacy is an example of interlegality in reverse. It is a valuable case study for its insights into the translation of local diversity into global universalism. Kichwa women were concerned with securing women's rights in local cultural contexts as much as with validating Indigenous realities within the international women's rights framework.

Kichwa demands for differentiated rights may be understood as a norm "spiral" in reverse because they bring local Indigenous diversities into universal rights. REDCH's advocacy was not merely about implementing international rights in local contexts, which would have been uncontroversial to feminist movements. It was about the confluence of local Indigenous self-determination and global women's rights. Kichwa women crafted specific rights for women within autonomous spaces, distilled from international laws that implicitly contained these rights but had yet to frame them explicitly. Their advocacy resonates with the boomerang model. Under the Pinochet regime Western states pressured Chile's government to respect human rights; here, Kichwa women pressured the Ecuadorian state to force Indigenous justice to respect women's rights. This advocacy also fits Merry's (2009) analysis since normative frameworks allow the enactment of international law in local contexts, thus reversing patterns of socialization. Yet these Kichwa politics of diversity are also more radical than models of norms cascade typically analyzed in the transnational civil society literature. The Kichwa women did not seek to replace one normative order with another, but to advance a project recognizing diversity in order to resist processes of homogenization based upon racist and sexist norms. They sought not to socialize an international normative structuring but to enable autonomous resistance to homogenizing structures. They claimed diversity to construct a more truly universal order respectful of their own agency.

Kichwa women's creative contestation suggests that gender equality and cultural autonomy can build off each other to build better societies. Their advocacy echoes Greta Gaard's (2001) distinction between "ethical contexts" and "ethical contents." Indigenous women endorse the "ethical contexts" of Indigenous judicial autonomy with the "ethical contents" of international women's rights. Across Latin America, Indigenous women continue to try to weave global ethical contents into global ethical contexts in their local societies. The same is true elsewhere. In Peru, for example, women in rural areas favor the Rural Nuclei for the Administration of Justice when courts have female delegates (Faúndez 2010). Mapuche women's organizations in Chile have long embraced feminist identities, although their agenda is strongly anchored in ethnic emancipation (Richards 2004). The case of Ecuador thus echoes a regional trend in which Indigenous women defending practices of autonomy strategically integrate feminist ethics. It is this articulation of autonomous "contexts" within universal rights "contents" that makes Indigenous gender clauses such a relevant case study for approaching international politics.

CONCLUSION

I have shown how Kichwa women pursued local justice in Chimborazo. Their claims were inspired by their own daily aspirations, not theoretical controversies. They nevertheless offer practical insights relevant to ongoing scholarly debates. Their advocacy was neither anticultural nor accepting of gender inequalities; it engaged international rights but contested their homogenizing tendencies. Refuting any incompatibility between gender rights and cultural autonomy, the Kichwa women held women's rights and cultural autonomy accountable to each other. Indigenous claims to gender within collective rights marked a step toward decolonizing feminism. Kichwa women articulated their initial demands within their own cultural systems, challenging Western feminist practices that reproduce an ethnocentric universality. Simultaneously, these women challenged gender violence within their own communities. They strengthened Indigenous self-determination by holding it accountable to international human rights norms. Universal rhetorics for gender equality and cultural diversity were managed as complementary imperatives to frame claims for differentiated rights.

The intersection of feminist standpoints with Indigenous ways of knowing provides a strategic position from which to examine world politics. Indigenous gender clauses emerged in vernacular settings, were pursued in national venues, and established powerful precedents at the global level. The politics of Kichwa women in the highlands of Chimborazo are relevant in the study of international relations because they engage international law and set precedents. More importantly, their politics used international law to strengthen Indigenous autonomy and self-determination and to reframe the legal authority of a sovereign state. Kichwa women's politics matter for (re)thinking the state because they offer insights into the mechanisms that shape denationalized or postnational legal spaces that interrogate and sometimes defy conventional notions of sovereignty.

5

SOVEREIGNTIES WITHIN

Making full sense of sovereignty is only possible when we realize that the European creation of a single global sociopolitical space both preceded and conditioned the emergence of the modern state and the modern international system.

—JENS BARTELSON, *SOVEREIGNTY AS SYMBOLIC FORM*

To be Indigenous means that the project of the nation-state did not triumph . . . , that there is not one single territory, one single language, one single citizenship.

—GLADYS TZUL TZUL, MAYA SCHOLAR

INDIGENOUS POLITICS geared toward securing women's votes within community councils in the Andean highlands may appear irrelevant to theoretical debates concerned with state sovereignty. Sovereignty, a foundational principle of the international system, is enforced through mutual recognition among states and is negotiated in international organizations like the UN. Its mutability is associated with global dynamics such as deterritorialized financial markets, not local Indigenous advocacy. Yet what disappears from sight at subnational levels can be tightly related to the international. Kichwa women in Ecuador reframe sovereignty, relocating not financial markets but legal authority. They articulate Indigenous autonomy, constitutional rights, and international normative frameworks to transfer authority from the state to Indigenous peoples. In so doing, Kichwa women do more than redefine legal assemblages; they disrupt established practices of sovereignty.

Westphalian sovereignty has long rested on the association between land, people, exclusive legal authority, and external (mutual) recognition. Over the last half century, however, global dynamics have challenged this concept so that the functions and meanings of sovereignty are increasingly understood to be mutable and contingent. Scholars have addressed the crisis of state sovereignty through ideas of global reassemblages (Sassen 2006) and have begun to consider deterritorialized forms of sovereignty (Agnew 2009). Cosmopolitan

frameworks have freed rights from the bonds of the sovereign state and allowed scholars to envision universal rights for global citizens (Linklater 1998; Chandler 2003). However, most debates on the crisis of sovereignty identify pressures and threats coming from international realms, especially global markets and international agreements, located "above" the state, not subnational dynamics located "below" it. This means that the ontological status of the state is largely unchallenged. But as Gladys Tzul Tzul indicates in the epigraph, the very existence of an Indigenous condition points to the fact that the hegemony of the Westphalian state system was always partial. One should not overlook *other* dynamics taking place within the territorial boundaries of the state, particularly Indigenous self-determination, that reframe legal authority beyond the state.

Indigenous politics matter to state sovereignty in ways reminiscent of the European Union, though in reverse. Europe reconfigured sovereignty in what Jürgen Habermas (2001) calls postnational constellations. The formation of the European Union implied a relocation of states' legal authority to supranational courts, legislative bodies, and administrative agencies, thereby dislocating state sovereignty from above. Similarly, the consolidation of accountability mechanisms beholden to Indigenous justice in the Andes constitutes a transfer of legal authority to autonomous nations. However, legal rearrangements emerge from below and relocate authority *within* the state. The reconfigurations of state sovereignty in Europe and in the Andes are similar in that legal reassemblages relocate sovereignty beyond the state. The main distinction is that in one case sovereignty is relocated to supranational levels *outside* the state and in the other to autonomous Indigenous nations *within* it.

Unlike in the EU, however, the impacts of Indigenous politics on state sovereignty go largely unexamined. This is primarily due to a lingering scholarly colonialism. The lack of interest in articulating the impact of Indigenous struggles on state sovereignty signals the coloniality of disciplines that still consider Indigenous ontologies to be "inappropriate" subjects of political analysis (Shaw 2008). It reveals the assumption that indigeneity is unrelated to the core concept of political theory: the state. Furthermore, it is not all that easy for conventional political theory to understand Indigenous approaches because those with Eurocentric world views have difficulty understanding the Indigenous other as co-constitutive of the sovereign state (Alfred 1999). One difficulty is that Indigenous politics do and do not "talk" sovereignty: Indigenous peoples do not discuss state authority in an attempt to replicate its form of governance (i.e.,

cessation claims to create another independent state) but rather in the effort to do away with it altogether. They speak the language of sovereignty only to challenge its totalizing views and propose alternative world views, which may or may not include similar notions of authority. On all accounts, Indigenous challenges to the state confront the Westphalian idea of sovereignty as a singular and hegemonic authority. But Native American and Indigenous perspectives are mostly alone in considering the impact of Indigenous politics on practices and concepts of state sovereignty, in proposing new grammars to discuss sovereignties in the plural and beyond stateness.

World politics are concerned with an international system of states organized around the principle of sovereignty, not with Indigenous subjects, much less female ones. The discipline is interested in peace and security, international organizations, global markets, and governance. Feminist critiques have brought fresh challenges from the margins, opening venues for queer approaches and postcolonial analysis (Weber 2016). But Indigenous women are nowhere to be found, especially not in debates about sovereignty. This research questions their absence by demonstrating how their political experiences shape the locus of sovereignty. The claims of Indigenous women are relevant to theoretical approaches because they disrupt assumptions about what the international is made of and where it is located. I argue that Indigenous women's politics dislocate legal authority, thereby reconfiguring state sovereignty. Far from being marginal to world politics, they influence its core architecture.

In the following pages, I discuss the idea and practice of sovereignty from Indigenous perspectives to engage post-Westphalian experiences of the international, which I hope uncovers a hidden dimension of global politics. First, I explain the particularity of Indigenous women's claims as they create a legal triangulation between international norms, constitutional rights, and Indigenous justice to ensure mechanisms of accountability. Kichwa women do not do away with the state in their search for self-determination; instead, they engage the state to leverage international norms and Indigenous justice and design complex mechanisms of legal accountability. I then discuss how Indigenous autonomy challenges the concept of exclusive authority. Indigenous authority, I argue, can be conceived as vernacular forms of sovereignties within the state. I conclude by emphasizing the significance of Indigenous ways of seeing and why Indigenous politics are fundamentally related to state sovereignty, the organizing principle of world politics.

A TRIANGULATION OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY

It is common for Indigenous peoples to use international rights like UNDRIP to pressure states into expanding legislation respecting their collective rights. Indigenous movements worldwide seek to create international mechanisms to hold state governments accountable to principles of self-determination. In Ecuador, for instance, Indigenous peoples know their rights to prior consultation and invoke ILO Convention 169 against the state when it promotes oil drilling in the Amazon or gold mining in the highlands. What is almost unique to the experience of Kichwa women is that they invoke international treaties primarily to pressure Indigenous institutions, not the state. They use international norms and state mediation to fight for gender rights in autonomous communities. The case of gender clauses within Indigenous rights in Ecuador illustrates the difference that gender makes in claims for self-determination. Kichwa women articulate a legal triangulation to hold their own communal governments accountable. They defend self-determination but ask that autonomy be held accountable, too.

Ecuador's gender clause had to articulate three legal realms together because no one system of justice could single-handedly address Indigenous women's needs. Both state and Indigenous systems of justice left women vulnerable to violence and failed to protect them from racism or sexism or both. International human rights frameworks guaranteed them rights but offered few or no enforcement mechanisms, leaving a gap of implementation. Kichwa women had inaccessible international rights, state courts that ignored them, and indigenous councils led by men with little incentive to overturn gender inequalities they benefited from. Only their careful interweaving of the three legal systems could balance out the strengths and deficiencies of each. Kichwa women created a triangular system of legal accountability to force Indigenous systems of justice to abide by international women's rights, using the state of Ecuador as guarantor. Similar strategies have been used elsewhere, for instance in Canada, where Indigenous women's organizations appealed to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in an effort to hold Indigenous organizations accountable to gender dynamics (organizations that mostly rejected the applicability of gender norms to Native communities). In the case of Ecuador, Kichwa women engaged the state as a third party to enforce international women's rights within Indigenous communities. Their advocacy convinced the state to convince their communities. Their strategy was to use

ordinary state justice as a third party or external referee to hold their communities accountable.

This articulation was possible in a specific legal context. Ecuadorian law holds ratified international treaties to have the same validity as domestic legislation. This means that CEDAW, which was ratified in 1984, counts as national law. In addition, women pushed for gender clauses because Indigenous justice had for over a decade been required to respect both international human rights and the criminal law as set forth in the Constitution. Indigenous women did not have to reinvent the wheel; they simply integrated gender into the overarching frame of Indigenous rights in the Constitution. They made explicit legal accountabilities that were implicit in the relation between Indigenous, national, and international law. If the state recognized CEDAW and if Indigenous justice had to respect the Constitution of Ecuador, then by default Indigenous justice was obliged to recognize CEDAW, too.

Accountability to international norms resulted in greater legitimacy for Indigenous justice. First, Indigenous justice became more accountable to gender standards: it has gender clauses that ordinary state justice does not. This means that Indigenous justice now entails more comprehensive gender standards and, at least on paper, has more sophisticated affirmative action policies than non-Indigenous legalities. Second, Indigenous justice is accountable to *international* norms for gender equality. Once Indigenous justice adheres to international treaties advancing women's rights, it engages with international law like states do. In this case, the watchdog is not a regional court like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but the Ecuadorian Constitution itself, which acts as a third party that monitors compliance with international norms but has no sovereign authority to enforce it. Indigenous justice is accountable to international norms, not state law. This weaving together of interlegalities does not undermine Indigenous justice, but rather reinforces its legal content and expands its responsibility to international levels. The triangulation of autonomous legal polities resonates with the calls of Native scholars Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle in *The Nations Within* (1984) for a consolidation of the political relationship among federal, state, and tribal governments in the United States through mutual respect and parity. Native proposals for arbitration and mediation as means of managing political differences in the United States relate to the triangulation of accountability established in Ecuador.

The state is strategic in this legal triangulation between international law and Indigenous justice. Yet the state is not the authority accountable to citizens;

it serves instead as an intermediary, a referee. For Kichwa women, the Ecuadorian Constitution is a double-edged sword. It is a legal system excluding that which is Indigenous but can also be a strategic tool to enforce gender claims upon Indigenous groups. The women engaged the state not as a site of contestation in which to frame their rights within the social contract but as an external third party that could incorporate their agendas into Indigenous justice. Kichwa women used international norms to simultaneously pressure two competing legal authorities, one to respect rights of self-determination and the other women's rights. This type of Indigenous advocacy is substantially distinct from norms diffusion, in which pressure is unidirectional on the state to democratize its social contract. In the Kichwa case, the state is a strategic watchdog used to democratize Indigenous politics. The state is neither the obstacle to be pressured nor an absolute enemy; it is an external third party.

Gender is key to this triangulation of legal accountability because it is what makes the state guarantee international norms within Indigenous justice. Gender is what distinguishes Indigenous women's politics from nongendered claims to self-determination. While Indigenous claims seek to expand

FIGURE 16. Teresa Pagalo, a member of a women's organization that uses agriculture to keep men and youth from migrating to cities, talks with the U.S. trade representative in preparation for a visit by the U.S. ambassador (2007).

political autonomy *from* the state, Indigenous women seek autonomy *with gender accountability*, in this case *through* the state. They articulate three legal systems because they are all too aware of the intersectional nature of the discrimination and oppression they face. This political distinction is important because Indigenous women take a specific stand vis-à-vis the role of the state. While they agree that Indigenous politics are situated outside the state, they do not necessarily agree on whether to pursue self-determination through state law. Can the system created through the violent erasure of Indigenous nations ever respect Indigenous self-determination? The debate on whether to pursue autonomy through the leviathan is a complex one without an optimal solution. If Indigenous lawmakers pursue claims within the state, they validate the legal structures that exclude Indigenous peoples. If they reject state institutions, they cannot reframe the very system they oppose.

The emancipatory potential of the state is controversial. Some theories of justice insist on the importance of the politics of recognition, which are defined as a form of justice as important as material redistribution (Fraser and Honneth 2003). Other theories doubt that even the most benevolent forms of liberalism can ever support Indigenous autonomy and question whether state laws can guide Indigenous self-determination. They see state recognition as a vehicle for sustaining structures of domination over Indigenous peoples, "culturalizing" claims to self-determination while resisting land redistribution in contexts of resource extraction (Eisenberg et al. 2014). Sheryl Lightfoot (2016) analyzes "overcompliance" with Indigenous rights in Canada and New Zealand as a state-centric model of reconciliation. Overcompliance occurs when a state's legal or policy behavior goes beyond its international normative commitments. Lightfoot explains that states are overcompliant not because they are progressive but because they are actually *resisting* the emerging Indigenous rights discourse. Similarly, Glen Sean Coulthard (2014) rejects politics of recognition as a form of liberal pluralism that reproduces colonial configurations of state power that Indigenous peoples have historically resisted and tried to transcend. His examination of land claims, economic policy, and self-government suggests it is impossible to "reconcile" Indigenous assertions of nationhood with the Canadian state.

These debates resonate with the state phobia of other postcolonial perspectives that distrust the coercive modus operandi of states (Puar 2007; Amar 2013; Bosia and Weiss 2013). While there is abundant evidence that the state is not to be trusted, there are at least two pragmatic reasons why Kichwa women

deal with it anyway. The first is that the state can come in handy. Nikita Dhawan (2016) warns about the dangers of state phobia, reminding us that violence is not unidimensional and does not emanate only from Western colonial states but has multiple, entangled sources that cannot be monopolized by the state. Political resistance against state forms of domination should not neglect violence against women in Indigenous communities. Indeed, Kichwa women are caught up between state racism and the sexism of their own communities, and while the two forms of violence are related, they cannot simply be conflated. The particular forms of racism and sexism that came with colonization are two sides of one coin that inform Indigenous experiences today (Canessa 2012). The colonial legacy is one in which the exercise of power is articulated in racist and sexist terms, whereby subalterns are racialized as they are feminized. For Indigenous women to combat sexism is not only to tackle a problem that is prevalent within their communities but also to unravel the ideology that has informed the exercise of power since the arrival of Europeans. To fight against racism without addressing sexism is not only problematic from a conceptual perspective, it is legally inefficient. Kichwa women's engagement with the state can be understood as pragmatic politics that address various forms of violence that are not reducible to state colonialism and seek legal protection accordingly.

The other reason to deal with the state is that it can more easily be transformed than erased. Kichwa women's strategies resonate with Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2000) argument that we can only provincialize Europe, not do away with it. He argues that Europe is inadequate but also indispensable in the sense that we have to deal with the contemporary world as it is. The state is inadequate yet indispensable, too. It needs to be provincialized, but it is at the core of international politics and is inescapably part of projects that imagine alternative political geographies. It may also be undesirable to do away with the state if it can be redeployed as a referee to advance women's rights or to improve the situation of subaltern groups standing at vulnerable intersections. Gayatri Spivak (2007) identifies the postcolonial challenge of converting poison into antidote. In this sense, Kichwa women invented a politics of triangulation to deal with the ambivalent function of the state, confirming that the state is both poison and remedy, or perhaps using poison as remedy (Dhawan 2016, 66). Dhawan's (2016) argument that the state has ambivalent functions relates to the way Mapuche peoples see their relationships to the state varying according to context: "Sin el estado, con el estado, contra el estado" (Without the state, with the state, against

the state). They may have to rely on self-government, negotiate with the state, or mobilize against it depending on whether the state is absent, present, or violent.

Indigenous women's politics are a complex, multidirectional politics of struggle for emancipation directed at coercive practices both in state and in Indigenous politics. Kichwa women have a clear distrust of state institutions and would probably agree with critical perspectives that describe the state as a psychopath (Bosia 2013). But they are aware of the pitfalls of their communities. They cannot afford to do away with the state altogether. They are contesting both "home and the world," not giving their unthinking allegiance to either the state or the community (Rao 2010). Kichwa women adopt a pragmatic approach that instrumentalizes the state while keeping it at a distance because they know that violence comes in multiple forms, from multiple sources. Without taking a definite stand for or against the state, Kichwa women pursue the more challenging task of reconfiguring the state by enacting multiple legal authorities. In the process, however, they deeply disturb state sovereignty.

NONEXCLUSIVE SOVEREIGNTY

The essence of sovereignty is legal authority over a territory. The Treaty of Westphalia associated political authority with a specific territory in 1648, and this principle has since been held as the key organizing principle of the international system of states. Westphalian sovereignty is based on the exclusion of external authority structures from state territory and is supported by the mutual recognition of other legally independent territorial entities in the international community of states (Krasner 1999). These are two core aspects of sovereignty: sovereign states that participate in the international system have supreme jurisdiction over their territories, and they mutually recognize each other among legally independent entities. Sovereignty is therefore what connects the state and the international system in one single order. Yet those are precisely the logics that Kichwa women challenge. Their legal triangulation complicates the geography of legal authority, confirming authorities *other* than the state and disrupting the claims of one single legal authority over a territory.

Sovereignty is what Giorgio Agamben (2005) calls the state of exception: it is the political authority to make rules and exceptions to the rules. Carl Schmitt (1922) posits this juridical exception as the core sign of sovereignty. Sovereign authority consists of being able to define the rules and to bypass them, thereby determining who is allowed to play the game. Sovereignty is the exception

that proves the rule, and this state of exception is not only the norm but also the definition of the juridical order, what Agamben (2005, 2) describes as a "threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism." The mutual recognition of this principle of juridical exception serves functions similar to veto power at the UN Security Council: those who possess it can define the game and who is allowed to play it. This principle establishes sovereignty as a self-fulfilling prophecy; it is the mutual recognition among sovereigns that binds together the international system of states. States assert their sovereignty internally, by exercising supremacy over all other authorities within a territory and population, and externally, through independence from outside authorities.

These understandings, which are woven into the genealogy of our social sciences, permit assumptions such as states hold exclusive power within their territories; domestic and foreign affairs are essentially distinct, separate realms following different rules; and the boundaries of the state define the boundaries of society and economy such that the latter are totally contained by the former. They also permit the assumption that Indigenous peoples may have autonomous legal systems without becoming sovereign nations. Jens Bartelson (2014, 41) points out three problems with such assumptions. First, by taking sovereignty to be a constitutive attribute of states, conventional theories assume that states are self-contained entities independent from anything outside themselves. Second, and by extension, these theories assume that the modern international system is self-regulating. Third, theories that assume states as self-contained and the international system as self-regulating imply that "the international system is exhaustive of the possibilities of political order and therefore lacks an exterior" (Bartelson 2014, 41). In other words, sovereignty would be exclusive of any other political order.

Political reassemblages have nevertheless complicated this morphology of sovereignty. The denationalization of currencies, long seen as bastions of state sovereignty, and global commodity chains have led critics to suggest that sovereignty is migrating from states to a loosely assembled global system, creating "multiple sites of citizen action within and above the state" (Connolly 2005, 7). John Agnew (2009, 10) contends that sovereignty is neither inherently territorial nor invariably state based, challenging the presumption that all states exercise equivalent levels of sovereignty and have exclusive jurisdiction within their territories. These global reassemblages also provoke and are shaped by processes taking place deep inside national territories. Saskia Sassen (2006) illustrates how global transformations are dislodging national capabilities and warns that these reconfigurations cannot be fully understood without examining local dynamics. Indigenous

justice illustrates Sassen's point: it is a process of judicial redistribution enabled by global rearrangements. International conventions such as ILO 169 and UNDRIP involve global norm-making, yet they become operative through the reassemblage of Indigenous rights (deep) inside national territories. Local Indigenous rights are enabled by global systems and meanings, and this legal reassemblage dislodges national systems of meanings. In particular, Indigenous justice challenges the association between sovereign authority and territory, becoming one such "place-making" that forces sovereignty to reinvent itself.

Agamben's state of exception has a territorial dimension that should not be overlooked. He argues that sovereignty as the state of exception can create bare life, for instance, the bodies deprived of political rights in Nazi concentration camps. Mark Rifkin (2009) offers the notion of *bare inhabitance*, referring not to the bodies but to the spaces denied political rights, including the Indigenous space denied sovereignty. Native territories denied sovereignty through centuries of terra nullius represent bare inhabitance. Rifkin (2009, 91) explains U.S. Indian policy as the state of exception that creates the "exclusive and uncontestable right to define what will count as a viable legal or political formulation." U.S. sovereignty, then, is but a "fundamentally circular and self-validating" performance that requires the axiomatic negation of Native political authority (Rifkin 2009, 91). Rifkin argues that sovereignty functions as a placeholder with no determinate content that depends on framing Native peoples as an exceptional category.

Indigenous justice entails relocating legal authority from the state to autonomous nations within the state. As legal authority migrates to Indigenous territories within, it dethrones a core assumption of sovereignty—exclusive state jurisdiction over a territory. This is why states resist Indigenous self-determination so intensely, why Indigenous self-determination was so contested at the UN. Member states could not agree on the principle of self-determination, the core element of Indigenous rights, and this exceptional situation led the UN to dedicate a second decade to pursuing consensus on this thorny issue. It is important to keep in mind that Indigenous politics do not challenge state sovereignty with the intention of creating a new state, the model pursued by many ethnic minorities in the twentieth century. Indigenous politics are not about secession, and Indigenous peoples do not seek to create more sovereign states, like Kurdish or Chechen peoples. For the past three centuries, many groups resolved conflicts of legitimacy with the state by seeking to forge new independent states. The Indigenous challenge to the state is very different. Indigenous movements seek not to create a new, independent state but to argue for autonomy with the intent of giving

rise to an entirely different *kind* of politics. In this sense, they aspire not to enter the international community of states but to expand ways of worlding beyond Westphalian rules, to uproot the foundations of the state system itself. Indigenous politics challenge the state's exclusive authority. Indigenous autonomy modifies patterns of legal authority by breaking the self-contained sovereignty of the state and its hegemonic monopoly of exception. States may remain the depositaries of sovereign authority, but legal authority can be redistributed and used by autonomous nations. These nations are not states, but they have autonomous systems of justice that are held accountable to international treaties and rule over their territories. For instance, the state of Ecuador has recognized Indigenous justice and was pressured to implement Convention 169. Yet Ecuador's state has no authority over rulings or procedures of Indigenous jurisdiction, which is a state of exception with the power to make the rules and exceptions to the rule. Indigenous justice is a state of exception *outside* Ecuador's sovereignty. It is precisely in the juridical exception that Indigenous justice gains the most salience to conventional theories of sovereignty—by highlighting that sovereignty is not necessarily singular and exclusive but potentially plural and inclusive.

The recognition of *other* states of exception within the state poses conceptual challenges to standard theories of sovereignty, notably by contesting the assumption of sovereign states as self-contained entities. In a way, the external is located within, the container becomes the contained. Indigenous justice is an operational state of exception to the legal authority of the state, one that escapes the supreme control of sovereignty: the state recognizes Indigenous justice but has no authority *over* it. It implies a redistribution of the authority to exercise justice to nations inside the territory, while remaining political autonomous. This does not entail a decentralization of state law, nor is it the local or subnational practice of national law. Indigenous justice systems as they now exist in Latin America enable de facto states of exception in Agamben's (2005) most fundamental sense. Indigenous politics have the potential to become precisely the sort of global reassemblages posited by Sassen due to their capacity to reconfigure sovereignty.

VERNACULAR SOVEREIGNTIES FROM WITHIN

Indigenous politics give rise to postnational constellations *from below*. Legal authority cannot be the exclusive right of a sovereign, nor is it the monopoly of states. Rather, vernacular sovereignty mutates to incorporate competing authorities. Substate actors rarely challenge the authority of sovereign states. Yet their accountability

to international regimes reinforces postnational assemblages that merit serious consideration if we are to understand the changing silhouette of sovereignty.

Europeanists have approached the reconfiguration of state sovereignty from above, analyzing a relocation of authority from individual nation-states to supranational authorities. The EU orchestrated the progressive explosion of state sovereignty as common institutions replaced state authority to assume jurisdiction over financial policy, currency, and legal codes. The European Court of Justice now has legal authority over national legislation, and national economic policy is now regulated by the European Commission. Habermas (2001) equates the emergence of such supranational institutions with the "disempowerment" of state sovereignty, creating a context in which traditional state actors are losing their ability to make rational decisions to preserve and expand their own power. Others have pointed out that the EU has also made it possible for Europe to deal with externalities arising from globalization (Warleigh-Lack, Robinson, and Rosamond 2011). States are transferring some aspects of their sovereignty, especially legal authority, to institutions *outside* state sovereignty. The EU's multilevel governance with supranational forms of political regulation located *above* state sovereignty thus constitutes a distinctly "post-national constellation" (Habermas 2001, 81).

FIGURE 17. Angelina serves liquor during a family party in Otavalo, 2008.

In Latin America, Indigenous politics point to different postnational constellations developing within states. The formal recognition of Indigenous justice evokes a similar relocation of state authority, not toward supranational but toward autonomous nations located deep inside state territory. Like European supranationalism, Indigenous autonomies do not seek secession from the state but rather reframe the distribution of legal authority. In Ecuador, this process enables pockets of legal autonomy to materialize *within* the state, suggesting an implosion of state sovereignty from below and from within. These dynamics are overlooked in mainstream political science, especially in theoretical debates about the mutability of sovereignty. Yet the recognition of Indigenous justice in Latin America unearths alternative pathways to rethinking the essence of the state and, by extension, the international system.

The consolidation of states of exception *within* disrupts the homogenous morphology of sovereignty. State sovereignty comes to resemble Swiss cheese, riddled with holes that are also called "eyes." The state is riddled with "eyes" in which its sovereignty is suspended by an Indigenous presence. Fragments of sovereignty migrate away from national states and toward local systems of justice. In such legal geographies, Indigenous justice becomes the legal antipode of EU supranationalism. Whereas the EU has provoked reassemblages of legal sovereignty toward supranational institutions, Indigenous justice in Latin America is generating reassemblages of legal sovereignty in extranational political spheres, "eyes" of autonomy within and below the state. Both European supranationalism and Indigenous self-determination stand outside the sovereign state; both constitute different forms of worlding beyond stateness.

I suggest we approach the idea of sovereign "eyes" *within* as a form of vernacular statecraft, a concept Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009) uses to analyze community politics. He examines how local communities in Ecuador adopt state methods of administration to pursue local autonomy. Translating architectural concepts into politics, Colloredo-Mansfeld conceives of vernacular statecraft as ordinary, domestic, and pragmatic rather than monumental. In vernacular architecture, builders appropriate elements of widely used designs by adapting them to local conditions. Similarly, vernacular statecraft constructs itself in its relation to high politics but is focused on the local, being replicable in format and resulting from minimal state intervention. The notion of vernacular statecraft can be transposed to Indigenous women's politics of triangulation: Kichwa women appropriate international norms and adapt them to Indigenous conditions with minimal state intervention. They are not only practicing vernacular statecraft,

since their politics are deeply international, but also creating vernacular sovereignties. They use international norms to assert Indigenous states of exception, engaging the limited participation of the state as a third party.

The term *within* refers to the existence of other sovereignties beyond Westphalia. Native American tribes claim sovereignty over territories within areas of U.S. sovereignty (Deloria and Lytle 1984). *Nations within* indicates a plural understanding of sovereignty that breaks state hegemony while simultaneously reordering the sovereign system of hierarchy. The notion of Indigenous sovereignties has been the object of heated debate among Native scholars and activists. Some reject Westphalian sovereignty as a fundamentally Western practice amounting to a new form of Indigenous assimilation (Alfred 1999). Others advocate post-sovereign citizenship to enable autonomous nations that enact multiple, concurrent, or shared forms of sovereignty within states (Murphy and Harty 2003). More than a question of semantics, these debates are concerned with teasing out new forms of authority and whether to borrow European ideas to frame emerging concepts.

In the Andes, states have enacted concurrent, shared sovereignty in the form of plurinational states. Constitutional reforms in Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009) redefined those countries as plurinational states (Resina de La Fuente 2012; Gustafson 2009), establishing a radical rupture with European schemata of homogeneous nation-states. Bolivia elected an Indigenous president. Ecuador's Constitution has over twenty-five articles defining collective rights, including rights to self-determination and prior consultation for projects on Indigenous territories. Nature became a subject of rights, and Indigenous concepts of sumak kawsay were adopted as a new principle of governance based on living well, or *buen vivir*. The fact that constitutions now recognize the state as comprising a plurality of political nations and validating a diversity of political orders is a constitutional milestone. Unfortunately, plurinationalism has been poorly implemented, seldom going beyond rhetorical invocation. In practice, Andean governments have expanded concessions to extractive industries on Indigenous lands without prior consultation, Indigenous resistance has been criminalized, and Indigenous parties have been sidelined as incompetent.

Since sovereignty is what connects the state and the international system, Native sovereignties invite considerations regarding Indigenous international relations. In the Americas, states have historically asserted a self-arrogated sovereignty to strip Indigenous nations of their independent status (D'Errico 2000). Competing legal authorities coexisted in flexible jurisdictions within the

United States and Australia until the 1820s, when white settlers started claiming legal jurisdiction over Native land through hardening notions of sovereignty (Ford 2010). Since the 1830s, Indian tribes in the United States have been in conflict with the federal government over their status as "domestic dependent nations." Tribes have fought to preserve that understanding of Indian sovereignty, negotiating principles of self-government in the pursuit of complete sovereignty. Yet the U.S. government has maintained contradictory laws that recognize Indian tribes as sovereign nations but preclude them from practicing international affairs. International regimes are filled with similar ambiguities. UNDRIP recognized self-determination but ignored Indigenous sovereignty, notably removing the provision that identified the right of Indigenous peoples to determine their relationship with a state, as opposed to having it forced upon them by the state (White Face 2013). Removing this language deleted one of the most basic reasons for the need for the declaration in the first place: Indigenous peoples' right to coexist with others. This demonstrated how the UN bureaucratic process protects state sovereignty while pushing Indigenous peoples to settle for less—in this case, less sovereignty.

The question is where do Indigenous peoples fit in relation to the political system, whether it is inside, outside, or somewhere else in between. Kevin Bruyneel (2007) approaches Indigenous law as a third space of sovereignty, one that opens alternative political geographies against notions of sovereignty that limit our imagination of the political. The notion of indigeneity as a third space of sovereignty includes overlapping, nonbinary renderings of political life. The nation-state is only one political geography among several (Biolsi 2005). Such perspectives permit us to account for variations in practices of authority, notably modular or shared forms of sovereignty. We can then recognize (and imagine) political rearrangements beyond the state for a less hegemonic distribution of authority. It is precisely because Indigenous forms of governance transcend state-centrism that they are able to abstract sovereignty from its Westphalian limitations.

If sovereignty is defined by the state of exception and that state of exception is the result of specific historical contexts, then there are necessarily different histories–forms of sovereignty to be found in Latin America, especially in the Andes where the Spanish Crown negotiated political borders with Native populations well into the nineteenth century. We need to analyze sovereignty as a by-product of history, especially the colonial history of terra nullius. Sovereignty is never a completed project but a social construction always in process, mutating according to which meanings it acquires and functions it serves.

Kichwa women are bridging Indigenous ways of knowing with political terminologies recognizable by the state. They expanded women's rights from their own communities, protecting Indigenous autonomy and showing that Indigenous politics are not fixed in the past but permanently evolving. In that sense, Kichwa women pushed the "threshold of the political order" (Agamben 1998, 12) and thus of political modernity, challenging sovereignty at its core.

The experiences of Kichwa women in Ecuador illustrate how to detach sovereignty from the state, not from above but from autonomous spaces within. The impact of Indigenous justice on sovereignty points to the need to expand our conception of international relations and where these relations are located. However, Indigenous perspectives are largely invisible in debates about sovereignty, marginalized as "niches" to scholars of Native and Indigenous studies. This invisibility is related to the difficulty of recognizing different political grammars. John Ruggie (1993) suggests that the discipline of international relations does not question whether the system of states may be yielding to other configurations of political space, as it considers no other possible entities in the world system but its own definition of states as unitary actors. If the field of world politics is not good at seeing the possibility of discontinuity in the international system, Indigenous "eyes" can help.

WAYS OF SEEING

Imagining a political realm outside sovereignty is so difficult because we fail to see what our minds cannot apprehend. When Spanish colonizers arrived in the Andes, they did not recognize Inka sacred places (*waka*). Carolyn Dean (2010, 11) describes their consternation at encountering "ugly" Andean idols when they were seeking aesthetically pleasing "art" forms according to familiar standards. Inka waka consisted of natural formations like boulders or mountains, located in nature rather than in opposition to it. Spaniards could not see waka or where they were located because they could not apprehend rocks as Inka culture saw them: animate, transmutable, sentient, and powerful. They could not identify sites of Inka authority because these did not look like their own. There are many more accounts of the inability of settlers to apprehend Indigenous systems of political authority during colonial encounters. Deloria and Lytle (1983) describe European settlers incapable of tracing the source of political authority among

Native Americans; Gunlög Fur (2009) narrates the difficulty of colonial delegates had in accepting Delaware women as diplomatic authorities.

The relevance of Indigenous sovereignties for world politics lies precisely in this inability to see: Indigenous sovereignties are not to be understood as the image of the modern European nation-state. They enact different forms of legal authority, alternative sovereignties at once within the state because of the colonial past and in mediation with it as permanent outsiders. Non-European political orders were silenced during the colonial encounter. Yet they provide insights into non-Western ways of seeing today. Looking for resemblance, Spanish colonizers concealed what they were encountering because they imposed Western perspectives on the Andes (Dean 2010, 172). They did not understand what they encountered and therefore could not see it. That inability to access Inka meaning echoes the larger colonial inability to understand alternative viewpoints. Like those of the Spaniards, contemporary hegemonic narratives of the state seem particularly inept at seeing anything beyond that which resembles the self.

Part of the inability to account for Indigenous dynamics in global politics derives from its otherness. Then as now, the capacity to recognize other ways of knowing is intertwined with formulations of the political self. Vanita Seth (2010) explains the European difficulty in seeing (and representing) difference as stemming from a broader inability to translate the New World into familiar political language. She describes the historical particularity of European representations of the New World that posited historical progress against "tradition" and claimed a modern, individualized form of selfhood in contrast to the collective identities of the Indigenous Americans. Seth (2010, 40) argues that the production of knowledge in the Americas was inherently handicapped "because colonial rule was administered through configurations of power that were themselves fundamentally pre-modern." The "discovery" was severely impaired by the Europeans' inability to convert what they encountered in the New World into accessible language.

State sovereignty is one of the practices that perpetuate a modern political self against Indigenous otherness. Enforcing the Eurocentric civilization's perception, Western thinkers tend to locate non-Western peoples in the European past (Fabian 2002; Helliwell and Hindess 2011). "In the beginning, all the world was America," claimed John Locke in his *Second Treatise of Government* back in 1690. This Western practice of temporalizing difference still permeates world politics today. The non-core is located in subaltern temporalities outside the temporality of the (European) state. A fundamental trait of colonial projects

is to bring the "uncivilized" into present time. British rule over India was tied to British time because to civilize meant, among other things, to bring *others* into European time (Ogle 2015). Contemporary knowledge production is filled with Western semantics of temporality, with economic studies about "emerging" economies and "developing" societies. This temporal dimension created false dichotomies between past and present, giving birth to a defective political thought stuck in the "first in Europe, then elsewhere" mentality (Chakrabarty 2000).

Eurocentric views tend to situate people's space in time, locating "other" people in past times. Peoples outside the temporality of the Westphalian state become peoples without history (Wolf 1982). Places of nature (in contrast to stateness) are relegated to atemporal places beyond history-making. They are still perceived as Locke once saw America, "before politics." This philosophy is contested in the very grammar of Quechua and Aymara, the two most widely spoken Native languages in the Americas, which have one single word to indicate both time *and* space: *pacha*. *Pacha* collapses the "here" into the "now," making time and space two aspects of a single concept. The hegemonic temporality of sovereign states defines present time, leaving that which is "apolitical" outside the pacha (time/place) of the modern state. Indigenous peoples are not only framed as others, but the nonrecognition of their sovereignty restrains them to exist only in the Westphalian past. This partly explains the schizophrenia around recognizing Indigenous peoples as urban and cosmopolitan, as political actors of the international system. In a way, Indigenous subjectivity is the dark matter without which the Westphalian system makes no sense. Dark matter cannot be seen, it is an invisible "missing mass" that holds the universe together and can only be felt through its gravitational effects on visible matter. Similarly, indigeneity is the dark matter that is invisible in mainstream accounts of world politics but which holds the Westphalian sovereignty regime together. We may not be able to see dark matter and states may not be able to see Indigenous politics, but the world as we know could not exist without either. Indigeneity is the essential ingredient.

Indigenous philosophies provide non-Eurocentric ways to analyze world politics and thus merit rigorous consideration in conceptualizations of the state. The challenge of conceptualizing Indigenous sovereignty is at the heart of contemporary understandings of political authority that determine who is allowed to play the sovereignty game and who is excluded for lacking political authority. Indigenous politics disturb the neat spatial containers of sovereignty; it is no

longer possible to separate the realm of the prestate/primitive "known" (and produced) by anthropology from the modern interstate world "known" (and produced) by international relations (Shaw 2008, 83). This theoretical division of labor is rooted in a certain philosophy of history that subjugates other peoples to "superior" European ways of understanding the world. Hegel's (1837) Eurocentric concept of universal history as a rational process excluded the histories of peoples he declared to be without reason. Negroes embodied savagery and lawlessness and did not belong in the camp of humanity (much less world history); Aborigines lived physically and psychically powerless in the land of childhood (America), reflecting Europe's past. Eurocentric philosophies defined European borders for universal history, declaring non-European peoples irrelevant to world politics. Consequently, taking Indigenous politics seriously is fundamental to rescuing political theory from Eurocentric philosophies that constrain our understanding of the international and to opening political theory to the possibility of orders beyond Westphalia.

International politics remain incapable of accurately understanding political configurations that differ from the Western principle of sovereignty. I seek to interweave the analyses of art history, the history of ideas, and the philosophy of history with Kichwa women's advocacy to stress the inability of mainstream political science to acknowledge alternative configurations of the political. The inability to recognize Indigenous women's political practices entails an impoverished understanding of what the political is. I shed light on Kichwa women's struggles in Ecuador not only to acknowledge their complex, autonomous political agency, but also to enable more comprehensive ways of seeing. Just as the Spaniards failed to see value and beliefs systems in Inka rock, our failure to see the international politics at play in Indigenous women's experiences signals a crippled understanding of the world we live in.

Indigeneity continues to epitomize the nonscientific and non-European, marginalized as unreliable and systematically excluded from legitimate processes of knowledge production. Transplanting Seth's notions into contemporary readings of global politics, I suggest that indigeneity is a necessary tool for recognizing the diversity of political configurations differing from Western state-centrism. "It is difficult to speak the language of otherness when the other is virtually absent from the discourse of the self" (Seth 2010, 38). More crucially, leaving Indigenous stories unheard allows past narratives to become the distorted foundations of "scientific" narratives. So the invention of the Indigenous as savage lingers on today in the form of implicit understandings of indigeneity

as outside of "real politics." Indians are not part of history: they appear when we discover them and disappear when we conquer them. Indians only appear in history when they are there to be conquered; they do not exist after the Guerra del Desierto in Argentina or Custer's Last Stand in the United States. Once conquered, they disappear because they are not agents of history. One of the shocks of the twentieth century occurred when Latin American elites discovered that Indigenous peoples had not actually disappeared and were therefore obliged to deal with them as political actors in international organizations and domestic politics. Thinking from marginal locations such as indigeneity permits these silences to be broken.

The philosophy of science has considerable implications for the study of global politics. Patrick T. Jackson (2011) discusses how the rhetorical power of science prioritizes some ways of seeing at the expense of others. The Indigenous was written off from the social sciences as particular and irrational, as the realm of the experiential, and as irremediably subjective, a colonized other irrelevant to (European) rational universalism. Science is deployed as a rhetorical weapon, an authoritative resource to (dis)attribute value. Questions of what is reliable knowledge are tangled up in questions of relevance. Its invocation to censor ways of seeing is like a self-fulfilling prophecy that assigns cultural prestige where "scientists" deem valid. Jackson makes a case for engaged pluralism, for respecting different traditions that are equally valid (and thus equally scientific) and that can contribute to a more informed, comprehensive, and accurate understanding of world politics. Validating storytelling and remembrances as forms of knowing, for instance, enables powerful counter-stories to emerge (Dauphinee 2013; Inayatullah and Dauphinee 2016; Mallon 2011). For instance, the memoirs of Mapuche feminist Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef (2002) show the internal crisis and conflicts of an Indigenous movement in permanent negotiation with a dominant and oppressive Chilean society. While testimonial literature makes no claims at objectivity, it can complement subaltern perspectives often left out of national history. Methodology matters because it influences research outcomes, and research in turn shapes policy. It is the reason why Indigenous forms of inquiry insist on community research as a methodology, integrating narratives from Indigenous researchers and stressing territoriality as a crux of tribal methodologies (Kovach 2010). Values and positionality are embedded within inquiry, and alternative forms of conceptual thinking on sovereignty should not be hierarchized. The decolonization of knowledge, called for by scholars across the social sciences, requires the ability to dialogue from different perspectives.

Indigenous ways of seeing may allow us to recognize how the rhetoric of state modernity itself creates coloniality (Mignolo 2005). Legal sovereignty is deeply anchored in a colonial matrix of power that first renamed and appropriated land and enslaved peoples across the Western hemisphere, then imposed its own political framework in the form of state sovereignty to justify its power. The political practice of colonialism vanished in the second half of the twentieth century, but colonial logics remain core organizers of world politics. The principle of sovereignty, in particular, perpetuates the modern/nonmodern divide. I shed light on the political significance of Indigenous women in Ecuador not only to make the political margins visible, but also to suggest that they are constitutive of the state and have the ability to redefine its foundations. As Indigenous women's politics challenge the assumed contours of sovereignty, they force discussions on the very ontology of state authority. They bring a refreshing disorder because they are not simply replacing authorities within an existing framework but challenging the framework itself, inviting diversities that resist universalisms and depend on situated knowledge. Ultimately, it is not only the international sovereignty regime they challenge, but its very epistemology.

The longstanding tradition that equates knowing with seeing in the philosophy of science made it impossible for the Spaniards to understand and appreciate Inka rock. What happens to the things we do not see? The value of seeing Indigenous experiences is not merely in righting historical wrongs but in exploring the epistemological resources of an indigeneity too often erased as peripheral for thinking the international.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous world views offer insights for thinking differently about sovereignty and international politics, for breaking with disciplinary silences, and for moving beyond state-centrism. They form a valuable category of analysis because they rescue stories deemed irrelevant and left invisible in hegemonic narratives of global politics. The politics of Kichwa women are unique in their articulation of three legal systems to guarantee accountability. They invoke international treaties to pressure Indigenous institutions, using the state as an external referee. Their position is distinct from postcolonial perspectives that refuse to advance Indigenous rights through state institutions. Kichwa women pursue a multidirectional politics that tackle coercive practices in both state and Indigenous

politics and in the process successfully provincialize the state. Their experience is an important step toward affirming nonexclusive forms of sovereignty, thereby challenging the international status quo. These experiences constitute vernacular sovereignties that decompose and reassemble the state. They invite decolonial eyes to see unforeseen epistemologies within and beyond states.

Indigenous politics are significant for state sovereignty along several lines. First, a tri/alogue of legal accountability is at play across political borders and scales of governance among Indigenous law, international human rights norms, and national law. Such legal triangulation entails a relocation of legal authority, creating vernacular sovereignties. Second, vernacular sovereignties within the state show ways of expanding the form and meanings of sovereignty. The existence of sovereignties within invites further research exploring concepts of sovereignties as plural and differentiated.

The experience of Indigenous women signals the need for further research taking context into account to understand the variety of forms that can be attached to sovereignty. As Hannah Arendt (1963, 141) points out, "No revolution ever succeeded; few rebellions ever started, so long as the authority of the body politic was truly intact." It is because law is power—*potestas legibus soluta*—that the pursuit of Indigenous autonomies proposed across the Americas seeks to uproot established colonial models of sovereignty inherited from European experiences.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. The region of Amazonia was named after the Amazons, the fierce warrior women who dwelled on the fringes of the known world in ancient Greece. The Greek word *a-mazon* means "without breast," following the legend saying they cut off one breast to improve their archery skills (Mayor 2015).
2. Although its electoral success diminished after 2000, Pachakutik remains a powerful voice of contestation in national politics (Becker 2010b).
3. The symbolic presidential inauguration in Zumbahua with Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales was a charade more than a genuine celebration of Indigenous peoples—most of whom were barred from their own town square—or their movement since Pachakutik decided against an alliance with Correa (Martínez Novo 2009). President Correa was not expressing support for Ecuador's originary peoples as much as searching for legitimacy beyond them. He used Indigenous symbols to portray himself as a leader for social justice and against neoliberalism to the global media, addressing a broad, global constituency.
4. *Sumak kawsay*, the Andean principle of sustainable relations between people and nature, has generated international debate in development theory. It has become the fundamental purpose of Ecuador's policy since the 2008 Constitution, but critics say the concept has been abused and appropriated, losing its original intent to promote neoliberal development (Caria and Dominguez 2016; Chuji 2009; Walsh 2010).
5. The exception are the Sami peoples, who live in an Arctic area spreading across Russia, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The Sami long lived beyond the fringes of Europe; the borders of the EU have now expanded onto their lands.

6. Political database of the Americas, 2006, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/IndigenousPeoples/demographics.html, accessed March 7, 2016.

CHAPTER 1

1. In 2017 the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs officially listed 567 recognized tribes (variously called tribes, nations, bands, pueblos, communities, and Native villages). According to the National Congress of American Indians, about 230 of these diverse nations are in Alaska; the other federally recognized tribes are in thirty-three other states. In addition, there are state-recognized tribes throughout the United States.
2. In 2008 CEPAL organized an international workshop called "2010 Censuses and the Inclusion of an Ethnic Focus: Towards a Participative Construction with Indigenous and Afro-descendent Peoples of Latin America." It gathered government actors to discuss methodologies to elaborate ethnic indicators, stirring collective momentum with the support of UNICEF, UNIFEM, the UN Population Fund, the World Health Organization, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, and the Fondo Indígena.
3. The motto translates to "We are all Indigenous."
4. Latin America has had forty-five racial censuses from 1850 to 1950. Only since the 1950s do national censuses rely on self-identification for racial classification (Loveman 2009).
5. The gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations is increasing in Guatemala. Poverty among Indigenous peoples was stable at 80 percent between 2003 and 2010, whereas poverty among the non-Indigenous population diminished significantly from 54 percent to 40 percent (Minority Rights Group International 2011).
6. Chimborazo has 17.6 percent of Ecuador's total Indigenous population. Only the provinces of Napo and Morona-Santiago, in the Amazon region, have higher proportions of Indigenous peoples (56.1 percent and 41.3 percent, respectively), but because they are low-density regions (representing 5 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, of the total Indigenous population) they gather a smaller Indigenous population in absolute terms.
7. Data are lacking for Indigenous health in most of the world: reports are irregular and often elaborated by civil society. Brazil, for instance, conducted its First National Survey of Indigenous People's Health and Nutrition in in 2008–9 across 113 villages.
8. Macas, a small Amazonian town of thirteen thousand inhabitants, recorded sixty-nine HIV-positive individuals in 2013. Indigenous women are infected by their husbands, and many only learn they are infected during pregnancy checkups. Less than 4 percent of them were tested, and most transmitted the virus when giving birth. Disinformation about HIV increases marginalization and limits prevention; rarely, individuals seek treatment in Cuenca, which is seven hours away. See Yépez 2016.
9. Montúbios are the peasants who inhabit Ecuador's coastal countryside. In 2001 the government acknowledged Montúbio as an ethnic identity and officially recog-

nized the Council for the Development of the Montubio People of the Ecuadorian Coast and Subtropical Zones of the Littoral Region.

10. In 2002 women's presence in Congress barely surpassed 15 percent (Ugalde 2005). The law of alternation and sequence has been partially implemented by the Electoral Supreme Court and left up to the interpretation of political parties after complaints and legal pursuit from the women's movement.
11. See http://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/sociedad/onu-mujeres-condena-los-hechos-de-acoso-y-violencia-politica-contra-concejalas-378203.
12. The participation in the levantamientos boosted the self-esteem of many Indigenous people, especially women, who identified their politicization in these events, as small as it might have been, as a turning point in their roles within the community and the family (Claudia Vega, interview with the author, January 2006).
13. Information collected with La Minga, Riobamba (November 2005), and First Police Station for Women and the Family, Riobamba (January 2006).
14. Interviews with women in rural Chimborazo, February 2005.
15. Although most women do not have recourse to a police station, the First Police Station for Women and Families in Riobamba recorded an average of eleven victims per day in January 2006. Data collected by the author.
16. Flor Catucho, interview with the author, June 2014.
17. After 2014, comisarías de la mujer were relabeled *juzgados de violencia intrafamiliar*.
18. "Chumadito" is a Kichwa expression referring to someone who is inebriated.
19. See http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/01/06/nota/5981602/cada-32-horas-se-registra-femicidio-albores-2017.
20. Three police reports were filed at Riobamba's comisaría de la mujer, Chimborazo, on January 24 (182/06), February 7 (268/06), and October 18, 2006 (2141/06), respectively.
21. Police report 268/06 (Riobamba, Chimborazo). The text declares that community leaders, together with sixty-five heads of household, can solve the conjugal differences with the parties in "the most humane and natural" fashion in Kichwa.
22. ILO 169 guarantees the recognition, protection, and respect of Indigenous institutions. Article 191 of Ecuador's 1998 Constitution recognized "the authority of Indigenous peoples in exercising functions of justice, according to [their] own justice and customary justice."
23. Mariana Yumbay (judge, Criminal Traffic Guarantees, Bolívar Province), interview with the author, June 14, 2010.
24. About a third of comisarías are in Guayaquil (four), Quito (three), and Cuenca (two). The provinces of Cotopaxi, Napo, Morona Santiago, Galapagos, and Santa Helena had no comisarías.

CHAPTER 2

Epigraph: Simone Amado, from the Terena peoples in Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil, is a leader and a scholar who participated in the UN women's project A Voz das Mulheres Indigenas. See ONU Mulheres Brasil 2015.

1. Micaela Bastidas (1744–81), who armed the resistance and was crucial in the Tinta Rebellion, was the daughter of Afro-descendent Manuel Bastidas and Josefa Puyucawa.
2. Gonzalo Lamana (2008) revisited the encounter between Spanish colonizers and Inka elites to break with taxonomies that replicate the mystifying tale of impotent Indians facing all-powerful colonizers.
3. Camilla Townsend (2006) contextualizes the life of Malintzin, the woman who became the translator and alleged mistress of Hernán Cortés during his effort to conquer Mexico, showing the complexity of her choices as a young slave in a time of conquest instead of portraying her as a hero or traitor Ackerman and Klein 2000).
4. Kurakas were the highest ranked political and administrative authorities in precolonial governance.
5. A *tupo* is a traditional metal pin or adorned brooch that Indigenous women wear to keep wool shawls tight around their shoulders.
6. Delfin Tenesaca, interview with the author, June 2017.
7. Steve Stern (1982) suggests that Indians' struggles within Spanish courts won them rights but also weakened their capacity to radically challenge colonial structures, thus ironically contributing to colonial dominance.
8. Testimony of Neptalí Ulcuango, Indigenous leader and founder of Pesillo's bilingual school, 1946 (Reinoso 2004). In 1931 thousands of Indigenous peoples converging at Cayambe for the first congress of peasant organizations were banned from gathering for not being citizens. The state sent in military troops to shut down the congress and arrested organizers, blocking roads of access to impede further participants from reaching Cayambe (Becker 2003).
9. Blomberg Archives, 1969, interview on film, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gRbrjYoQA0.
10. The term *patrón* (boss) refers to large estate owners and holds a strong class connotation. Indigenous elders in the highlands still use the honorific *patrón* to address people considered to be a higher social class.
11. Nela Martínez joined the Communist Party in 1934 and became Ecuador's first woman elected to Congress in 1945. She was a strong defender of Indigenous rights. She edited the *Ñucanchic Allpa* newspaper for FEI and worked closely with Dolores Cacuango and Luisa Gómez de la Torre in Indian struggles and bilingual education programs (Martínez 2005).
12. In 1988 Executive Decree 203 amended the General Regulation of the Education Act and institutionalized intercultural education as bilingual. The National Indigenous Intercultural Bilingual Education was underfunded but had a level of autonomy unique in Latin America. Indigenous communities oversaw the nomination of educational authorities, the hiring of teachers, and curriculum design, but a lack of resources undermined the quality of education. In 2012 bilingual schools counted 163,000 students and 6,000 teachers; bilingual schools were most prevalent in Chimborazo with 24,000 students (www.andes.info.ec/es/sociedad/

9283.html). But the standardization of education virtually abolished Indigenous education by 2017. Most Indigenous schools did not meet standards imposed by a new Organic Law of Higher Education and were forced to close. The Indigenous University Amawta Wasi was forced into clandestinity.

13. Tránsito Amaguaña Alba, interview with the author, 2007.
14. *Choza* is a Spanish word with pejorative connotations that refers to hutlike, usually poor, houses built of traditional adobe walls with roofs of straw.
15. *Machica* (barley flour) is a traditional food from the Andean highlands. This starchy food was common during the huasipungo and remains central to the diet of Indigenous elders.
16. Juana Morocho, interview with the author, August 11, 2013.
17. Blanca Chancoso, interview with the author, August 2013.
18. Development funds from Norway enabled the school to operate on a more regular basis after 1998.
19. Pachakutik members were elected for the office of governor in the following five provinces: Chimborazo, Zamora, Orellana, Cotopaxi, and Morona Santiago.
20. Indigenous women in national and regional positions of leadership, interviews with the author, January 2006 and December 2007; elected female officials in the sector of Flores, Chimborazo, interviews with the author, November 2005.
21. "If you are a *compañera*, you must share everything."
22. Many national female leaders are single. Some have children and others not, but many have never married. There is a clear trade-off between having a conjugal life and becoming engaged in politics. Although these leaders are engaged in their political careers, the personal costs are extremely high and difficult to live with (Claudia Vega, interview with the author, January 2006).
23. The high levels of migration are promoting changes in this male-dominated voting system, as women become the heads of families and replace them in the voting sessions.
24. Despite their traditional absence from decision-making arenas in the communities, women increasingly replace their husbands who migrate to the cities (CESA 1993; Tránsito Chela [CONMIE delegate], interview with the author, January 2006; Naula family, interviews with the author, 2006).
25. AIM, a prominent Red Power urban group founded in 1968 and inspired by the Black Panther Party, called attention to police harassment with actions like the seventy-one-day Wounded Knee Occupation in 1973. WARN initially worked on reproductive rights and land treaties, intersectional politics that combine feminist concern with self-determination (Hightower-Langston 2003, 328).
26. Tránsito Chela (CONMIE coordinator), interviews with the author, January 2006.
27. The harassment and aggression suffered by the founders of the organization were also reported at the local level, in the province of Cañar, against women who participated in meetings. Their number has now decreased substantially.
28. The agrarian reform distributed, often sold, land to Indigenous peoples, but most parcels were less fertile lands higher in the Andes.

29. The year 1978 marked the transition to democracy, when the military junta accepted the return of a civilian to government. Jaime Roldós (1979–81), a young politician committed to human rights, was elected president.
30. Naula family, interviews with the author, March 2006.
31. The first woman to formally exercise the right to vote in Latin America was Matilde Hidalgo de Procel, who successfully registered to vote in Loja, southern Ecuador, in 1924. The country's 1929 Constitution establishes that men and women who are literate can exercise the right to vote (Prieto and Goetschel 2008).

CHAPTER 3

1. A *chalina* is a wool shawl.
2. In Colombia, *resguardos* are autonomous territories managed by Indigenous peoples. The Indigenous Guard protects the territory, operating on a voluntary basis with men and women of all ages. The guard is a respected authority providing security in a context of civil war. In 2013 about thirty thousand Indigenous guards defended communities from guerrillas and paramilitaries across Colombia. Over one hundred guards secured the Abya Yala summit.
3. Activist Berta Cáceres was coordinator of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras and led the Lenca resistance against the hydroelectric project Agua Zarca. She was assassinated in her home on March 2, 2016. An investigation by an international group of human rights lawyers reported that her murder was plotted months in advance by the private dam corporation DESA with the support of high-ranked offificials from the government of Honduras (GAIPE 2017).
4. In 2011 over fifteen hundred people joined a 375-mile trek from the Amazon lowlands to La Paz to protest the construction of a road through the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park, a national park and an autonomous territory held in common by the Yuracaré, Moxeño, and Chiman peoples. President Morales labeled Indigenous protesters "enemies of the nation" and sent police forces to brutally repress the march. Civil society and the UN have insistently called for state accountability for the crimes of what is known as the Chaparina Repression.
5. In 1954 huasipungo families comprised 22 percent of Ecuador's rural population, and land labor relations were similar or worse than during the colonial period (Becker 1997, 111)
6. The Colombian state recognized Indigenous justice but had no control over rural areas controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Indigenous areas such as the Valle del Cauca and La Guajira spent decades beyond governmental control; some communities developed their own policing systems. Indigenous justice could have been a type of government proxy in areas beyond reach.
7. The Ecuadorian government ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1998.

8. Eight indigenous members are appointed by the president of the council, following consultation with regional groups and Indigenous organizations, whereas the other eight members are nominated by governments and elected by the council.
9. Deloria (1974) sees treaties as legal mechanisms for colonial expansion in North America. Ned Blackhawk (2006), in contrast, argues that treaty diplomacy presupposed relations of force with rituals of violence in the American West.
10. Deloria's seminal book *God is Red* (1972) tackled the language used by Pope Alexander VI in the 1493 bull. Newcomb (2008) argues that the chosen people doctrine is at the core of U.S. federal Indian law.
11. Zarakol (2012) discusses the role of cartography in the production of a scientific knowledge that builds the international order by stigmatizing rather than socializing. Bryan and Wood (2015) argue that maps play an indispensable role in contemporary Indigenous efforts to secure land rights.

CHAPTER 4

1. The Chimborazo Network of Kichwa and Rural Women Organizations was founded in 2005.
2. CEDAW, adopted in 1979 by the UN, is globally recognized as the women's bill of rights.
3. CEDIS collaborated for years with REDCH to improve the situation of rural Kichwa women in the highlands of Chimborazo and managed a project called Escuela Itinerante de los Derechos de la Mujer in the Consejo de Pueblos Indígenas de Chimborazo.
4. Cucuri graduated with a master's degree in December 2015. In 2016 she was elected coordinator of territories and environmental issues at ECUARUNARI (2016–19).
5. Cristina Cucuri, interview with the author, 2008.
6. The Zapatista Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación or EZLN) distributed the pamphlets titled "The Mexican Awakening" in January 1994.
7. UNDRIP treats gender as a vulnerability, stating that "particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities" (art 21.2).
8. Declaration by Pachakutik legislator Mauro Andino.
9. The anako is a long wool skirt Indigenous women traditionally wear in Ecuador's central and northern highlands.
10. Cristina Cucuri, interviews with the author, 2009, 2013, and 2015.
11. It was the assistant of Pachakutik legislator Mauro Andino who questioned the civil status of Kichwa women, implying that to have credibility women must be "decent," that is, married and mothers.
12. The Committee on Justice and Corruption was composed of thirteen legislators, eight of whom represented the governing party Alianza País.
13. Emphasis added by the author
14. Cristina Cucuri, interview with the author, 2008.

15. Ceviche is a dish of raw seafood marinated in citrus juice that is popular in coastal regions of the Andes. This dish, served in fishing villages, contrasts with the quinoa traditionally served in the highlands.
16. Cristina Cucuri, interview with the author, 2009 and 2013.
17. Preamble, 2003 Constitution of Rwanda.
18. These are laws or amendments requiring that women constitute a certain percentage of party candidates in elections. Eleven out of nineteen countries approved gender quota systems in legal or constitutional form between 1996 and 2000; Argentina pioneered this approach in 1991 (Htun 2016).
19. The Americas led the world in promoting women's presence in parliaments (25.7 percent), second only to Nordic countries (42.0 percent), despite the low ranking of the United States (18.3 percent). See Women in Parliaments, http://www.ipu.org.
20. Cristina Cucuri, interview with the author, 2010.
21. The "influence" thesis arguing that the Iroquois Confederacy served as a model for American democracy generated intense academic denial. Bruce E. Johansen's decade-long battle with deniers signals the extent of academic resistance in admitting Indigenous contributions to the construction of the U.S. political democracy.

GLOSSARY

ABYA YALA—Abya Yala refers to the continent of the Americas in the language of Kuna peoples. It can be translated as "land in its full maturity" or "land of vital blood." The concept emerged toward the end of the 1970s in the Kuna territory of Dulenega, Panama, when Kuna activists won a lawsuit to stop the construction of a shopping mall: they employed the term *Abya Yala* to refer to the American continent in its totality (Escalante 2014). Since the 1980s, Indigenous movements increasingly refer to the Americas as Abya Yala, enacting an Indigenous locus of cultural and political expression to decolonize epistemologies (Muyolema 2001).

HUASIPUNGO—Huasipungo was a forced labor system consisting of a land-labor exchange in which landowners coerced Indian laborers into debt bondage. The Kichwa term means "house door" because the *pungo* used to sleep on the threshold of the door (*punku* in Kichwa), a linguistic connotation that indicates the servility of the position. In Ecuador, the word refers specifically to the small subsistence plots of land granted to Indians in exchange for their labor. The term was made famous in Jorge Icaza's 1934 novel *Huasipungo*, which portrays the violent exploitation of Indians until Ecuador's 1963 agrarian reform (Becker and Tutillo 2009; Lyons 2006; O'Connor 2007).

INTERLEGALITY—The term refers to the interaction among different legal systems and the porosity of multiple legal orders, in which legal

spaces are superimposed and interpenetrated. It is often used to refer to a legal interchange between state law and indigenous law.

INTERSECTIONALITY—Intersectionality is a feminist sociological theory first highlighted by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989). Feminist scholars argued that gender, race, and class are interconnected as "intersecting oppressions" (Crenshaw 1989). The theory recognized that there were important differences among women and men rather than simply between them.

MESTIZO—A Spanish term (from the Latin *mixtus*) that refers to the interethnic mixing since the sixteenth century in the Americas. A mestizo is usually a person of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry, although the social construction of this racial marker has changed over time (De la Cadena 2005).

SUMAK KAWSAY—This Kichwa expression translated as "buen vivir" in Spanish, or "good living" in English, is a core notion of Andean philosophy that refers to harmonious relations of reciprocity among humans and nature. It expresses respectful interactions with the biosphere; its ethic of sustainability and equilibrium contrasts with extractive profit and accumulation. The idea of sumak kawsay was inscribed in Ecuador's 2008 Constitution and adopted as a transversal axis of public policy across ministries.

TERRA NULLIUS—The notion of terra nullius, or no one's land, was the basis for the doctrine of discovery. This doctrine was based on a bull from the eleventh century that legitimized the crusades into Palestine: lands occupied by "barbarous nations" were considered empty wastelands that Christian colonizers should bring to faith. In 1492 and 1493, Pope Alexander VI issued four bulls establishing a Christian "law of nations" and encouraging the conquest of the New World. The Inter Caetera bulls "granted" Spain and Portugal the right to conquer discovered lands in the Americas if they were not under Christian faith. Terra nullius invented spaces without sovereign authority to justify European colonial invasions, shaping the formation of international law.

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